The internal and external centralisation of Capital Markets Union regulatory structures: the case of Central Counterparties

The aim of this chapter is to study if, how and to what extent the recent reforms of the regulatory framework for central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs) have led to a centralisation of the supervisory authority over the EU financial sector. The reform of the CCP regulation, known as the Europea...

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Tipo de recurso:
Part of book
Fecha de publicación:
2020
Institución:
Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano
Repositorio:
Expeditio: repositorio UTadeo
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:expeditiorepositorio.utadeo.edu.co:20.500.12010/15430
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/15430
Palabra clave:
Centralisation of capital markets
Mercado de capitales
Instituciones financieras
Mercado monetario
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dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv The internal and external centralisation of Capital Markets Union regulatory structures: the case of Central Counterparties
title The internal and external centralisation of Capital Markets Union regulatory structures: the case of Central Counterparties
spellingShingle The internal and external centralisation of Capital Markets Union regulatory structures: the case of Central Counterparties
Centralisation of capital markets
Mercado de capitales
Instituciones financieras
Mercado monetario
title_short The internal and external centralisation of Capital Markets Union regulatory structures: the case of Central Counterparties
title_full The internal and external centralisation of Capital Markets Union regulatory structures: the case of Central Counterparties
title_fullStr The internal and external centralisation of Capital Markets Union regulatory structures: the case of Central Counterparties
title_full_unstemmed The internal and external centralisation of Capital Markets Union regulatory structures: the case of Central Counterparties
title_sort The internal and external centralisation of Capital Markets Union regulatory structures: the case of Central Counterparties
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv Centralisation of capital markets
topic Centralisation of capital markets
Mercado de capitales
Instituciones financieras
Mercado monetario
dc.subject.lemb.spa.fl_str_mv Mercado de capitales
Instituciones financieras
Mercado monetario
description The aim of this chapter is to study if, how and to what extent the recent reforms of the regulatory framework for central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs) have led to a centralisation of the supervisory authority over the EU financial sector. The reform of the CCP regulation, known as the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) was part of the Capital Markets Union (CMU) project. The CMU is a package of regulatory reforms unveiled in 2015 as one of the flagship projects of the Juncker Commission. It has the ambitious goal of deepening, integrating and diversifying the EU financial market, focusing in particular on non-banking segments like bond issuance, corporate bond securitisation, public equity investment, venture capital and credit intermediation by specialised non-bank financial firms (i.e. leasing companies and consumer finance companies) (Quaglia et al. 2016). Implementation of the various CMU proposals has indeed led to a reshaping of the regulatory framework for many financial activities, marking a landmark moment in EU financial regulation. At the same time, this regulatory activity has been contentious, as it has required strengthened cross-border intra-EU and extra-EU regulatory and supervisory cooperation. This is particularly true for the regulation of CCPs, which – as market infrastructure – are a key node of internal market integration, making them an ideal vantage point from which to study regulatory and supervisory centralisation in a horizontal and vertical perspective (Smoleńska 2017).
publishDate 2020
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-11-05T15:54:05Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-11-05T15:54:05Z
dc.date.created.none.fl_str_mv 2020
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dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/15430
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/15430
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
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dc.rights.local.spa.fl_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
rights_invalid_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.extent.spa.fl_str_mv 27 páginas
dc.format.mimetype.spa.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Elgar
institution Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano
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spelling 2020-11-05T15:54:05Z2020-11-05T15:54:05Z2020http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/15430The aim of this chapter is to study if, how and to what extent the recent reforms of the regulatory framework for central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs) have led to a centralisation of the supervisory authority over the EU financial sector. The reform of the CCP regulation, known as the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) was part of the Capital Markets Union (CMU) project. The CMU is a package of regulatory reforms unveiled in 2015 as one of the flagship projects of the Juncker Commission. It has the ambitious goal of deepening, integrating and diversifying the EU financial market, focusing in particular on non-banking segments like bond issuance, corporate bond securitisation, public equity investment, venture capital and credit intermediation by specialised non-bank financial firms (i.e. leasing companies and consumer finance companies) (Quaglia et al. 2016). Implementation of the various CMU proposals has indeed led to a reshaping of the regulatory framework for many financial activities, marking a landmark moment in EU financial regulation. At the same time, this regulatory activity has been contentious, as it has required strengthened cross-border intra-EU and extra-EU regulatory and supervisory cooperation. This is particularly true for the regulation of CCPs, which – as market infrastructure – are a key node of internal market integration, making them an ideal vantage point from which to study regulatory and supervisory centralisation in a horizontal and vertical perspective (Smoleńska 2017).27 páginasapplication/pdfengElgarCentralisation of capital marketsMercado de capitalesInstituciones financierasMercado monetarioThe internal and external centralisation of Capital Markets Union regulatory structures: the case of Central CounterpartiesAbierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_3248Bulfone, FabioSmoleńska, AgnieszkaORIGINAL[9781839101113 - Governing Finance in Europe] The internal and external centralisation of Capital Markets Union regulatory structures_ the case of Central Counterparties.pdf[9781839101113 - Governing Finance in Europe] The internal and external centralisation of Capital Markets Union regulatory structures_ the case of Central Counterparties.pdfVer capítuloapplication/pdf326239https://expeditiorepositorio.utadeo.edu.co/bitstream/20.500.12010/15430/1/%5b9781839101113%20-%20Governing%20Finance%20in%20Europe%5d%20The%20internal%20and%20external%20centralisation%20of%20Capital%20Markets%20Union%20regulatory%20structures_%20the%20case%20of%20Central%20Counterparties.pdfc281b05214f9acbe6119cbaf022c35caMD51open accessLICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; 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