Kant on Empirical and Transcendental Functions of Memory

This paper analyses the features of Kant’s view of memory, which Kant himself described explicitly in his lectures on anthropology and implicitly in the A edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. I shall offer a review of literature on Kant’s view of memory up to this day. I suggest that memory is a...

Full description

Autores:
Pacheco Acosta, Héctor Luis
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2020
Institución:
Universidad Simón Bolívar
Repositorio:
Repositorio Digital USB
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:bonga.unisimon.edu.co:20.500.12442/6939
Acceso en línea:
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12442/6939
http://dx.doi.org/10.14482/eidos.32.193
http://rcientificas.uninorte.edu.co/index.php/eidos/article/view/11704
Palabra clave:
Kant
Memory
Cognition
Imagination
Experience
Memoria
Conocimiento
Imaginación
Experiencia
Rights
openAccess
License
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
Description
Summary:This paper analyses the features of Kant’s view of memory, which Kant himself described explicitly in his lectures on anthropology and implicitly in the A edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. I shall offer a review of literature on Kant’s view of memory up to this day. I suggest that memory is a cognitive faculty that has the power to store and reproduce representations. Kant distinguishes among three different kinds of memorization which are relevant for human cognition. I offer reasons to hold that imagination and memory must be differentiated by their functioning, although the first one grounds the second one. Finally, I hold that certain functions of memory need to be presupposed at a transcendental level, in which memory would play a fundamental function with regard to the possibility of experience