Practical Reason, Habit, and Care in Aristotle

(Eng) Interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of action in the last few decades has tended toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by the revival of anti-intellectualism (particularly from J. Moss’ work), according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. In this essay I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and propose an intermediate account, which I call indirect intellectualism, that preserves the merits of both traditional interpretations and is able to dispel the problems that trouble each. There is very strong textual evidence for the claim that goal-setting is the task not of reason but of character (and in this anti-intellectualists are right); but reason is able to set goals indirectly by carefully shaping the processes of habituation that constitute a person’s character (and in this intellectualists are right). I argue for this position through a study of the division of labour between character and reason, and through a reconstruction of Aristotle’s conception of habituation.

• Autores: Bermúdez, Juan Pablo
• Tipo de recurso: Article of journal
• Fecha de publicación: 2016
• Institución: Universidad del Valle
• Repositorio: Repositorio Digital Univalle
• Idioma: eng
• OAI Identifier: oai:bibliotecadigital.univalle.edu.co:10893/18884
• Acceso en línea: https://hdl.handle.net/10893/18884
• Palabra clave: Acción; Control; Hábito; Razón; Cuidado; Action; Control; Habit; Reason; Care
• Rights: closedAccess
• License: http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb