A note on risk-sharing mechanisms for the colombian health insurance system

We evaluate, in terms of efficiency and selection incentives, four different ex post risk sharing mecha-nisms. Outlier risk sharing (ORS), proportional risk sharing (PRS), risk sharing for high costs (RSHC)and risk sharing for high risks. Our results suggest that the best mechanism in terms of their...

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Autores:
Riascos Villegas, Álvaro José
Camelo Gómez, Sergio Armando
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2017
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8718
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8718
Palabra clave:
Risk adjustment
Risk selection
Efficiency
Seguros de salud - Colombia - Evaluación
Evaluación de riesgos
Evaluación de riesgos contra la salud - Colombia
I11, I13, I18, C45, C55
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A note on risk-sharing mechanisms for the colombian health insurance system
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv Una nota sobre mecanismos de riesgo compartido en el sistema de aseguramiento de salud en Colombia
title A note on risk-sharing mechanisms for the colombian health insurance system
spellingShingle A note on risk-sharing mechanisms for the colombian health insurance system
Risk adjustment
Risk selection
Efficiency
Seguros de salud - Colombia - Evaluación
Evaluación de riesgos
Evaluación de riesgos contra la salud - Colombia
I11, I13, I18, C45, C55
title_short A note on risk-sharing mechanisms for the colombian health insurance system
title_full A note on risk-sharing mechanisms for the colombian health insurance system
title_fullStr A note on risk-sharing mechanisms for the colombian health insurance system
title_full_unstemmed A note on risk-sharing mechanisms for the colombian health insurance system
title_sort A note on risk-sharing mechanisms for the colombian health insurance system
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Riascos Villegas, Álvaro José
Camelo Gómez, Sergio Armando
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Riascos Villegas, Álvaro José
Camelo Gómez, Sergio Armando
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv Risk adjustment
Risk selection
Efficiency
topic Risk adjustment
Risk selection
Efficiency
Seguros de salud - Colombia - Evaluación
Evaluación de riesgos
Evaluación de riesgos contra la salud - Colombia
I11, I13, I18, C45, C55
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv Seguros de salud - Colombia - Evaluación
Evaluación de riesgos
Evaluación de riesgos contra la salud - Colombia
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv I11, I13, I18, C45, C55
description We evaluate, in terms of efficiency and selection incentives, four different ex post risk sharing mecha-nisms. Outlier risk sharing (ORS), proportional risk sharing (PRS), risk sharing for high costs (RSHC)and risk sharing for high risks. Our results suggest that the best mechanism in terms of their impliedefficiency selection trade off are, risk sharing for high costs and risk sharing for high risks. In general,outlier risk sharing has a poor performance. Our results are robust with respect to different scenariosfor ex ante risk adjustment or incentives for efficiency and selection based on expected or realized costs.We believe that the most realistic scenario analysed is one in which insurance companies use expectedreimbursements and costs as their best source of information (signal) to decide on efficiency and selectiontrade-offs. In this case, we found that risk sharing of high risks dominates all other mechanisms.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2017
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:56:18Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:56:18Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
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dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 1657-5334
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8718
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv 1657-7191
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.57784/1992/8718
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad de los Andes
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca
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identifier_str_mv 1657-5334
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url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8718
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv Documentos CEDE No. 30 Abril de 2017
dc.relation.repec.spa.fl_str_mv https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/015604.html
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eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv 14 páginas
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
institution Universidad de los Andes
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spelling Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Riascos Villegas, Álvaro José10110600Camelo Gómez, Sergio Armandoca3655e6-c679-44e5-a9b4-b255a1f774ce6002018-09-27T16:56:18Z2018-09-27T16:56:18Z20171657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/87181657-719110.57784/1992/8718instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/We evaluate, in terms of efficiency and selection incentives, four different ex post risk sharing mecha-nisms. Outlier risk sharing (ORS), proportional risk sharing (PRS), risk sharing for high costs (RSHC)and risk sharing for high risks. Our results suggest that the best mechanism in terms of their impliedefficiency selection trade off are, risk sharing for high costs and risk sharing for high risks. In general,outlier risk sharing has a poor performance. Our results are robust with respect to different scenariosfor ex ante risk adjustment or incentives for efficiency and selection based on expected or realized costs.We believe that the most realistic scenario analysed is one in which insurance companies use expectedreimbursements and costs as their best source of information (signal) to decide on efficiency and selectiontrade-offs. In this case, we found that risk sharing of high risks dominates all other mechanisms.En este trabajo evaluamos, en términos de eficiencia y selección de riesgos, cuatro mecanismos de ajuste de riesgo compartido. Riesgo compartido de costos atípicos, riesgo compartido proporcional, riesgos compartidos de costos altos y riesgos compartidos de riesgos altos. Nuestros resultados sugieren que los mejores mecanismos en términos de los incentivos que generan a la eficiencia y selección de riesgos, son los mecanismos de riesgos compartidos de costos altos y riesgos compartidos de riesgos altos. En general, el mecanismo de riesgos compartidos de costos atípicos tiene el peor desempeño. Nuestros resultados son robustos a diferentes formas de pago ex ante o, incentivos estimados utilizando los costos y beneficios esperados de las aseguradoras. El caso más realista que consideramos es uno en el que las aseguradoras basan sus acciones en los reembolsos y costos esperados como su mejor fuente de información para ponderar sus incentivos a la eficiencia y selección. En este caso encontramos que el mecanismo de riesgo compartidos de los más riesgosos domina a todos lo demás mecanismos.14 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 30 Abril de 2017https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/015604.htmlA note on risk-sharing mechanisms for the colombian health insurance systemUna nota sobre mecanismos de riesgo compartido en el sistema de aseguramiento de salud en ColombiaDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPRisk adjustmentRisk selectionEfficiencySeguros de salud - Colombia - EvaluaciónEvaluación de riesgosEvaluación de riesgos contra la salud - ColombiaI11, I13, I18, C45, C55Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTHUMBNAILdcede2017-30.pdf.jpgdcede2017-30.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg10435https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/ccaa66ac-c5cf-4239-8970-c1ed6c3bfcbd/download75d0b2262cbf7815614eee19fbbd3df8MD55TEXTdcede2017-30.pdf.txtdcede2017-30.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain34078https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/6b16950d-5481-4529-b184-8beb6db692ef/download65cb3d8e9d720dccfe71a8a95441fc47MD54ORIGINALdcede2017-30.pdfdcede2017-30.pdfapplication/pdf498728https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/14a78018-8856-4b07-a3b0-c98bce3c25c2/download1e6ada1a07f71a104682eda9bdb02c5dMD511992/8718oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/87182024-06-04 15:46:14.286http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co