A note on risk-sharing mechanisms for the colombian health insurance system

We evaluate, in terms of efficiency and selection incentives, four different ex post risk sharing mecha-nisms. Outlier risk sharing (ORS), proportional risk sharing (PRS), risk sharing for high costs (RSHC)and risk sharing for high risks. Our results suggest that the best mechanism in terms of their...

Full description

Autores:
Riascos Villegas, Álvaro José
Camelo Gómez, Sergio Armando
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2017
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8718
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8718
Palabra clave:
Risk adjustment
Risk selection
Efficiency
Seguros de salud - Colombia - Evaluación
Evaluación de riesgos
Evaluación de riesgos contra la salud - Colombia
I11, I13, I18, C45, C55
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description
Summary:We evaluate, in terms of efficiency and selection incentives, four different ex post risk sharing mecha-nisms. Outlier risk sharing (ORS), proportional risk sharing (PRS), risk sharing for high costs (RSHC)and risk sharing for high risks. Our results suggest that the best mechanism in terms of their impliedefficiency selection trade off are, risk sharing for high costs and risk sharing for high risks. In general,outlier risk sharing has a poor performance. Our results are robust with respect to different scenariosfor ex ante risk adjustment or incentives for efficiency and selection based on expected or realized costs.We believe that the most realistic scenario analysed is one in which insurance companies use expectedreimbursements and costs as their best source of information (signal) to decide on efficiency and selectiontrade-offs. In this case, we found that risk sharing of high risks dominates all other mechanisms.