A note on risk-sharing mechanisms for the colombian health insurance system
We evaluate, in terms of efficiency and selection incentives, four different ex post risk sharing mecha-nisms. Outlier risk sharing (ORS), proportional risk sharing (PRS), risk sharing for high costs (RSHC)and risk sharing for high risks. Our results suggest that the best mechanism in terms of their...
- Autores:
-
Riascos Villegas, Álvaro José
Camelo Gómez, Sergio Armando
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2017
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8718
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8718
- Palabra clave:
- Risk adjustment
Risk selection
Efficiency
Seguros de salud - Colombia - Evaluación
Evaluación de riesgos
Evaluación de riesgos contra la salud - Colombia
I11, I13, I18, C45, C55
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Summary: | We evaluate, in terms of efficiency and selection incentives, four different ex post risk sharing mecha-nisms. Outlier risk sharing (ORS), proportional risk sharing (PRS), risk sharing for high costs (RSHC)and risk sharing for high risks. Our results suggest that the best mechanism in terms of their impliedefficiency selection trade off are, risk sharing for high costs and risk sharing for high risks. In general,outlier risk sharing has a poor performance. Our results are robust with respect to different scenariosfor ex ante risk adjustment or incentives for efficiency and selection based on expected or realized costs.We believe that the most realistic scenario analysed is one in which insurance companies use expectedreimbursements and costs as their best source of information (signal) to decide on efficiency and selectiontrade-offs. In this case, we found that risk sharing of high risks dominates all other mechanisms. |
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