Welfare Impacts of Genetic Testing in Health Insurance Markets: Will Cross-Subsidies Survive?

Personalized medicine is still in its infancy, with costly genetic tests providing Little actionable information in terms of e¢ cient prevention decisions. As a consequence, few people undertake these tests currently, and health insurance contracts pool all agents irrespective of their genetic backg...

Full description

Autores:
Bardey, David
De Donder, Philippe
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2019
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/41077
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/41077
Palabra clave:
Discrimination risk
Informational value of test
Personalized medecine
Pooling and separating equilibria
D82, I18
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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spelling Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Bardey, Davideb5d55eb-0c4d-4330-b74c-b4e0ef0037ac500De Donder, Philippe9dec99f8-89a8-4f2f-9b50-dc23536b33b35002020-07-28T17:16:06Z2020-07-28T17:16:06Z20191657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/410771657-719110.57784/1992/41077instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/Personalized medicine is still in its infancy, with costly genetic tests providing Little actionable information in terms of e¢ cient prevention decisions. As a consequence, few people undertake these tests currently, and health insurance contracts pool all agents irrespective of their genetic background. Cheaper and especially more informative tests will induce more people to undertake these tests and will impact not only the pricing but also the type of health insurance contracts. We develop a setting with endogenous prevention decisions and we study which contract type (pooling or separating) emerges at equilibrium as a function of the proportion of agents undertaking the genetic test as well as of the informativeness of this test. Our results show that, ceteris paribus, the higher is the proportion of tested agents, the more likely is the emergence of a separating equilibrium that implies some risk discrimination. However, a better pooling contract in which policyholders undertake preventive actions (and lower their health risk) can be attained if the informativeness of the genetic tests increases su¢ ciently. Once the proportion of tested individuals reaches a threshold, we move abruptly from pooling to separating equilibrium, which unambiguously decreases social welfare. Once the equilibrium is of the separating type, social welfare increases with the genetic tests take-up rate, thanks to a composition e¤ect.54 páginasspaUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 13 Marzo de 2019https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/017220.htmlWelfare Impacts of Genetic Testing in Health Insurance Markets: Will Cross-Subsidies Survive?Documento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPDiscrimination riskInformational value of testPersonalized medecinePooling and separating equilibriaD82, I18Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTEXTdcede2019-13.pdf.txtdcede2019-13.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain102975https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/2b60d0ef-e12e-4c6b-ba59-73f14491365f/download212272677c9405f7e319c81658955956MD54ORIGINALdcede2019-13.pdfdcede2019-13.pdfapplication/pdf913275https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/8f7ae922-0c94-4f54-ae6b-1423191fc948/download38a75677441895cf8db983fbbb009413MD51THUMBNAILdcede2019-13.pdf.jpgdcede2019-13.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg10971https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/32cc894d-0022-41b2-a08a-f13c2ed46e82/download7a8819551583f75c98d5dfea068333d5MD551992/41077oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/410772024-06-04 15:28:20.764http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Welfare Impacts of Genetic Testing in Health Insurance Markets: Will Cross-Subsidies Survive?
title Welfare Impacts of Genetic Testing in Health Insurance Markets: Will Cross-Subsidies Survive?
spellingShingle Welfare Impacts of Genetic Testing in Health Insurance Markets: Will Cross-Subsidies Survive?
Discrimination risk
Informational value of test
Personalized medecine
Pooling and separating equilibria
D82, I18
title_short Welfare Impacts of Genetic Testing in Health Insurance Markets: Will Cross-Subsidies Survive?
title_full Welfare Impacts of Genetic Testing in Health Insurance Markets: Will Cross-Subsidies Survive?
title_fullStr Welfare Impacts of Genetic Testing in Health Insurance Markets: Will Cross-Subsidies Survive?
title_full_unstemmed Welfare Impacts of Genetic Testing in Health Insurance Markets: Will Cross-Subsidies Survive?
title_sort Welfare Impacts of Genetic Testing in Health Insurance Markets: Will Cross-Subsidies Survive?
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Bardey, David
De Donder, Philippe
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Bardey, David
De Donder, Philippe
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv Discrimination risk
Informational value of test
Personalized medecine
Pooling and separating equilibria
topic Discrimination risk
Informational value of test
Personalized medecine
Pooling and separating equilibria
D82, I18
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv D82, I18
description Personalized medicine is still in its infancy, with costly genetic tests providing Little actionable information in terms of e¢ cient prevention decisions. As a consequence, few people undertake these tests currently, and health insurance contracts pool all agents irrespective of their genetic background. Cheaper and especially more informative tests will induce more people to undertake these tests and will impact not only the pricing but also the type of health insurance contracts. We develop a setting with endogenous prevention decisions and we study which contract type (pooling or separating) emerges at equilibrium as a function of the proportion of agents undertaking the genetic test as well as of the informativeness of this test. Our results show that, ceteris paribus, the higher is the proportion of tested agents, the more likely is the emergence of a separating equilibrium that implies some risk discrimination. However, a better pooling contract in which policyholders undertake preventive actions (and lower their health risk) can be attained if the informativeness of the genetic tests increases su¢ ciently. Once the proportion of tested individuals reaches a threshold, we move abruptly from pooling to separating equilibrium, which unambiguously decreases social welfare. Once the equilibrium is of the separating type, social welfare increases with the genetic tests take-up rate, thanks to a composition e¤ect.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2019
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-07-28T17:16:06Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-07-28T17:16:06Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo
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dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
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dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.57784/1992/41077
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1657-7191
10.57784/1992/41077
instname:Universidad de los Andes
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca
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url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/41077
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv Documentos CEDE No. 13 Marzo de 2019
dc.relation.repec.spa.fl_str_mv https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/017220.html
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv 54 páginas
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
institution Universidad de los Andes
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