The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects

We study the problem of allocating objects among people. We consider cases where each object is initially owned by someone, no object is initially owned by anyone, and combinations of the two. The problems we look at are those where each person has a need for exactly one object and initially owns at most one object (also known as "house allocation with existing tenants"). We split with most of the existing literature on this topic by dropping the assumption that people can always strictly rank the objects. We show that, without this assumption, problems in which either some or all of the objects are not initially owned are equivalent to problems where each object is initially owned by someone. Thus, it suffices to study problems of the latter type.

• Autores: Jaramillo Vidales, Paula; Manjunath, Vikram
• Tipo de recurso: Work document
• Fecha de publicación: 2011
• Institución: Universidad de los Andes
• Repositorio: Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
• Idioma: eng
• OAI Identifier: oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8249
• Acceso en línea: http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8249
• Palabra clave: Strategy-proofness; Indivisible goods; Indifference; Housing market; House allocation; Kidney exchange; Bienes de capital - Modelos econométricos; C71, C78, D71, D78
• Rights: openAccess
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/