The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects

We study the problem of allocating objects among people. We consider cases where each object is initially owned by someone, no object is initially owned by anyone, and combinations of the two. The problems we look at are those where each person has a need for exactly one object and initially owns at...

Full description

Autores:
Jaramillo Vidales, Paula
Manjunath, Vikram
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2011
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8249
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8249
Palabra clave:
Strategy-proofness
Indivisible goods
Indifference
Housing market
House allocation
Kidney exchange
Bienes de capital - Modelos econométricos
C71, C78, D71, D78
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description
Summary:We study the problem of allocating objects among people. We consider cases where each object is initially owned by someone, no object is initially owned by anyone, and combinations of the two. The problems we look at are those where each person has a need for exactly one object and initially owns at most one object (also known as "house allocation with existing tenants"). We split with most of the existing literature on this topic by dropping the assumption that people can always strictly rank the objects. We show that, without this assumption, problems in which either some or all of the objects are not initially owned are equivalent to problems where each object is initially owned by someone. Thus, it suffices to study problems of the latter type.