Directed search in over-the-counter markets crises
I study optimal liquidity provision by dealers in Over-the-Counter (OTC) markets during crises. I develop a two-sided asset market in which all trades are intermediated by dealers. I model a crisis as an aggregate shock that reduces investor's marginal utilities, creating a large but temporary...
- Autores:
-
Franco Tabares, Santiago
- Tipo de recurso:
- Trabajo de grado de pregrado
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2017
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/61285
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/61285
- Palabra clave:
- Mercados extrabursátiles
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
| Summary: | I study optimal liquidity provision by dealers in Over-the-Counter (OTC) markets during crises. I develop a two-sided asset market in which all trades are intermediated by dealers. I model a crisis as an aggregate shock that reduces investor's marginal utilities, creating a large but temporary selling pressure. My contribution to the literature is twofold: 1) in the model, the rate of contact between dealers and investors is given by a matching function which may exhibit congestion and 2) dealers operate in two different markets (buying and selling) where they post the terms at which they execute trade and investors direct they search toward the dealers with the most attractive terms. I characterize the competitive equilibrium and show that when posting costs are sufficiently low, then dealers provide the socially optimal amount of liquidity. |
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