Anti-social norms
Códigos JEL.: C91, D30, D91, D74, N46
- Autores:
-
Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo
Guerra Forero, José Alberto
Robinson, James A.
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2024
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/74564
- Acceso en línea:
- https://hdl.handle.net/1992/74564
- Palabra clave:
- Social norms
Fairness
Long-run effects of conflict
Laboratory experiment
Economía
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/static/pdf/aceptacion_uso_es.pdf
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Anti-social norms |
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Anti-social norms |
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Anti-social norms Social norms Fairness Long-run effects of conflict Laboratory experiment Economía |
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Anti-social norms |
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Anti-social norms |
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Anti-social norms |
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Anti-social norms |
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Anti-social norms |
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Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo Guerra Forero, José Alberto Robinson, James A. |
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Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo Guerra Forero, José Alberto Robinson, James A. |
| dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Social norms Fairness Long-run effects of conflict Laboratory experiment |
| topic |
Social norms Fairness Long-run effects of conflict Laboratory experiment Economía |
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Economía |
| description |
Códigos JEL.: C91, D30, D91, D74, N46 |
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2024 |
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2024-07-17T12:51:51Z |
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2024-07-17T12:51:51Z |
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eng |
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eng |
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Documentos CEDE; 2024-25 |
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https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/021159.html |
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123 páginas |
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application/pdf |
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Universidad de los Andes |
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Facultad de Economía |
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Fergusson Talero, Leopoldovirtual::18964-1Guerra Forero, José Albertovirtual::18965-1Robinson, James A.2024-07-17T12:51:51Z2024-07-17T12:51:51Z2024-071657-7191https://hdl.handle.net/1992/74564Códigos JEL.: C91, D30, D91, D74, N46Since formal rules can only partially reduce opportunistic behavior, third-party sanctioning to promote fairness is critical to achieving desirable social outcomes. Social norms may underpin such behavior, but they can also undermine it. We study one such norm —the “don’t be a toad” norm, as it is referred to in Colombia— that tells people to mind their own business and not snitch on others. In a set of fairness games where a third party can punish unfair behavior, but players can invoke the “don’t be a toad” norm, we find that the mere possibility of invoking this norm completely reverses the benefits of third-party sanctioning to achieve fair social outcomes. We establish this is an anti-social norm in a well-defined sense: most players consider it inappropriate, yet they expect the majority will invoke it. To understand this phenomenon we develop an evolutionary model of endogenous social norm transmission and demonstrate that a payoff advantage from adherence to the norm in social dilemmas, combined with sufficient heterogeneity in the disutility of those who view the norm as inappropriate, can generate the apparent paradox of an anti-social norm in the steady-state equilibrium. We provide further evidence that historical exposure to political violence, which increased the ostracization of snitches, raised sensitivity to this norm.Dado que las reglas formales solo pueden reducir parcialmente el comportamiento oportunista, la sanción de terceros para promover la justicia es crítica para lograr resultados sociales deseables. Las normas sociales pueden respaldar tal comportamiento, pero también pueden socavarlo. Estudiamos una norma —la norma de "no sea sapo", como se le conoce en Colombia— que indica a las personas que se ocupen de sus propios asuntos y no delaten a otros. En un conjunto de juegos donde un tercero puede castigar el comportamiento injusto, pero los jugadores pueden invocar la norma de "no sea sapo", encontramos que la mera posibilidad de invocar esta norma revierte completamente los beneficios de la sanción de terceros para lograr resultados sociales justos. Establecemos que esta es una norma antisocial en un sentido bien definido: la mayoría de los jugadores la consideran inapropiada, pero esperan que la mayoría la invoque. Para entender este fenómeno desarrollamos un modelo evolutivo de transmisión de normas sociales endógenas y demostramos que una ventaja de pago por adherirse a la norma en dilemas sociales, combinada con suficiente heterogeneidad en la disutilidad de aquellos que ven la norma como inapropiada, genera la aparente paradoja de una norma antisocial en el equilibrio de estado estacionario. Proveemos evidencia adicional que la exposición histórica a la violencia política, que aumentó la ostracización de los informantes, aumenta la sensibilidad a esta norma.123 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los AndesFacultad de EconomíaDocumentos CEDE; 2024-25https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/021159.htmlhttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/static/pdf/aceptacion_uso_es.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Anti-social normsDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPSocial normsFairnessLong-run effects of conflictLaboratory experimentEconomíaPublication3ca859b2-d3ce-4f17-975a-9a5a01525871virtual::18964-1ee404e7a-3a1b-49d5-99d7-e0ba586abddevirtual::18965-13ca859b2-d3ce-4f17-975a-9a5a01525871virtual::18964-1ee404e7a-3a1b-49d5-99d7-e0ba586abddevirtual::18965-1https://scholar.google.es/citations?user=Vh0eC9QAAAAJvirtual::18964-1https://scholar.google.es/citations?user=EeJ7bfgAAAAJvirtual::18965-10000-0002-8012-2301virtual::18964-10000-0003-1879-3742virtual::18965-1https://scienti.minciencias.gov.co/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0000176842virtual::18964-1https://scienti.minciencias.gov.co/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0000378119virtual::18965-1ORIGINALdcede2024-25.pdfdcede2024-25.pdfapplication/pdf17087783https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/ef3bdb54-a444-4084-a8fb-29ad8306deb3/downloadb547df45a4a3c616012717effde7d289MD51LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; 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