Corporate Ownership and Control Contestability in Emerging Markets: the Case of Colombia
This paper studies the structure of voting control and block holders' contestability in Colombia for a sample of 233 non-financial listed firms during 1996-2004 period. Corporate control is characterized by high ownership concentration and block holder power, which implies low separation ratios...
- Autores:
-
Gutiérrez Ramírez, Luis Hernando
Pombo Vejarano, Carlos
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2007
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/46382
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46382
- Palabra clave:
- Corporate control
Multiple blockholders
Corporate governance
Firm value
Colombian corporations
Corporaciones - Valoración - Modelos econométricos
Accionistas - Investigaciones - Colombia
Mercados emergentes - Estudio de casos
Administración
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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|
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Corporate Ownership and Control Contestability in Emerging Markets: the Case of Colombia |
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv |
Control corporativo en presencia de múltiples grandes accionistas en mercados emergentes: el caso de Colombia |
title |
Corporate Ownership and Control Contestability in Emerging Markets: the Case of Colombia |
spellingShingle |
Corporate Ownership and Control Contestability in Emerging Markets: the Case of Colombia Corporate control Multiple blockholders Corporate governance Firm value Colombian corporations Corporaciones - Valoración - Modelos econométricos Accionistas - Investigaciones - Colombia Mercados emergentes - Estudio de casos Administración |
title_short |
Corporate Ownership and Control Contestability in Emerging Markets: the Case of Colombia |
title_full |
Corporate Ownership and Control Contestability in Emerging Markets: the Case of Colombia |
title_fullStr |
Corporate Ownership and Control Contestability in Emerging Markets: the Case of Colombia |
title_full_unstemmed |
Corporate Ownership and Control Contestability in Emerging Markets: the Case of Colombia |
title_sort |
Corporate Ownership and Control Contestability in Emerging Markets: the Case of Colombia |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Gutiérrez Ramírez, Luis Hernando Pombo Vejarano, Carlos |
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Gutiérrez Ramírez, Luis Hernando Pombo Vejarano, Carlos |
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Corporate control Multiple blockholders Corporate governance Firm value Colombian corporations |
topic |
Corporate control Multiple blockholders Corporate governance Firm value Colombian corporations Corporaciones - Valoración - Modelos econométricos Accionistas - Investigaciones - Colombia Mercados emergentes - Estudio de casos Administración |
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv |
Corporaciones - Valoración - Modelos econométricos Accionistas - Investigaciones - Colombia Mercados emergentes - Estudio de casos |
dc.subject.themes.none.fl_str_mv |
Administración |
description |
This paper studies the structure of voting control and block holders' contestability in Colombia for a sample of 233 non-financial listed firms during 1996-2004 period. Corporate control is characterized by high ownership concentration and block holder power, which implies low separation ratios between cash flow rights and voting rights. On average the separation ratios for the largest voting block is 0.95 while for the fourth largest shareholder it is 0.80. Corporate control is privately biased when there is direct monitoring between controlling owners and firm management. Regression results show that a more equal distribution of equity among large block holders leads to a positive effect on firm value. Contestability matters most when firm shares are liquid and highly traded on the stock market. This finding is reinforced when the probability of forming a winning coalition by the largest block decreases and when performance variables, such as market to sales ratio and return on equity, are included in the estimating equations as substitutes of firm value. In addition, our estimations provide evidence that diversion of rents is limited by block holders' contestability and there is no effective tunneling. |
publishDate |
2007 |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2007 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-09-21T15:19:01Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-09-21T15:19:01Z |
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv |
Documento de trabajo |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.type.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.type.content.spa.fl_str_mv |
Text |
dc.type.redcol.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP |
format |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
1900-1606 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46382 |
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad de los Andes |
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
dc.identifier.repourl.spa.fl_str_mv |
repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
identifier_str_mv |
1900-1606 instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46382 |
dc.language.iso.es_CO.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv |
Galeras de Administración, No. 16 |
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
dc.rights.accessrights.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv |
24 páginas |
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de los Andes |
dc.publisher.faculty.none.fl_str_mv |
Facultad de Administración |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de los Andes |
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spelling |
Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Gutiérrez Ramírez, Luis Hernando0582fb5e-ad8a-4f62-acc0-2b2e18abe657600Pombo Vejarano, Carlos98856002020-09-21T15:19:01Z2020-09-21T15:19:01Z20071900-1606http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46382instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/This paper studies the structure of voting control and block holders' contestability in Colombia for a sample of 233 non-financial listed firms during 1996-2004 period. Corporate control is characterized by high ownership concentration and block holder power, which implies low separation ratios between cash flow rights and voting rights. On average the separation ratios for the largest voting block is 0.95 while for the fourth largest shareholder it is 0.80. Corporate control is privately biased when there is direct monitoring between controlling owners and firm management. Regression results show that a more equal distribution of equity among large block holders leads to a positive effect on firm value. Contestability matters most when firm shares are liquid and highly traded on the stock market. This finding is reinforced when the probability of forming a winning coalition by the largest block decreases and when performance variables, such as market to sales ratio and return on equity, are included in the estimating equations as substitutes of firm value. In addition, our estimations provide evidence that diversion of rents is limited by block holders' contestability and there is no effective tunneling.Este artículo estudia la estructura de votación y con-trol entre los primeros cuatro bloques de votación en Colombia para una muestra de 233 empresas públicas por acciones que estuvieron listadas en bolsa durante el período 1996-2004. El control corporativo está caracterizado por una alta concentración y poder de votación entre los grandes accionistas, lo que implica que existan bajas razones de separación entre los derechos de flujo de caja o propiedad directa con los derechos totales de votación dada por la propiedad integrada. En promedio la razón de separación para el primer bloque de votación es de 0.95, mientras que para el cuarto bloque de votación es de 0.80. El control corporativo sigue un sesgo privado cuando hay un monitoreo directo entre los accionistas controlantes con las gerencias. Los resultados econométricos muestran que entre más igualitario sea el poder de votación entre los principales bloques conlleva a un efecto positivo sobre la valoración de la firma. Este control interno entre los bloques se hace más evidente cuando las acciones transadas de las empresas son de alta y mediana bursatilidad. Este resultado se refuerza cuando la probabilidad de la formación de una coalición dominante por parte del primer bloque de votación disminuye y cuando se incluyen variables de desempeño en las regresiones. Más aún, nuestras estimaciones proveen evidencia que la extracción de rentas es limitada por este control interno entre los bloques de votación y la transferencia de rentas a otras empresas (tunneling) no es efectivo.1. Introduction. 2. Literature on control contestability. 3. Data and Sample Selection. 4. Corporate Control. 5. Econometric Analysis. 6. Conclusions. References.24 páginasapplication/pdfspaUniversidad de los AndesFacultad de AdministraciónGaleras de Administración, No. 16instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional SénecaCorporate Ownership and Control Contestability in Emerging Markets: the Case of ColombiaControl corporativo en presencia de múltiples grandes accionistas en mercados emergentes: el caso de ColombiaDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPCorporate controlMultiple blockholdersCorporate governanceFirm valueColombian corporationsCorporaciones - Valoración - Modelos econométricosAccionistas - Investigaciones - ColombiaMercados emergentes - Estudio de casosAdministraciónFacultad de AdministraciónPublicationORIGINALGaleras-de-administración-16.pdfGaleras-de-administración-16.pdfapplication/pdf2668693https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/42a7836a-e5a9-4648-adc9-a0d74cc92e43/downloada77787d0ce5b7b576d4f6d478947d078MD51TEXTGaleras-de-administración-16.pdf.txtGaleras-de-administración-16.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain86169https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/d7cebec5-27d2-4841-9e42-f5ce59aea5f7/download524726048f9c112558f7b04b8312ec7aMD54THUMBNAILGaleras-de-administración-16.pdf.jpgGaleras-de-administración-16.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg7264https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/a2dd5cae-f8d2-42cb-86e8-e25413774b98/download6f3bfd13370287691a97bb240cd7696dMD551992/46382oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/463822023-10-10 16:23:19.32http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |