Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students
Códigos JEL.: D7, H5, H7, I2
- Autores:
-
Harker Roa, Arturo
Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés
Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo
Yamin Silva, Juan Camilo
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2023
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/66329
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/66329
- Palabra clave:
- Education
Political agency
Corruption
Clientelism
Economía
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/static/pdf/aceptacion_uso_es.pdf
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Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students |
| title |
Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students |
| spellingShingle |
Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students Education Political agency Corruption Clientelism Economía |
| title_short |
Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students |
| title_full |
Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students |
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Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students |
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Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students |
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Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students |
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Harker Roa, Arturo Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo Yamin Silva, Juan Camilo |
| dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Harker Roa, Arturo Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo Yamin Silva, Juan Camilo |
| dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Education Political agency Corruption Clientelism |
| topic |
Education Political agency Corruption Clientelism Economía |
| dc.subject.themes.es_CO.fl_str_mv |
Economía |
| description |
Códigos JEL.: D7, H5, H7, I2 |
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2023 |
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2023-04-24T21:22:30Z |
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2023-04 |
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10.57784/1992/66329 |
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eng |
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eng |
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Documentos CEDE;2023-10 |
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69 páginas |
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Universidad de los Andes |
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Facultad de Economía |
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Universidad de los Andes |
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Harker Roa, Arturo8662600Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés6a99d083-0c3c-4d79-94b2-13119f25b02c600Fergusson Talero, Leopoldovirtual::17843-1Yamin Silva, Juan Camilovirtual::17844-12023-04-24T21:22:30Z2023-04-24T21:22:30Z2023-041657-7191http://hdl.handle.net/1992/6632910.57784/1992/66329Códigos JEL.: D7, H5, H7, I2We study the effect of links between politicians on corruption under prevailing clientelism. Connections between politicians increase fabricated "ghost" students to obtain more national transfers, without raising the quality or quantity of education. Bureaucratic turnover, temporary and discretionary hiring, electoral fraud, and complaints against functionaries also increase. Effects on ghosts are larger in municipalities with more clientelism, discretion over resource spending, and weaker oversight. The findings favor a venal view of corruption, where politicians divert resources for personal gain rather than to favor their constituencies. Nonetheless, they have better future career prospects, reflecting a failure of electoral control.Estudiamos el efecto de los vínculos entre políticos sobre la corrupción bajo clientelismo imperante. Las conexiones entre políticos aumentan los estudiantes "fantasmas" fabricados para obtener más transferencias nacionales, sin elevar la calidad ni la cantidad de la educación. También aumentan la rotación burocrática, las contrataciones temporales y discrecionales, el fraude electoral y las denuncias contra funcionarios. Los efectos sobre los fantasmas son mayores en los municipios con más clientelismo, discreción sobre el gasto de recursos y una supervisión más débil. Los hallazgos favorecen una visión venal de la corrupción, donde los políticos desvían recursos para beneficio personal en lugar de favorecer a sus electores. No obstante, tienen mejores perspectivas futuras de carrera, lo que refleja una falla en el control electoral.69 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los AndesFacultad de EconomíaDocumentos CEDE;2023-10https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/020732.htmlhttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/static/pdf/aceptacion_uso_es.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost studentsDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPEducationPolitical agencyCorruptionClientelismEconomíaPublication3ca859b2-d3ce-4f17-975a-9a5a01525871virtual::17843-1b3efd563-540e-4577-a581-30025ba85386virtual::17844-13ca859b2-d3ce-4f17-975a-9a5a01525871virtual::17843-1b3efd563-540e-4577-a581-30025ba85386virtual::17844-1https://scholar.google.es/citations?user=Vh0eC9QAAAAJvirtual::17843-10000-0002-8012-2301virtual::17843-1https://scienti.minciencias.gov.co/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0000176842virtual::17843-1THUMBNAILdcede2023-10.pdf.jpgdcede2023-10.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg18466https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/a7b678ec-8d50-4a8d-bca1-947a43cb6dbd/downloadfd764134310ba33b59ac4c56bceea61cMD54LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-81810https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/26b57013-aa59-4476-b6e9-03f9880ee14e/download5aa5c691a1ffe97abd12c2966efcb8d6MD51TEXTdcede2023-10.pdf.txtdcede2023-10.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain153824https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/1dedb289-cfda-439c-83a6-afb75bf5d58f/downloadb76d39d911542a6c982382d8bb53c823MD53ORIGINALdcede2023-10.pdfdcede2023-10.pdfapplication/pdf10187756https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/70956f6c-e080-466a-9702-d555b4d05061/download7b1184b6a5c49c08364b42acde5e0dbcMD551992/66329oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/663292024-06-04 15:40:12.204https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/static/pdf/aceptacion_uso_es.pdfopen.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.coWW8sIGVuIG1pIGNhbGlkYWQgZGUgYXV0b3IgZGVsIHRyYWJham8gZGUgdGVzaXMsIG1vbm9ncmFmw61hIG8gdHJhYmFqbyBkZSBncmFkbywgaGFnbyBlbnRyZWdhIGRlbCBlamVtcGxhciByZXNwZWN0aXZvIHkgZGUgc3VzIGFuZXhvcyBkZSBzZXIgZWwgY2FzbywgZW4gZm9ybWF0byBkaWdpdGFsIHkvbyBlbGVjdHLDs25pY28geSBhdXRvcml6byBhIGxhIFVuaXZlcnNpZGFkIGRlIGxvcyBBbmRlcyBwYXJhIHF1ZSByZWFsaWNlIGxhIHB1YmxpY2FjacOzbiBlbiBlbCBTaXN0ZW1hIGRlIEJpYmxpb3RlY2FzIG8gZW4gY3VhbHF1aWVyIG90cm8gc2lzdGVtYSBvIGJhc2UgZGUgZGF0b3MgcHJvcGlvIG8gYWplbm8gYSBsYSBVbml2ZXJzaWRhZCB5IHBhcmEgcXVlIGVuIGxvcyB0w6lybWlub3MgZXN0YWJsZWNpZG9zIGVuIGxhIExleSAyMyBkZSAxOTgyLCBMZXkgNDQgZGUgMTk5MywgRGVjaXNpw7NuIEFuZGluYSAzNTEgZGUgMTk5MywgRGVjcmV0byA0NjAgZGUgMTk5NSB5IGRlbcOhcyBub3JtYXMgZ2VuZXJhbGVzIHNvYnJlIGxhIG1hdGVyaWEsIHV0aWxpY2UgZW4gdG9kYXMgc3VzIGZvcm1hcywgbG9zIGRlcmVjaG9zIHBhdHJpbW9uaWFsZXMgZGUgcmVwcm9kdWNjacOzbiwgY29tdW5pY2FjacOzbiBww7pibGljYSwgdHJhbnNmb3JtYWNpw7NuIHkgZGlzdHJpYnVjacOzbiAoYWxxdWlsZXIsIHByw6lzdGFtbyBww7pibGljbyBlIGltcG9ydGFjacOzbikgcXVlIG1lIGNvcnJlc3BvbmRlbiBjb21vIGNyZWFkb3IgZGUgbGEgb2JyYSBvYmpldG8gZGVsIHByZXNlbnRlIGRvY3VtZW50by4gIAoKCkxhIHByZXNlbnRlIGF1dG9yaXphY2nDs24gc2UgZW1pdGUgZW4gY2FsaWRhZCBkZSBhdXRvciBkZSBsYSBvYnJhIG9iamV0byBkZWwgcHJlc2VudGUgZG9jdW1lbnRvIHkgbm8gY29ycmVzcG9uZGUgYSBjZXNpw7NuIGRlIGRlcmVjaG9zLCBzaW5vIGEgbGEgYXV0b3JpemFjacOzbiBkZSB1c28gYWNhZMOpbWljbyBkZSBjb25mb3JtaWRhZCBjb24gbG8gYW50ZXJpb3JtZW50ZSBzZcOxYWxhZG8uIExhIHByZXNlbnRlIGF1dG9yaXphY2nDs24gc2UgaGFjZSBleHRlbnNpdmEgbm8gc29sbyBhIGxhcyBmYWN1bHRhZGVzIHkgZGVyZWNob3MgZGUgdXNvIHNvYnJlIGxhIG9icmEgZW4gZm9ybWF0byBvIHNvcG9ydGUgbWF0ZXJpYWwsIHNpbm8gdGFtYmnDqW4gcGFyYSBmb3JtYXRvIGVsZWN0csOzbmljbywgeSBlbiBnZW5lcmFsIHBhcmEgY3VhbHF1aWVyIGZvcm1hdG8gY29ub2NpZG8gbyBwb3IgY29ub2Nlci4gCgoKRWwgYXV0b3IsIG1hbmlmaWVzdGEgcXVlIGxhIG9icmEgb2JqZXRvIGRlIGxhIHByZXNlbnRlIGF1dG9yaXphY2nDs24gZXMgb3JpZ2luYWwgeSBsYSByZWFsaXrDsyBzaW4gdmlvbGFyIG8gdXN1cnBhciBkZXJlY2hvcyBkZSBhdXRvciBkZSB0ZXJjZXJvcywgcG9yIGxvIHRhbnRvLCBsYSBvYnJhIGVzIGRlIHN1IGV4Y2x1c2l2YSBhdXRvcsOtYSB5IHRpZW5lIGxhIHRpdHVsYXJpZGFkIHNvYnJlIGxhIG1pc21hLiAKCgpFbiBjYXNvIGRlIHByZXNlbnRhcnNlIGN1YWxxdWllciByZWNsYW1hY2nDs24gbyBhY2Npw7NuIHBvciBwYXJ0ZSBkZSB1biB0ZXJjZXJvIGVuIGN1YW50byBhIGxvcyBkZXJlY2hvcyBkZSBhdXRvciBzb2JyZSBsYSBvYnJhIGVuIGN1ZXN0acOzbiwgZWwgYXV0b3IgYXN1bWlyw6EgdG9kYSBsYSByZXNwb25zYWJpbGlkYWQsIHkgc2FsZHLDoSBkZSBkZWZlbnNhIGRlIGxvcyBkZXJlY2hvcyBhcXXDrSBhdXRvcml6YWRvcywgcGFyYSB0b2RvcyBsb3MgZWZlY3RvcyBsYSBVbml2ZXJzaWRhZCBhY3TDumEgY29tbyB1biB0ZXJjZXJvIGRlIGJ1ZW5hIGZlLiAKCg== |