Honesty after a labor relationship

At the end of a controlled experiment where research assistants were hired for coding news from online newspapers, the experimenter-employer asked a number of them to roll a die and report the result in order to be paid in cash an amount linear on the reported number from 1 to 6 that could go from 1...

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Autores:
Blanco, Mariana
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2015
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8611
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8611
Palabra clave:
Honesty
Cheating
Labor relationships
Unemployment
Experiments
Honradez
Verdad y mentira
Relaciones laborales
D73, C93, D01, E24, J24
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Honesty after a labor relationship
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv Honestidad después de una relación laboral
title Honesty after a labor relationship
spellingShingle Honesty after a labor relationship
Honesty
Cheating
Labor relationships
Unemployment
Experiments
Honradez
Verdad y mentira
Relaciones laborales
D73, C93, D01, E24, J24
title_short Honesty after a labor relationship
title_full Honesty after a labor relationship
title_fullStr Honesty after a labor relationship
title_full_unstemmed Honesty after a labor relationship
title_sort Honesty after a labor relationship
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Blanco, Mariana
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Blanco, Mariana
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv Honesty
Cheating
Labor relationships
Unemployment
Experiments
topic Honesty
Cheating
Labor relationships
Unemployment
Experiments
Honradez
Verdad y mentira
Relaciones laborales
D73, C93, D01, E24, J24
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv Honradez
Verdad y mentira
Relaciones laborales
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv D73, C93, D01, E24, J24
description At the end of a controlled experiment where research assistants were hired for coding news from online newspapers, the experimenter-employer asked a number of them to roll a die and report the result in order to be paid in cash an amount linear on the reported number from 1 to 6 that could go from 1.6 to 9.4 USD. Another (control) group of similar students, recruited in a similar manner, were also invited to perform the same die-roll task, but they had no prior labor relationship with the experimenter-employer. Our treatment group showed in average higher levels of honesty as their distribution of reported numbers was lees skewed to the right, that is, the long-term labor relationship group was more likely to report numbers that are closer to the uniform (honest) distribution than our control, and than other reported numbers in this kind of experiments. We conjecture that the previous experimenter-subject relationship of the treatment group induced higher levels of honesty among the participants. One of the possible reasons is that the labor relationship created for the group of "treatment" students included a series of shocks that involved the possibility of involuntary unemployment, bringing incentives for the students to signal honesty as a trait that could be valued in the labor market. This paper contributes to the growing literature on understanding the motives for honesty and cheating.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2015
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:54:58Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:54:58Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo
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dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.57784/1992/8611
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad de los Andes
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url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8611
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv Documentos CEDE No. 37 Octubre de 2015
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dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv 9 páginas
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
institution Universidad de los Andes
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spelling Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Blanco, Marianad8357b8f-30d3-437f-b523-8ca1064e6543500Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo76335002018-09-27T16:54:58Z2018-09-27T16:54:58Z20151657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/86111657-719110.57784/1992/8611instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/At the end of a controlled experiment where research assistants were hired for coding news from online newspapers, the experimenter-employer asked a number of them to roll a die and report the result in order to be paid in cash an amount linear on the reported number from 1 to 6 that could go from 1.6 to 9.4 USD. Another (control) group of similar students, recruited in a similar manner, were also invited to perform the same die-roll task, but they had no prior labor relationship with the experimenter-employer. Our treatment group showed in average higher levels of honesty as their distribution of reported numbers was lees skewed to the right, that is, the long-term labor relationship group was more likely to report numbers that are closer to the uniform (honest) distribution than our control, and than other reported numbers in this kind of experiments. We conjecture that the previous experimenter-subject relationship of the treatment group induced higher levels of honesty among the participants. One of the possible reasons is that the labor relationship created for the group of "treatment" students included a series of shocks that involved the possibility of involuntary unemployment, bringing incentives for the students to signal honesty as a trait that could be valued in the labor market. This paper contributes to the growing literature on understanding the motives for honesty and cheating.Al final de un experimento controlado, donde se contrataron asistentes de investigación para la codificación de noticias de los periódicos en línea durante un mes, el experimentador-empleador los invito a lanzar un dado y reportar el resultado con el fin de pagar en efectivo una cantidad proporcional y lineal en el número reportado, de 1 a 6. Otro grupo (control) de estudiantes similares, fue invitado a realizar la misma tarea, pero sin tener relación laboral previa con el experimentador-empleador. Nuestro grupo de tratamiento mostró niveles promedio más altos de honestidad, ya que la distribución de los números reportados por estos fue menos sesgada a la derecha. Es decir, el grupo de relaciones de trabajo fue más propenso a reportar números que están más cerca de la distribución uniforme (honesta) que el grupo de control, y que otros estudios con este tipo de experimento. Se conjetura que la relación laboral del grupo de tratamiento indujo mayores niveles de honestidad entre los participantes. Una de las posibles razones es que la relación de trabajo creada para el grupo de estudiantes de tratamiento incluía una serie de choques que implicaba la posibilidad de desempleo involuntario, generando incentivos para que los estudiantes interpretaran la honestidad como un rasgo que podría ser valorado en el mercado de trabajo. Este artículo contribuye a la creciente literatura sobre la comprensión de los motivos de la honestidad y el engaño.9 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 37 Octubre de 2015https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/014066.htmlHonesty after a labor relationshipHonestidad después de una relación laboralDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPHonestyCheatingLabor relationshipsUnemploymentExperimentsHonradezVerdad y mentiraRelaciones laboralesD73, C93, D01, E24, J24Facultad de EconomíaPublicationORIGINALdcede2015-37.pdfdcede2015-37.pdfapplication/pdf582403https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/bf43a2b3-367f-44be-9704-79472f41a71d/download36802ee79e1bac9cf7ef9fee38984476MD51THUMBNAILdcede2015-37.pdf.jpgdcede2015-37.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg29500https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/3ecb74c2-676b-478a-82f8-582123d7f1f2/download08a72c987d9d9ee91ae7795b0e01a0cbMD55TEXTdcede2015-37.pdf.txtdcede2015-37.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain25239https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/95507b65-2cdc-4221-9e1f-1ef6ef11a809/download74d9817ca89f07a2a3266c9efe40ea9aMD541992/8611oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/86112024-06-04 15:36:57.414http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co