How is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? : theory and experiment
We compare two genetic testing regulations, Disclosure Duty (DD) and Consent Law (CL), in an environment where individuals choose to take a genetic test or not. DD forces agents to reveal the test results to their insurers, resulting in a discrimination risk. CL allows agents to withhold that inform...
- Autores:
-
Bardey, David
Donder, Philippe De
Mantilla Ribero, César Andrés
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2017
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8681
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8681
- Palabra clave:
- Consent law
Disclosure duty
Personalized medicine
Test take up rate
Pooling health insurance contracts
Genética humana - Aspectos económicos
Consentimiento (Derecho)
Divulgación de información
C91, D82, I18
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
| Summary: | We compare two genetic testing regulations, Disclosure Duty (DD) and Consent Law (CL), in an environment where individuals choose to take a genetic test or not. DD forces agents to reveal the test results to their insurers, resulting in a discrimination risk. CL allows agents to withhold that information, generating adverse selection. We complement our model with an experiment. We obtain that a larger fraction of agents test under CL than under DD, and that the proportion of individuals preferring CL to DD is non-monotone in the test cost when adverse selection is set endogenously at its steady state level. |
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