Conflict, decentralisation and local governance in Colombia, 1974-2004

The objective of this paper is to determine the variables that explain the geographical expansion and armed activity of Colombian irregular groups since the mid seventies, taking into account the role of the political, fiscal and budgetary decentralization and its effects over local governance. This...

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Autores:
Sánchez Torres, Fabio José
Palau Madriñán, María del Mar
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2006
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/7999
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/7999
Palabra clave:
Armed conflict
Violence
Decentralization
Local governance
Spatial econometrics
Conflicto armado - Colombia - Modelos econométricos
Violencia política - Colombia
Descentralización administrativa - Colombia
Gobierno local - Colombia
C23, C24, D74, R12
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description
Summary:The objective of this paper is to determine the variables that explain the geographical expansion and armed activity of Colombian irregular groups since the mid seventies, taking into account the role of the political, fiscal and budgetary decentralization and its effects over local governance. This period of Colombian history (1974-2004) has been graved by strong economic, social and institutional changes that have deepened particularly since the decentralization process of the mid eighties. In fact, this paper states that decentralization process transformed the conflict into a dispute over the local power, intensifying the use of violence in order to appropriate part of the public goods and resources, interfere the political process and consolidate the group's territorial control. The analysis of the illegal group's early activity (1974-1982) shows that the use of violence is explained by grievances such as poverty or inequality. However, subsequent years reveal deep changes in the illegal group's strategic procedures in which the decentralization process have given them incentives to control the local governments by using violence (greed). The results demonstrate a strong and significant relationship between the intensification of the armed conflict and the greater political, budgetary and fiscal autonomy of local governments. In fact, the presence of local resources such as royalties and taxes triggers violence against politicians being more intense in the municipalities where the actions of the illegal groups are higher.