Counting on My Vote Not Counting: Expressive Voting in Committees
A committee chooses whether to approve a proposal that some members may consider ethical. Members who vote for the proposal receive expressive utility, and all pay a cost if the proposal is accepted. Committee members have di erent depths of reasoning. The model predicts that features that reduce th...
- Autores:
-
Ginzburg, Boris
Guerra, José-Alberto
Lekfuangfu, Warn N.
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2020
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/41138
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/41138
- Palabra clave:
- Expressive voting
Committees
Pivotality
Laboratory experiment
Level-k
Structural estimation
C57, C72, C92, D71, D91
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
| Summary: | A committee chooses whether to approve a proposal that some members may consider ethical. Members who vote for the proposal receive expressive utility, and all pay a cost if the proposal is accepted. Committee members have di erent depths of reasoning. The model predicts that features that reduce the probability of being pivotal - namely, larger committee size, or a more restrictive voting rule - raise the share of votes for the proposal. A laboratory experiment with a charitable donation framing supports these results. Our structural estimation recovers the distributions of altruistic and expressive preferences, and of depth of reasoning, across individuals. |
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