Public development banks and credit market imperfections
Which projects/firms should be the target of lending by a Public Development Bank (PDB)? What is the optimal design for the PDB's loans, and the optimal structure for delivering them? We analyze these questions in the context of a model where screening is costly to banks and underprovision of c...
- Autores:
-
Eslava Mejía, Marcela
Freixas, Xavier
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2016
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8627
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8627
- Palabra clave:
- Public development banks
Governmental loans and guarantees
Costly screening
Credit rationing
Bancos de desarrollo
Préstamos gubernamentales
Finanzas
Mercado financiero
H81, G20, G21, G23
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Public development banks and credit market imperfections |
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv |
Banca pública de desarrollo e imperfecciones del mercado crediticio |
title |
Public development banks and credit market imperfections |
spellingShingle |
Public development banks and credit market imperfections Public development banks Governmental loans and guarantees Costly screening Credit rationing Bancos de desarrollo Préstamos gubernamentales Finanzas Mercado financiero H81, G20, G21, G23 |
title_short |
Public development banks and credit market imperfections |
title_full |
Public development banks and credit market imperfections |
title_fullStr |
Public development banks and credit market imperfections |
title_full_unstemmed |
Public development banks and credit market imperfections |
title_sort |
Public development banks and credit market imperfections |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Eslava Mejía, Marcela Freixas, Xavier |
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Eslava Mejía, Marcela Freixas, Xavier |
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Public development banks Governmental loans and guarantees Costly screening Credit rationing |
topic |
Public development banks Governmental loans and guarantees Costly screening Credit rationing Bancos de desarrollo Préstamos gubernamentales Finanzas Mercado financiero H81, G20, G21, G23 |
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv |
Bancos de desarrollo Préstamos gubernamentales Finanzas Mercado financiero |
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv |
H81, G20, G21, G23 |
description |
Which projects/firms should be the target of lending by a Public Development Bank (PDB)? What is the optimal design for the PDB's loans, and the optimal structure for delivering them? We analyze these questions in the context of a model where screening is costly to banks and underprovision of credit results from the inability of banks to appropriate the full benefits of projects they finance, more pronounced for high value projects. PDB intervention arises as a natural alternative to alleviate this inefficiency, since it originates in a failure in the private provision of credit. Lending to commercial banks at subsidized rates or providing credit guarantees, targeting the firms that generate high added value, are valid policy alternatives. Though in normal times PDB lending and credit guarantees are shown to be equivalent, lending is preferred when banks are facing a liquidity shortage, while a credit guarantees program is preferred when banks are undercapitalized... |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2016 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:55:09Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:55:09Z |
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv |
Documento de trabajo |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.type.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.type.content.spa.fl_str_mv |
Text |
dc.type.redcol.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP |
format |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
1657-5334 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8627 |
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv |
1657-7191 |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
10.57784/1992/8627 |
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad de los Andes |
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
dc.identifier.repourl.spa.fl_str_mv |
repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
identifier_str_mv |
1657-5334 1657-7191 10.57784/1992/8627 instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8627 |
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv |
Documentos CEDE No. 06 Febrero de 2016 |
dc.relation.repec.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/014234.html |
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
dc.rights.accessrights.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv |
38 páginas |
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
institution |
Universidad de los Andes |
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Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Eslava Mejía, Marcela8149500Freixas, Xavier5f14704c-ae30-45a2-950b-28b9474d08ec5002018-09-27T16:55:09Z2018-09-27T16:55:09Z20161657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/86271657-719110.57784/1992/8627instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/Which projects/firms should be the target of lending by a Public Development Bank (PDB)? What is the optimal design for the PDB's loans, and the optimal structure for delivering them? We analyze these questions in the context of a model where screening is costly to banks and underprovision of credit results from the inability of banks to appropriate the full benefits of projects they finance, more pronounced for high value projects. PDB intervention arises as a natural alternative to alleviate this inefficiency, since it originates in a failure in the private provision of credit. Lending to commercial banks at subsidized rates or providing credit guarantees, targeting the firms that generate high added value, are valid policy alternatives. Though in normal times PDB lending and credit guarantees are shown to be equivalent, lending is preferred when banks are facing a liquidity shortage, while a credit guarantees program is preferred when banks are undercapitalized...Este artículo analiza el papel de un Banco Público de Desarrollo (BPD) en un contexto en que los bancos necesitan recurrir a estrategias costosas de evaluación de proyectos para definir la asignación de créditos. Exploramos dos preguntas: 1) qué tipos de empresas deberían ser las beneficiarias de apoyo financiero público; y 2) qué tipo de mecanismo debería emplear el para proveer ese apoyo de la manera más eficiente. Mostramos que el carácter costoso de la tecnología de evaluación, y el hecho de que los bancos sólo internalizan una fracción del beneficio del proyecto, implica provisión subóptima de crédito en la solución de mercado. La sub-provisión de crédito es particularmente aguda para los proyectos de más valor, pues la brecha con respecto al beneficio que el banco apropia es mayor en estos casos. Este resultado, y su implicación de que el BPD puede jugar un papel central en la financiación de proyectos de alto valor, contrastan con el énfasis usual en el racionamiento de crédito para empresas y proyectos relativamente débiles (Mipymes, empresas nacientes, aquellas sin acceso a colateral). Mostramos que el BPD puede aliviar estas ineficiencias prestando recursos a bancos comerciales a tasas subsidiadas, dirigidos a empresas que generan alto valor...38 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 06 Febrero de 2016https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/014234.htmlPublic development banks and credit market imperfectionsBanca pública de desarrollo e imperfecciones del mercado crediticioDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPPublic development banksGovernmental loans and guaranteesCostly screeningCredit rationingBancos de desarrolloPréstamos gubernamentalesFinanzasMercado financieroH81, G20, G21, G23Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTEXTdcede2016-06.pdf.txtdcede2016-06.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain92283https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/1bb0f396-ddd7-48c4-8013-2d979bab0659/download471b12ff1e9af38d7af9031c40d87505MD54THUMBNAILdcede2016-06.pdf.jpgdcede2016-06.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg29802https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/4380ce9a-5964-4a2e-a065-0c7257e4ad54/download83aacbbd69d69d5a95bb74d11422e31eMD55ORIGINALdcede2016-06.pdfdcede2016-06.pdfapplication/pdf503874https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/ba62015b-4534-4a36-832b-88245102d962/download95510fb1814b2b61156c65bd2b275097MD511992/8627oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/86272024-06-04 15:40:10.508http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |