Public development banks and credit market imperfections

Which projects/firms should be the target of lending by a Public Development Bank (PDB)? What is the optimal design for the PDB's loans, and the optimal structure for delivering them? We analyze these questions in the context of a model where screening is costly to banks and underprovision of c...

Full description

Autores:
Eslava Mejía, Marcela
Freixas, Xavier
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2016
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8627
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8627
Palabra clave:
Public development banks
Governmental loans and guarantees
Costly screening
Credit rationing
Bancos de desarrollo
Préstamos gubernamentales
Finanzas
Mercado financiero
H81, G20, G21, G23
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Public development banks and credit market imperfections
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv Banca pública de desarrollo e imperfecciones del mercado crediticio
title Public development banks and credit market imperfections
spellingShingle Public development banks and credit market imperfections
Public development banks
Governmental loans and guarantees
Costly screening
Credit rationing
Bancos de desarrollo
Préstamos gubernamentales
Finanzas
Mercado financiero
H81, G20, G21, G23
title_short Public development banks and credit market imperfections
title_full Public development banks and credit market imperfections
title_fullStr Public development banks and credit market imperfections
title_full_unstemmed Public development banks and credit market imperfections
title_sort Public development banks and credit market imperfections
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Eslava Mejía, Marcela
Freixas, Xavier
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Eslava Mejía, Marcela
Freixas, Xavier
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv Public development banks
Governmental loans and guarantees
Costly screening
Credit rationing
topic Public development banks
Governmental loans and guarantees
Costly screening
Credit rationing
Bancos de desarrollo
Préstamos gubernamentales
Finanzas
Mercado financiero
H81, G20, G21, G23
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv Bancos de desarrollo
Préstamos gubernamentales
Finanzas
Mercado financiero
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv H81, G20, G21, G23
description Which projects/firms should be the target of lending by a Public Development Bank (PDB)? What is the optimal design for the PDB's loans, and the optimal structure for delivering them? We analyze these questions in the context of a model where screening is costly to banks and underprovision of credit results from the inability of banks to appropriate the full benefits of projects they finance, more pronounced for high value projects. PDB intervention arises as a natural alternative to alleviate this inefficiency, since it originates in a failure in the private provision of credit. Lending to commercial banks at subsidized rates or providing credit guarantees, targeting the firms that generate high added value, are valid policy alternatives. Though in normal times PDB lending and credit guarantees are shown to be equivalent, lending is preferred when banks are facing a liquidity shortage, while a credit guarantees program is preferred when banks are undercapitalized...
publishDate 2016
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2016
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:55:09Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:55:09Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo
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dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
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dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 1657-5334
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8627
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv 1657-7191
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.57784/1992/8627
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad de los Andes
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca
dc.identifier.repourl.spa.fl_str_mv repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/
identifier_str_mv 1657-5334
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instname:Universidad de los Andes
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url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8627
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv Documentos CEDE No. 06 Febrero de 2016
dc.relation.repec.spa.fl_str_mv https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/014234.html
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv 38 páginas
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
institution Universidad de los Andes
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spelling Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Eslava Mejía, Marcela8149500Freixas, Xavier5f14704c-ae30-45a2-950b-28b9474d08ec5002018-09-27T16:55:09Z2018-09-27T16:55:09Z20161657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/86271657-719110.57784/1992/8627instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/Which projects/firms should be the target of lending by a Public Development Bank (PDB)? What is the optimal design for the PDB's loans, and the optimal structure for delivering them? We analyze these questions in the context of a model where screening is costly to banks and underprovision of credit results from the inability of banks to appropriate the full benefits of projects they finance, more pronounced for high value projects. PDB intervention arises as a natural alternative to alleviate this inefficiency, since it originates in a failure in the private provision of credit. Lending to commercial banks at subsidized rates or providing credit guarantees, targeting the firms that generate high added value, are valid policy alternatives. Though in normal times PDB lending and credit guarantees are shown to be equivalent, lending is preferred when banks are facing a liquidity shortage, while a credit guarantees program is preferred when banks are undercapitalized...Este artículo analiza el papel de un Banco Público de Desarrollo (BPD) en un contexto en que los bancos necesitan recurrir a estrategias costosas de evaluación de proyectos para definir la asignación de créditos. Exploramos dos preguntas: 1) qué tipos de empresas deberían ser las beneficiarias de apoyo financiero público; y 2) qué tipo de mecanismo debería emplear el para proveer ese apoyo de la manera más eficiente. Mostramos que el carácter costoso de la tecnología de evaluación, y el hecho de que los bancos sólo internalizan una fracción del beneficio del proyecto, implica provisión subóptima de crédito en la solución de mercado. La sub-provisión de crédito es particularmente aguda para los proyectos de más valor, pues la brecha con respecto al beneficio que el banco apropia es mayor en estos casos. Este resultado, y su implicación de que el BPD puede jugar un papel central en la financiación de proyectos de alto valor, contrastan con el énfasis usual en el racionamiento de crédito para empresas y proyectos relativamente débiles (Mipymes, empresas nacientes, aquellas sin acceso a colateral). Mostramos que el BPD puede aliviar estas ineficiencias prestando recursos a bancos comerciales a tasas subsidiadas, dirigidos a empresas que generan alto valor...38 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 06 Febrero de 2016https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/014234.htmlPublic development banks and credit market imperfectionsBanca pública de desarrollo e imperfecciones del mercado crediticioDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPPublic development banksGovernmental loans and guaranteesCostly screeningCredit rationingBancos de desarrolloPréstamos gubernamentalesFinanzasMercado financieroH81, G20, G21, G23Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTEXTdcede2016-06.pdf.txtdcede2016-06.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain92283https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/1bb0f396-ddd7-48c4-8013-2d979bab0659/download471b12ff1e9af38d7af9031c40d87505MD54THUMBNAILdcede2016-06.pdf.jpgdcede2016-06.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg29802https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/4380ce9a-5964-4a2e-a065-0c7257e4ad54/download83aacbbd69d69d5a95bb74d11422e31eMD55ORIGINALdcede2016-06.pdfdcede2016-06.pdfapplication/pdf503874https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/ba62015b-4534-4a36-832b-88245102d962/download95510fb1814b2b61156c65bd2b275097MD511992/8627oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/86272024-06-04 15:40:10.508http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co