Can co-management improve the governance of a common-pool resource? Lessons from a framed field experiment in a marine protected area in the Colombian Caribbean
Complexities associated with the management of common pool resources (CPR) threaten governance at some marine protected areas (MPA). In this paper, using economic experimental games (EEG), we investigate the effects of both external regulation and the complementarities between internal regulation an...
- Autores:
-
Moreno Sánchez, Rocío del Pilar
Maldonado, Jorge Higinio
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2009
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8119
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8119
- Palabra clave:
- Common-pool resources
Governance
Co-management
Experimental economic games
Fisheries
Latin America
Economía experimental - América Latina
Gestión ambiental - América Latina
Teoría de los juegos
C93, C72, D02, D70, Q01, Q22, Q28, C23, C25
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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Can co-management improve the governance of a common-pool resource? Lessons from a framed field experiment in a marine protected area in the Colombian Caribbean |
| dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv |
Comanejo y gobernabilidad de recursos de uso común: lecciones a partir de experimentos económicos en un área marina protegida del caribe colombiano |
| title |
Can co-management improve the governance of a common-pool resource? Lessons from a framed field experiment in a marine protected area in the Colombian Caribbean |
| spellingShingle |
Can co-management improve the governance of a common-pool resource? Lessons from a framed field experiment in a marine protected area in the Colombian Caribbean Common-pool resources Governance Co-management Experimental economic games Fisheries Latin America Economía experimental - América Latina Gestión ambiental - América Latina Teoría de los juegos C93, C72, D02, D70, Q01, Q22, Q28, C23, C25 |
| title_short |
Can co-management improve the governance of a common-pool resource? Lessons from a framed field experiment in a marine protected area in the Colombian Caribbean |
| title_full |
Can co-management improve the governance of a common-pool resource? Lessons from a framed field experiment in a marine protected area in the Colombian Caribbean |
| title_fullStr |
Can co-management improve the governance of a common-pool resource? Lessons from a framed field experiment in a marine protected area in the Colombian Caribbean |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Can co-management improve the governance of a common-pool resource? Lessons from a framed field experiment in a marine protected area in the Colombian Caribbean |
| title_sort |
Can co-management improve the governance of a common-pool resource? Lessons from a framed field experiment in a marine protected area in the Colombian Caribbean |
| dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Moreno Sánchez, Rocío del Pilar Maldonado, Jorge Higinio |
| dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Moreno Sánchez, Rocío del Pilar Maldonado, Jorge Higinio |
| dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Common-pool resources Governance Co-management Experimental economic games Fisheries Latin America |
| topic |
Common-pool resources Governance Co-management Experimental economic games Fisheries Latin America Economía experimental - América Latina Gestión ambiental - América Latina Teoría de los juegos C93, C72, D02, D70, Q01, Q22, Q28, C23, C25 |
| dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv |
Economía experimental - América Latina Gestión ambiental - América Latina Teoría de los juegos |
| dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv |
C93, C72, D02, D70, Q01, Q22, Q28, C23, C25 |
| description |
Complexities associated with the management of common pool resources (CPR) threaten governance at some marine protected areas (MPA). In this paper, using economic experimental games (EEG), we investigate the effects of both external regulation and the complementarities between internal regulation and non-coercive authority intervention-what we call co-management-on fishermen's extraction decisions. We perform EEG with fishermen inhabiting the influence zone of an MPA in the Colombian Caribbean. The results show that co-management exhibits the best results, both in terms of resource sustainability and reduction in extraction, highlighting the importance of strategies that recognize communities as key actors in the decision-making process for the sustainable use and conservation of CPR in protected areas. |
| publishDate |
2009 |
| dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2009 |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:50:40Z |
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2018-09-27T16:50:40Z |
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Documento de trabajo |
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http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
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Text |
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https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
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1657-5334 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8119 |
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1657-7191 |
| dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
10.57784/1992/8119 |
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instname:Universidad de los Andes |
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reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
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repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
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1657-5334 1657-7191 10.57784/1992/8119 instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8119 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
| language |
eng |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv |
Documentos CEDE No. 15 Junio de 2009 |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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openAccess |
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30 páginas |
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application/pdf |
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes |
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Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Moreno Sánchez, Rocío del Pilare50e5578-2dec-476e-8b8e-e308e8e0827c600Maldonado, Jorge Higinio32266158-6a94-4e05-b6a3-9fbc956d02396002018-09-27T16:50:40Z2018-09-27T16:50:40Z20091657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/81191657-719110.57784/1992/8119instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/Complexities associated with the management of common pool resources (CPR) threaten governance at some marine protected areas (MPA). In this paper, using economic experimental games (EEG), we investigate the effects of both external regulation and the complementarities between internal regulation and non-coercive authority intervention-what we call co-management-on fishermen's extraction decisions. We perform EEG with fishermen inhabiting the influence zone of an MPA in the Colombian Caribbean. The results show that co-management exhibits the best results, both in terms of resource sustainability and reduction in extraction, highlighting the importance of strategies that recognize communities as key actors in the decision-making process for the sustainable use and conservation of CPR in protected areas.La gestión de los recursos de uso común (RUC) presentes en áreas marinas protegidas (AMP) es especialmente difícil, debido a varias complejidades asociadas con su aprovechamiento. En este documento analizamos, utilizando juegos experimentales económicos (JEE), el efecto que sobre las decisiones de extracción de recursos tienen dos estrategias de manejo: la regulación externa y el comanejo. Operativamente, definimos el comanejo como la complementariedad entre regulación interna (comunicación) e intervención no coercitiva por parte de las autoridades. Los juegos experimentales se desarrollaron en ocho comunidades de pescadores que habitan en la zona de influencia de un área protegida en el Caribe colombiano, el Parque Nacional Natural Corales del Rosario y San Bernardo. Los resultados de los JEE muestran que la estrategia de comanejo, relativa a la de regulación externa, mejora significativamente la sostenibilidad en el uso del recurso y reduce la extracción. Estos resultados resaltan la importancia de reconocer a comunidades locales, usuarias de recursos, como actores clave en el proceso de toma de decisiones para el uso sostenible y la conservación de recursos de uso común en áreas protegidas.30 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 15 Junio de 2009Can co-management improve the governance of a common-pool resource? Lessons from a framed field experiment in a marine protected area in the Colombian CaribbeanComanejo y gobernabilidad de recursos de uso común: lecciones a partir de experimentos económicos en un área marina protegida del caribe colombianoDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPCommon-pool resourcesGovernanceCo-managementExperimental economic gamesFisheriesLatin AmericaEconomía experimental - América LatinaGestión ambiental - América LatinaTeoría de los juegosC93, C72, D02, D70, Q01, Q22, Q28, C23, C25Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTHUMBNAILdcede2009-15.pdf.jpgdcede2009-15.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg3911https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/e78c688c-fb3c-49f5-bd3e-1513de063d8d/download28fb59c1988cb09514a8fab40065dc1eMD55TEXTdcede2009-15.pdf.txtdcede2009-15.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain60631https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/cfb9f844-fbc8-459f-ada9-71f8da1fd4f1/download50cd94af7dd1a3ff9e547a9150a73a15MD54ORIGINALdcede2009-15.pdfdcede2009-15.pdfapplication/pdf476326https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/dfa1a8e2-ee28-4287-aa73-75359d69d305/downloadc97e9f51953bf0d9825aaa8cff56d253MD511992/8119oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/81192024-06-04 15:42:24.085http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |