Implementable Mechanisms for discrete utility functions, a solution using Tropical Geometry
For mechanisms with two possible outcomes and a unique agent with two posible types, we state sufficient and necessary conditions over the type space that guarantees the existence of an incentive compatible mechanism. By using tropical geometry, we found that these conditions rely only on the relati...
- Autores:
-
Chitiva Bocanegra, Julián Enrique
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2019
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/41101
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/41101
- Palabra clave:
- Mechanism Design
Incentive compatible
Implementable mechanism
Tropical geometry
C62, C65, C79, D82, D86
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
| Summary: | For mechanisms with two possible outcomes and a unique agent with two posible types, we state sufficient and necessary conditions over the type space that guarantees the existence of an incentive compatible mechanism. By using tropical geometry, we found that these conditions rely only on the relative valuations to be increasing over types. This result extends implementability for discrete utility functions. |
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