Media markets, special interests, and voters
This paper examines the role of mass media in countering special interest group influence. I use the concentration of campaign contributions from Political Action Committees to proxy special interests' capture US Senate candidates from 1980 to 2002, and compare the reaction of voters to increas...
- Autores:
-
Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2012
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8315
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8315
- Palabra clave:
- Campaign finance
Elections
Media
Special interests
Fondos para campañas electorales
Elecciones
Medios de comunicación de masas - Aspectos políticos
D72, L82
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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|
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Media markets, special interests, and voters |
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv |
Mercados de medios, grupos de interés, y electores |
title |
Media markets, special interests, and voters |
spellingShingle |
Media markets, special interests, and voters Campaign finance Elections Media Special interests Fondos para campañas electorales Elecciones Medios de comunicación de masas - Aspectos políticos D72, L82 |
title_short |
Media markets, special interests, and voters |
title_full |
Media markets, special interests, and voters |
title_fullStr |
Media markets, special interests, and voters |
title_full_unstemmed |
Media markets, special interests, and voters |
title_sort |
Media markets, special interests, and voters |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo |
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo |
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Campaign finance Elections Media Special interests |
topic |
Campaign finance Elections Media Special interests Fondos para campañas electorales Elecciones Medios de comunicación de masas - Aspectos políticos D72, L82 |
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv |
Fondos para campañas electorales Elecciones Medios de comunicación de masas - Aspectos políticos |
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv |
D72, L82 |
description |
This paper examines the role of mass media in countering special interest group influence. I use the concentration of campaign contributions from Political Action Committees to proxy special interests' capture US Senate candidates from 1980 to 2002, and compare the reaction of voters to increases in concentration in two different types of media markets - in-state media markets and out-of-state media markets. Unlike in-state media markets, out-of-state markets focus on neighboring states' politics and elections. Thus, if citizens punish political capture, increases in concentration of special interest contributions to a particular candidate should reduce his vote share in in-state counties relative to the out-of-state counties, where the candidate receives less coverage. I find that a one standard deviation increase in concentration of special interest contributions to incumbents reduces their vote share by about 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points in in-state counties relative to the out-of-state counties. Results are similar in specifications that rely solely on variation in concentration across time within the same county, and when the sample is limited to in-state counties that are contiguous to out-of-state counties and have similar demographic structures. A placebo test where in-state counties bordering out-of-state ones are compared to other in-state counties shows no effect, confirming the identification hypothesis that the results are not driven by geographic characteristics or distance from the media center of the state. |
publishDate |
2012 |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2012 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:52:06Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:52:06Z |
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv |
Documento de trabajo |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.type.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.type.content.spa.fl_str_mv |
Text |
dc.type.redcol.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP |
format |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
1657-5334 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8315 |
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv |
1657-7191 |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
10.57784/1992/8315 |
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad de los Andes |
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
dc.identifier.repourl.spa.fl_str_mv |
repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
identifier_str_mv |
1657-5334 1657-7191 10.57784/1992/8315 instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8315 |
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv |
Documentos CEDE No. 08 Junio de 2012 |
dc.relation.repec.SPA.fl_str_mv |
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/009796.html |
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
dc.rights.accessrights.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv |
58 páginas |
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes |
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spelling |
Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo82075002018-09-27T16:52:06Z2018-09-27T16:52:06Z20121657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/83151657-719110.57784/1992/8315instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/This paper examines the role of mass media in countering special interest group influence. I use the concentration of campaign contributions from Political Action Committees to proxy special interests' capture US Senate candidates from 1980 to 2002, and compare the reaction of voters to increases in concentration in two different types of media markets - in-state media markets and out-of-state media markets. Unlike in-state media markets, out-of-state markets focus on neighboring states' politics and elections. Thus, if citizens punish political capture, increases in concentration of special interest contributions to a particular candidate should reduce his vote share in in-state counties relative to the out-of-state counties, where the candidate receives less coverage. I find that a one standard deviation increase in concentration of special interest contributions to incumbents reduces their vote share by about 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points in in-state counties relative to the out-of-state counties. Results are similar in specifications that rely solely on variation in concentration across time within the same county, and when the sample is limited to in-state counties that are contiguous to out-of-state counties and have similar demographic structures. A placebo test where in-state counties bordering out-of-state ones are compared to other in-state counties shows no effect, confirming the identification hypothesis that the results are not driven by geographic characteristics or distance from the media center of the state.En este documento estudio la capacidad de los medios masivos de comunicación para contrarrestar la influencia de los grupos de interés. Para ello, calculo el grado de concentración de las contribuciones a las campañas electorales para el Senado de los Estados Unidos entre 1980 y 2002, y comparo la reacción de los electores frente a incrementos en la concentración en dos tipos de mercados de medios ¿los mercados -en-el-estado y mercados fuera-del-estado. Contrario a los mercados de medios en-el-estado, los mercados fuera-del-estado se enfocan en la política y elecciones de estados vecinos. Así, si los ciudadanos castigan la captura política, incrementos en la concentración de las contribuciones por parte de grupos de interés a un candidato en particular deben reducir su votación en los condados con mercados en-el-estado en comparación con aquellos fuera-del- estado, donde se da menos cubrimiento al candidato. Los resultados indican que un incremento de una desviación estándar en el índice de concentración reduce la votación por el senador de turno en aproximadamente 0,5a1,5 puntos porcentuales en los condados en-el-estado relativo a los condados fuera-del-estado...58 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 08 Junio de 2012https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/009796.htmlMedia markets, special interests, and votersMercados de medios, grupos de interés, y electoresDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPCampaign financeElectionsMediaSpecial interestsFondos para campañas electoralesEleccionesMedios de comunicación de masas - Aspectos políticosD72, L82Facultad de EconomíaPublicationORIGINALdcede2012-08.pdfdcede2012-08.pdfapplication/pdf2102334https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/4670d4c9-e74c-4a42-983f-a540400f03a0/download2c985b0d4cb36e143794d808189ae58dMD51THUMBNAILdcede2012-08.pdf.jpgdcede2012-08.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg7893https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/0c55975b-fb46-41a6-9c62-02d8ec128592/download8cc46308831d83cb39605e5991cc32acMD55TEXTdcede2012-08.pdf.txtdcede2012-08.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain470753https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/cf6e79a6-8256-46d7-af17-35e30193617b/download59258c0a17cdcf7f8ed955f470133455MD541992/8315oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/83152024-06-04 15:46:40.666http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |