When ignorance is bliss: theory and experiment on collective learning
When do groups and societies choose to be uninformed? We study a commit-tee that needs to vote on a reform which will give every member a private state-dependent payoff. The committee can vote to learn the state at no cost. We show that the committee decides not to learn the state when preferences a...
- Autores:
-
Ginzburg, Boris
Guerra Forero, José Alberto
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2017
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8687
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8687
- Palabra clave:
- Voting
Collective learning
Reform adoption
Information acquisition
Laboratory experiment
Cuerpos legislativos - Votación
Prácticas parlamentarias
Planificación política - Toma de decisiones
Teoría de los juegos
C72, C92, D71, D72, D83
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Ginzburg, Boris5585bb05-3adf-49c3-bc41-1100108bc079600Guerra Forero, José Alberto311336002018-09-27T16:55:54Z2018-09-27T16:55:54Z20171657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/86871657-719110.57784/1992/8687instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/When do groups and societies choose to be uninformed? We study a commit-tee that needs to vote on a reform which will give every member a private state-dependent payoff. The committee can vote to learn the state at no cost. We show that the committee decides not to learn the state when preferences are more fractionalised on the state-relevant dimension than on the state-irrelevant dimension. Hence, decisions on divisive issues are likely to be made in haste, and heterogeneous societies tend to seek less information. A simple laboratory experiment confirms key results.¿Cuándo los grupos y las sociedades deciden no estar informados? Estudiamos un comité que necesita votar sobre una reforma que dará a cada miembro un pago privado dependiente del estado. El comité puede votar por aprender el estado sin costo alguno. Mostramos que el comité decide no aprender el estado cuando las preferencias son más fraccionadas en la dimensión relevante del estado que en la dimensión irrelevante del estado. Por lo tanto, es probable que las decisiones sobre cuestiones divisivas se hagan con prisa, y las sociedades heterogéneas tiendan a buscar menos información. Un experimento de laboratorio confirma los resultados teóricos claves.46 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 16 Febrero de 2017https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/015377.htmlWhen ignorance is bliss: theory and experiment on collective learningCuando la ignorancia es dicha: teoría y experimento sobre aprendizaje colectivoDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPVotingCollective learningReform adoptionInformation acquisitionLaboratory experimentCuerpos legislativos - VotaciónPrácticas parlamentariasPlanificación política - Toma de decisionesTeoría de los juegosC72, C92, D71, D72, D83Facultad de EconomíaPublicationORIGINALdcede2017-16.pdfdcede2017-16.pdfapplication/pdf1001022https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/820153be-baaa-4a01-b240-717c040f603e/downloadc0f3b8c80326be39b2bee055668797f7MD51THUMBNAILdcede2017-16.pdf.jpgdcede2017-16.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg10271https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/afd0f4ac-0881-4a1a-b35b-93f5bd3e5b72/downloaddf51bf7a0a2d9eec38189ee89e6e6195MD55TEXTdcede2017-16.pdf.txtdcede2017-16.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain100977https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/b08cc12f-c6e2-4c57-9d3c-deb9344ece9b/download34abb35f4dcb297d2c975eea3dcad890MD541992/8687oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/86872024-06-04 15:43:55.55http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
When ignorance is bliss: theory and experiment on collective learning |
| dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv |
Cuando la ignorancia es dicha: teoría y experimento sobre aprendizaje colectivo |
| title |
When ignorance is bliss: theory and experiment on collective learning |
| spellingShingle |
When ignorance is bliss: theory and experiment on collective learning Voting Collective learning Reform adoption Information acquisition Laboratory experiment Cuerpos legislativos - Votación Prácticas parlamentarias Planificación política - Toma de decisiones Teoría de los juegos C72, C92, D71, D72, D83 |
| title_short |
When ignorance is bliss: theory and experiment on collective learning |
| title_full |
When ignorance is bliss: theory and experiment on collective learning |
| title_fullStr |
When ignorance is bliss: theory and experiment on collective learning |
| title_full_unstemmed |
When ignorance is bliss: theory and experiment on collective learning |
| title_sort |
When ignorance is bliss: theory and experiment on collective learning |
| dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Ginzburg, Boris Guerra Forero, José Alberto |
| dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Ginzburg, Boris Guerra Forero, José Alberto |
| dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Voting Collective learning Reform adoption Information acquisition Laboratory experiment |
| topic |
Voting Collective learning Reform adoption Information acquisition Laboratory experiment Cuerpos legislativos - Votación Prácticas parlamentarias Planificación política - Toma de decisiones Teoría de los juegos C72, C92, D71, D72, D83 |
| dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv |
Cuerpos legislativos - Votación Prácticas parlamentarias Planificación política - Toma de decisiones Teoría de los juegos |
| dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv |
C72, C92, D71, D72, D83 |
| description |
When do groups and societies choose to be uninformed? We study a commit-tee that needs to vote on a reform which will give every member a private state-dependent payoff. The committee can vote to learn the state at no cost. We show that the committee decides not to learn the state when preferences are more fractionalised on the state-relevant dimension than on the state-irrelevant dimension. Hence, decisions on divisive issues are likely to be made in haste, and heterogeneous societies tend to seek less information. A simple laboratory experiment confirms key results. |
| publishDate |
2017 |
| dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2017 |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:55:54Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:55:54Z |
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Documento de trabajo |
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http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
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Text |
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https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
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1657-5334 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8687 |
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1657-7191 |
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10.57784/1992/8687 |
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instname:Universidad de los Andes |
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reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8687 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
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eng |
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Documentos CEDE No. 16 Febrero de 2017 |
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https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/015377.html |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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openAccess |
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46 páginas |
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application/pdf |
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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