When ignorance is bliss: theory and experiment on collective learning
When do groups and societies choose to be uninformed? We study a commit-tee that needs to vote on a reform which will give every member a private state-dependent payoff. The committee can vote to learn the state at no cost. We show that the committee decides not to learn the state when preferences a...
- Autores:
-
Ginzburg, Boris
Guerra Forero, José Alberto
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2017
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8687
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8687
- Palabra clave:
- Voting
Collective learning
Reform adoption
Information acquisition
Laboratory experiment
Cuerpos legislativos - Votación
Prácticas parlamentarias
Planificación política - Toma de decisiones
Teoría de los juegos
C72, C92, D71, D72, D83
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
| Summary: | When do groups and societies choose to be uninformed? We study a commit-tee that needs to vote on a reform which will give every member a private state-dependent payoff. The committee can vote to learn the state at no cost. We show that the committee decides not to learn the state when preferences are more fractionalised on the state-relevant dimension than on the state-irrelevant dimension. Hence, decisions on divisive issues are likely to be made in haste, and heterogeneous societies tend to seek less information. A simple laboratory experiment confirms key results. |
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