The hidden face of justice : fairness, discrimination and distribution in transitional justice processes
This article contributes to the literature on the impact of transitional justice measures using microfoundational evidence from experiments. We argue that there is a distributional dilemma at the heart of transitional justice programs, given that the State must allocate goods and services both to vi...
- Autores:
-
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
Casas Casas, Andrés
Méndez Méndez, Nathalie
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2013
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8437
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8437
- Palabra clave:
- Transitional justice
Fairness
Field experiments
Third-party punishment game
Justicia transicional
Justicia distributiva
Víctimas de delitos - Aspectos económicos
C93, D03, D63, D64, D74, H56
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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|
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The hidden face of justice : fairness, discrimination and distribution in transitional justice processes |
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv |
La cara oculta de la justicia : justicia, discriminación y distribución en los procesos de justicia transicional |
title |
The hidden face of justice : fairness, discrimination and distribution in transitional justice processes |
spellingShingle |
The hidden face of justice : fairness, discrimination and distribution in transitional justice processes Transitional justice Fairness Field experiments Third-party punishment game Justicia transicional Justicia distributiva Víctimas de delitos - Aspectos económicos C93, D03, D63, D64, D74, H56 |
title_short |
The hidden face of justice : fairness, discrimination and distribution in transitional justice processes |
title_full |
The hidden face of justice : fairness, discrimination and distribution in transitional justice processes |
title_fullStr |
The hidden face of justice : fairness, discrimination and distribution in transitional justice processes |
title_full_unstemmed |
The hidden face of justice : fairness, discrimination and distribution in transitional justice processes |
title_sort |
The hidden face of justice : fairness, discrimination and distribution in transitional justice processes |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo Casas Casas, Andrés Méndez Méndez, Nathalie |
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo Casas Casas, Andrés Méndez Méndez, Nathalie |
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Transitional justice Fairness Field experiments Third-party punishment game |
topic |
Transitional justice Fairness Field experiments Third-party punishment game Justicia transicional Justicia distributiva Víctimas de delitos - Aspectos económicos C93, D03, D63, D64, D74, H56 |
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv |
Justicia transicional Justicia distributiva Víctimas de delitos - Aspectos económicos |
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv |
C93, D03, D63, D64, D74, H56 |
description |
This article contributes to the literature on the impact of transitional justice measures using microfoundational evidence from experiments. We argue that there is a distributional dilemma at the heart of transitional justice programs, given that the State must allocate goods and services both to victims and excombatants. Individual and social preferences over these processes matter, given that they are likely to scale up to undermine or increase public support for transitional justice programs. We offer evidence from the Colombian case, to show what we call the hidden face of justice effect, which occurs when in the transition from war to peace distributional dilemmas arise and generate a social sanction function that creates negative incentives that can affect the achievement of reintegration of excombatants and jeopardizes the maintenance of peace. In order to explore the microfoundations that underlie the differences between allocations to victims and excombatants, we use a database built by Cárdenas et. al (2008) and find that excombatants expect lower transfers from public officers and indeed receive lower transfers, if compared to the victims and the control groups included in the study, despite the fact that third-party observers have the power to punish senders when making offers seen by the third-party as unfair. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2013 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:53:11Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:53:11Z |
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv |
Documento de trabajo |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.type.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.type.content.spa.fl_str_mv |
Text |
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https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP |
format |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
1657-5334 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8437 |
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv |
1657-7191 |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
10.57784/1992/8437 |
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad de los Andes |
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
dc.identifier.repourl.spa.fl_str_mv |
repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
identifier_str_mv |
1657-5334 1657-7191 10.57784/1992/8437 instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8437 |
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv |
Documentos CEDE No. 40 Septiembre de 2013 |
dc.relation.repec.SPA.fl_str_mv |
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/011470.html |
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
dc.rights.accessrights.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv |
30 páginas |
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
institution |
Universidad de los Andes |
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spelling |
Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo7633500Casas Casas, Andrés72be3af7-0935-4afe-94fe-3c236413eab8500Méndez Méndez, Nathalie8c71cfc6-9679-4635-aa22-7520f2a35d184002018-09-27T16:53:11Z2018-09-27T16:53:11Z20131657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/84371657-719110.57784/1992/8437instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/This article contributes to the literature on the impact of transitional justice measures using microfoundational evidence from experiments. We argue that there is a distributional dilemma at the heart of transitional justice programs, given that the State must allocate goods and services both to victims and excombatants. Individual and social preferences over these processes matter, given that they are likely to scale up to undermine or increase public support for transitional justice programs. We offer evidence from the Colombian case, to show what we call the hidden face of justice effect, which occurs when in the transition from war to peace distributional dilemmas arise and generate a social sanction function that creates negative incentives that can affect the achievement of reintegration of excombatants and jeopardizes the maintenance of peace. In order to explore the microfoundations that underlie the differences between allocations to victims and excombatants, we use a database built by Cárdenas et. al (2008) and find that excombatants expect lower transfers from public officers and indeed receive lower transfers, if compared to the victims and the control groups included in the study, despite the fact that third-party observers have the power to punish senders when making offers seen by the third-party as unfair.Este artículo busca contribuir a la literatura sobre el impacto de las medidas de justicia transicional desde la perspectiva de los microfundamentos. A través del análisis de los resultados de juegos experimentales se establece la presencia de un dilema distributivo que al parecer está a la base de los mecanismos de justicia transicional cuando el estado debe destinar recursos, bines y servicios tanto a las víctimas como a los excombatientes. Las preferencias sociales en el nivel microsocial importan ya que determinan la legitimidad y el éxito de las medidas escogidas para facilitar la transición. Ofrecemos evidencia de cómo en el caso colombiano se observa la presencia de lo que denominamos como el efecto de la cara oculta de la justicia. Este se produce cuando en la transición de la guerra a la paz surgen dilemas distributivos que a su vez generan una función de sanción social que crea incentivos negativos que pueden afectar el logro de la reinserción de los excombatientes y puede poner en peligro la estabilización y el mantenimiento de la paz. Buscando explorar los micro fundamentos que subyacen a las diferencias entre las distribuciones a víctimas y excombatientes usamos los datos de los experimentos de Cárdenas et. al. en 2008, encontrando que los excombatientes esperan transferencias inferiores y de igual forma, reciben menores cantidades de dinero en comparación con las víctimas que participaron en el estudio.30 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 40 Septiembre de 2013https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/011470.htmlThe hidden face of justice : fairness, discrimination and distribution in transitional justice processesLa cara oculta de la justicia : justicia, discriminación y distribución en los procesos de justicia transicionalDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPTransitional justiceFairnessField experimentsThird-party punishment gameJusticia transicionalJusticia distributivaVíctimas de delitos - Aspectos económicosC93, D03, D63, D64, D74, H56Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTEXTdcede2013-40.pdf.txtdcede2013-40.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain77419https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/4607c8d7-57b6-4865-ad1e-ce0b1c759b8c/download62f7c7692716262a14679c8a3fc5cbd3MD54THUMBNAILdcede2013-40.pdf.jpgdcede2013-40.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg10062https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/53040a8c-d7f6-4825-ab97-5c5cf09c2041/downloadbaa689b2e92a6f19a228a6312146da7dMD55ORIGINALdcede2013-40.pdfdcede2013-40.pdfapplication/pdf500772https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/f4089489-0e17-4b50-ad59-e0468d31855f/downloadc1b483480c0afa734f89c01d899a7b22MD511992/8437oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/84372024-06-04 15:44:16.358http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |