The hidden face of justice : fairness, discrimination and distribution in transitional justice processes
This article contributes to the literature on the impact of transitional justice measures using microfoundational evidence from experiments. We argue that there is a distributional dilemma at the heart of transitional justice programs, given that the State must allocate goods and services both to vi...
- Autores:
-
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
Casas Casas, Andrés
Méndez Méndez, Nathalie
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2013
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8437
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8437
- Palabra clave:
- Transitional justice
Fairness
Field experiments
Third-party punishment game
Justicia transicional
Justicia distributiva
Víctimas de delitos - Aspectos económicos
C93, D03, D63, D64, D74, H56
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
| Summary: | This article contributes to the literature on the impact of transitional justice measures using microfoundational evidence from experiments. We argue that there is a distributional dilemma at the heart of transitional justice programs, given that the State must allocate goods and services both to victims and excombatants. Individual and social preferences over these processes matter, given that they are likely to scale up to undermine or increase public support for transitional justice programs. We offer evidence from the Colombian case, to show what we call the hidden face of justice effect, which occurs when in the transition from war to peace distributional dilemmas arise and generate a social sanction function that creates negative incentives that can affect the achievement of reintegration of excombatants and jeopardizes the maintenance of peace. In order to explore the microfoundations that underlie the differences between allocations to victims and excombatants, we use a database built by Cárdenas et. al (2008) and find that excombatants expect lower transfers from public officers and indeed receive lower transfers, if compared to the victims and the control groups included in the study, despite the fact that third-party observers have the power to punish senders when making offers seen by the third-party as unfair. |
|---|