Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets

By means of a suitable Bayesian game we study spot electricity markets from a structural point of view. We address the problem of individual and aggregate eficciency and we show how to value water from market observables. We compare the former to engineering methods and apply our methodology to Colo...

Full description

Autores:
Espinosa Farfán, Miguel Andrés
Riascos Villegas, Alvaro José
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2010
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8155
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8155
Palabra clave:
Multi-unit auctions
Oligopoly
Electricity markets
Subastas
Oligopolios
Producción de energía eléctrica
D44, D43, L94
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
id UNIANDES2_73999de0438de141a44679ad5d0dfe54
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8155
network_acronym_str UNIANDES2
network_name_str Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
repository_id_str
spelling Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Espinosa Farfán, Miguel Andrésbc0ae1b2-2ad6-4a4a-8fd8-313fe8f6e71c500Riascos Villegas, Alvaro José9d5edd1a-2800-42af-b5b7-6cd5baeac1925002018-09-27T16:50:54Z2018-09-27T16:50:54Z20101657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/81551657-719110.57784/1992/8155instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/By means of a suitable Bayesian game we study spot electricity markets from a structural point of view. We address the problem of individual and aggregate eficciency and we show how to value water from market observables. We compare the former to engineering methods and apply our methodology to Colombian spot electricity market. Our results show that big gas and small hydro plants overbid, resources are undervalued by engineering costs and aggregate costs would have been considerably smaller if agents had played optimally. Revealed costs show a substantial gain in eficciency in the Vickrey auction compared to the actual uniform auction. Por medio de un juego Bayesiano estudiamos sectores eléctricos spot desde un punto de vista estructural. Nos concentramos en el problema de eficiencia individual y agregada, y mostramos como encontrar valoraciones de recursos cómo el agua a partir de variables observables en el mercado. Comparamos estos resultados con los resultantes por métodos de ingeniería y aplicamos nuestra metodología al mercado spot del sector eléctrico colombiano. Nuestros resultados muestran que plantas de gas grandes e hidroeléctricas pequeñas sobre-reportan; recursos cómo el agua son subestimados por métodos de ingeniería y los costos agregados de producción energética hubiesen sido considerablemente menores si los agentes del sector se hubiesen comportado óptimamente. Costos revelados muestran una ganancia sustancial en eficiencia en la subasta Vickrey comparada con la subasta uniforme que actualmente utiliza el sector.25 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 10 Marzo de 2010https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/006856.htmlStrategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity marketsComportamiento estratégico, valoración de recursos y competencia en sectores eléctricosDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPMulti-unit auctionsOligopolyElectricity marketsSubastasOligopoliosProducción de energía eléctricaD44, D43, L94Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTHUMBNAILdcede2010-10.pdf.jpgdcede2010-10.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg11252https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/72a5bb1e-e6f2-4abc-8121-f4f84e25740d/download5ab310658504475318eb62d11f1cf6ecMD55TEXTdcede2010-10.pdf.txtdcede2010-10.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain53720https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/af0633e0-28f1-4461-9c49-cbe4a87b8aef/download0efcd3728e102690dad3e7024b48d2c5MD54ORIGINALdcede2010-10.pdfdcede2010-10.pdfapplication/pdf2572262https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/3498b9bb-2d5a-46ac-9cdf-3adff0d083ec/download99c648f7c734e8cb37e8808f58667ad8MD511992/8155oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/81552024-06-04 15:32:30.657http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv Comportamiento estratégico, valoración de recursos y competencia en sectores eléctricos
title Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
spellingShingle Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
Multi-unit auctions
Oligopoly
Electricity markets
Subastas
Oligopolios
Producción de energía eléctrica
D44, D43, L94
title_short Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
title_full Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
title_fullStr Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
title_full_unstemmed Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
title_sort Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Espinosa Farfán, Miguel Andrés
Riascos Villegas, Alvaro José
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Espinosa Farfán, Miguel Andrés
Riascos Villegas, Alvaro José
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv Multi-unit auctions
Oligopoly
Electricity markets
topic Multi-unit auctions
Oligopoly
Electricity markets
Subastas
Oligopolios
Producción de energía eléctrica
D44, D43, L94
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv Subastas
Oligopolios
Producción de energía eléctrica
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv D44, D43, L94
description By means of a suitable Bayesian game we study spot electricity markets from a structural point of view. We address the problem of individual and aggregate eficciency and we show how to value water from market observables. We compare the former to engineering methods and apply our methodology to Colombian spot electricity market. Our results show that big gas and small hydro plants overbid, resources are undervalued by engineering costs and aggregate costs would have been considerably smaller if agents had played optimally. Revealed costs show a substantial gain in eficciency in the Vickrey auction compared to the actual uniform auction. 
publishDate 2010
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2010
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:50:54Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:50:54Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.type.coar.spa.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042
dc.type.content.spa.fl_str_mv Text
dc.type.redcol.spa.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP
format http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 1657-5334
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8155
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv 1657-7191
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.57784/1992/8155
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad de los Andes
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca
dc.identifier.repourl.spa.fl_str_mv repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/
identifier_str_mv 1657-5334
1657-7191
10.57784/1992/8155
instname:Universidad de los Andes
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca
repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/
url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8155
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv Documentos CEDE No. 10 Marzo de 2010
dc.relation.repec.spa.fl_str_mv https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/006856.html
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights.accessrights.spa.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.coar.spa.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv 25 páginas
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
institution Universidad de los Andes
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/72a5bb1e-e6f2-4abc-8121-f4f84e25740d/download
https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/af0633e0-28f1-4461-9c49-cbe4a87b8aef/download
https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/3498b9bb-2d5a-46ac-9cdf-3adff0d083ec/download
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv 5ab310658504475318eb62d11f1cf6ec
0efcd3728e102690dad3e7024b48d2c5
99c648f7c734e8cb37e8808f58667ad8
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv MD5
MD5
MD5
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio institucional Séneca
repository.mail.fl_str_mv adminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co
_version_ 1808390290301517824

Publicaciones similares