Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
By means of a suitable Bayesian game we study spot electricity markets from a structural point of view. We address the problem of individual and aggregate eficciency and we show how to value water from market observables. We compare the former to engineering methods and apply our methodology to Colo...
- Autores:
-
Espinosa Farfán, Miguel Andrés
Riascos Villegas, Alvaro José
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2010
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8155
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8155
- Palabra clave:
- Multi-unit auctions
Oligopoly
Electricity markets
Subastas
Oligopolios
Producción de energía eléctrica
D44, D43, L94
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
| Summary: | By means of a suitable Bayesian game we study spot electricity markets from a structural point of view. We address the problem of individual and aggregate eficciency and we show how to value water from market observables. We compare the former to engineering methods and apply our methodology to Colombian spot electricity market. Our results show that big gas and small hydro plants overbid, resources are undervalued by engineering costs and aggregate costs would have been considerably smaller if agents had played optimally. Revealed costs show a substantial gain in eficciency in the Vickrey auction compared to the actual uniform auction. |
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