Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control

This study examines the effect of family management, ownership, and control on capital structure for 523 listed and unlisted Colombian firms between 1996 and 2006 (5,094 firm-year observations). The study finds that when families are involved in management, debt levels tend to be lower for younger f...

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Autores:
González Ferrero, Maximiliano
Guzmán Vásquez, Álvaro Alexander
Pombo Vejarano, Carlos
Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2011
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/46365
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46365
Palabra clave:
Family businesses
Family control
Capital structure
Colombia
Empresas familiares - Colombia
Empresas familiares - Finanzas
Administración
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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network_acronym_str UNIANDES2
network_name_str Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
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dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv Empresas familiares y deuda: tensión entre aversión al riesgo y el riesgo de perder el control
title Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control
spellingShingle Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control
Family businesses
Family control
Capital structure
Colombia
Empresas familiares - Colombia
Empresas familiares - Finanzas
Administración
title_short Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control
title_full Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control
title_fullStr Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control
title_full_unstemmed Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control
title_sort Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control
dc.creator.fl_str_mv González Ferrero, Maximiliano
Guzmán Vásquez, Álvaro Alexander
Pombo Vejarano, Carlos
Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv González Ferrero, Maximiliano
Guzmán Vásquez, Álvaro Alexander
Pombo Vejarano, Carlos
Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv Family businesses
Family control
Capital structure
Colombia
topic Family businesses
Family control
Capital structure
Colombia
Empresas familiares - Colombia
Empresas familiares - Finanzas
Administración
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv Empresas familiares - Colombia
Empresas familiares - Finanzas
dc.subject.themes.none.fl_str_mv Administración
description This study examines the effect of family management, ownership, and control on capital structure for 523 listed and unlisted Colombian firms between 1996 and 2006 (5,094 firm-year observations). The study finds that when families are involved in management, debt levels tend to be lower for younger firms when the founder is still present or when heirs act as managers, but trends heighten as the firm ages. When families' involvement derives from direct and indirect ownership, the family/debt relationship is positive; consistent with the idea that external supervision accompanies higher debt levels and reduces the risk of losing control. When families are present on the board of directors (but are not in management), debt levels tend to be lower, suggesting that family directors are more risk-averse. The results stress the tradeoff between two distinct motivations that determine the capital structure of family firms: Risk aversion pushes firms toward lower debt levels, but the need to finance growth and the risk of losing control make family firms prefer higher debt levels.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2011
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-09-21T15:18:56Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-09-21T15:18:56Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo
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dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46365
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad de los Andes
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url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46365
dc.language.iso.es_CO.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv Galeras de Administración, No. 33
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dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv 22 páginas
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes
dc.publisher.faculty.none.fl_str_mv Facultad de Administración
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes
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spelling Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2González Ferrero, Maximiliano8532600Guzmán Vásquez, Álvaro Alexandera9d25b6b-263a-48a9-aa36-2924a7fff714600Pombo Vejarano, Carlos9885600Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea5e161ddb-f902-45b0-bb70-79288bf634ac6002020-09-21T15:18:56Z2020-09-21T15:18:56Z20111900-1606http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46365instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/This study examines the effect of family management, ownership, and control on capital structure for 523 listed and unlisted Colombian firms between 1996 and 2006 (5,094 firm-year observations). The study finds that when families are involved in management, debt levels tend to be lower for younger firms when the founder is still present or when heirs act as managers, but trends heighten as the firm ages. When families' involvement derives from direct and indirect ownership, the family/debt relationship is positive; consistent with the idea that external supervision accompanies higher debt levels and reduces the risk of losing control. When families are present on the board of directors (but are not in management), debt levels tend to be lower, suggesting that family directors are more risk-averse. The results stress the tradeoff between two distinct motivations that determine the capital structure of family firms: Risk aversion pushes firms toward lower debt levels, but the need to finance growth and the risk of losing control make family firms prefer higher debt levels.Este estudio revisa el efecto de la gerencia, la propiedad y el control familiar sobre el nivel de endeudamiento de 523 empresas listadas y no listadas en bolsa en el periodo comprendido entre 1996 y 2006 (5,094 observaciones firma-año). El estudio encuentra que cuando las familias están involucradas en la gerencia, los niveles de deuda tienden a ser menores para las firmas jóvenes donde el fundador aún se encuentra presente o cuando los herederos se desempeñan como gerentes, pero la tendencia cambia en la medida en que la firma envejece. Cuando el involucramiento de las familias proviene de la propiedad directa o indirecta, la relación familia/deuda es positiva, consistente con el argumento bajo el cual la supervisión externa viene acompañada de mayores niveles de endeuda-miento para reducir el riesgo de perder el control. Cuando las familias están presentes en la junta directiva (pero no en la gerencia), los niveles de deuda tienen a ser menores, sugiriendo que los directores familiares son más adversos al riesgo. Los resultados resaltan una tensión entre dos motivaciones diferentes que determinan la estructura de capital de las empresas familiares: La aversión al riesgo lleva a menores niveles de deuda, pero la necesidad de financiar el crecimiento y el riesgo de perder el control hacen que las empresas familiares prefieran mayores niveles de deuda.Introduction. Family involvement and capital structure. Database and methodology. Results. Robustness. Conclusions. References. Appendix.22 páginasapplication/pdfspaUniversidad de los AndesFacultad de AdministraciónGaleras de Administración, No. 33instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional SénecaFamily firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing controlEmpresas familiares y deuda: tensión entre aversión al riesgo y el riesgo de perder el controlDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPFamily businessesFamily controlCapital structureColombiaEmpresas familiares - ColombiaEmpresas familiares - FinanzasAdministraciónFacultad de AdministraciónPublicationTHUMBNAILGaleras-de-administración-33.pdf.jpgGaleras-de-administración-33.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg23602https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/dfdd36d7-7344-4524-be1e-caad3f9dff92/download1ed410a7758b4e2791a4daed7ebf74e9MD55ORIGINALGaleras-de-administración-33.pdfGaleras-de-administración-33.pdfapplication/pdf1650102https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/85a2c813-65da-40ad-b708-beeafc06096b/downloadaeb5537599bea5ec5e1ec53bbcc17f82MD51TEXTGaleras-de-administración-33.pdf.txtGaleras-de-administración-33.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain60750https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/20dfa489-e620-4f4a-a3db-f9869834aca4/downloade208f6253da48a651a061a9e49e64830MD541992/46365oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/463652023-10-10 16:33:03.369http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co