Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control
This study examines the effect of family management, ownership, and control on capital structure for 523 listed and unlisted Colombian firms between 1996 and 2006 (5,094 firm-year observations). The study finds that when families are involved in management, debt levels tend to be lower for younger f...
- Autores:
-
González Ferrero, Maximiliano
Guzmán Vásquez, Álvaro Alexander
Pombo Vejarano, Carlos
Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2011
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/46365
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46365
- Palabra clave:
- Family businesses
Family control
Capital structure
Colombia
Empresas familiares - Colombia
Empresas familiares - Finanzas
Administración
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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|
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control |
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv |
Empresas familiares y deuda: tensión entre aversión al riesgo y el riesgo de perder el control |
title |
Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control |
spellingShingle |
Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control Family businesses Family control Capital structure Colombia Empresas familiares - Colombia Empresas familiares - Finanzas Administración |
title_short |
Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control |
title_full |
Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control |
title_fullStr |
Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control |
title_full_unstemmed |
Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control |
title_sort |
Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
González Ferrero, Maximiliano Guzmán Vásquez, Álvaro Alexander Pombo Vejarano, Carlos Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea |
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
González Ferrero, Maximiliano Guzmán Vásquez, Álvaro Alexander Pombo Vejarano, Carlos Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea |
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Family businesses Family control Capital structure Colombia |
topic |
Family businesses Family control Capital structure Colombia Empresas familiares - Colombia Empresas familiares - Finanzas Administración |
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv |
Empresas familiares - Colombia Empresas familiares - Finanzas |
dc.subject.themes.none.fl_str_mv |
Administración |
description |
This study examines the effect of family management, ownership, and control on capital structure for 523 listed and unlisted Colombian firms between 1996 and 2006 (5,094 firm-year observations). The study finds that when families are involved in management, debt levels tend to be lower for younger firms when the founder is still present or when heirs act as managers, but trends heighten as the firm ages. When families' involvement derives from direct and indirect ownership, the family/debt relationship is positive; consistent with the idea that external supervision accompanies higher debt levels and reduces the risk of losing control. When families are present on the board of directors (but are not in management), debt levels tend to be lower, suggesting that family directors are more risk-averse. The results stress the tradeoff between two distinct motivations that determine the capital structure of family firms: Risk aversion pushes firms toward lower debt levels, but the need to finance growth and the risk of losing control make family firms prefer higher debt levels. |
publishDate |
2011 |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2011 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-09-21T15:18:56Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-09-21T15:18:56Z |
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv |
Documento de trabajo |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.type.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.type.content.spa.fl_str_mv |
Text |
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https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
1900-1606 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46365 |
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad de los Andes |
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
dc.identifier.repourl.spa.fl_str_mv |
repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
identifier_str_mv |
1900-1606 instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46365 |
dc.language.iso.es_CO.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv |
Galeras de Administración, No. 33 |
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
dc.rights.accessrights.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv |
22 páginas |
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de los Andes |
dc.publisher.faculty.none.fl_str_mv |
Facultad de Administración |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de los Andes |
dc.source.es_CO.fl_str_mv |
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Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
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spelling |
Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2González Ferrero, Maximiliano8532600Guzmán Vásquez, Álvaro Alexandera9d25b6b-263a-48a9-aa36-2924a7fff714600Pombo Vejarano, Carlos9885600Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea5e161ddb-f902-45b0-bb70-79288bf634ac6002020-09-21T15:18:56Z2020-09-21T15:18:56Z20111900-1606http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46365instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/This study examines the effect of family management, ownership, and control on capital structure for 523 listed and unlisted Colombian firms between 1996 and 2006 (5,094 firm-year observations). The study finds that when families are involved in management, debt levels tend to be lower for younger firms when the founder is still present or when heirs act as managers, but trends heighten as the firm ages. When families' involvement derives from direct and indirect ownership, the family/debt relationship is positive; consistent with the idea that external supervision accompanies higher debt levels and reduces the risk of losing control. When families are present on the board of directors (but are not in management), debt levels tend to be lower, suggesting that family directors are more risk-averse. The results stress the tradeoff between two distinct motivations that determine the capital structure of family firms: Risk aversion pushes firms toward lower debt levels, but the need to finance growth and the risk of losing control make family firms prefer higher debt levels.Este estudio revisa el efecto de la gerencia, la propiedad y el control familiar sobre el nivel de endeudamiento de 523 empresas listadas y no listadas en bolsa en el periodo comprendido entre 1996 y 2006 (5,094 observaciones firma-año). El estudio encuentra que cuando las familias están involucradas en la gerencia, los niveles de deuda tienden a ser menores para las firmas jóvenes donde el fundador aún se encuentra presente o cuando los herederos se desempeñan como gerentes, pero la tendencia cambia en la medida en que la firma envejece. Cuando el involucramiento de las familias proviene de la propiedad directa o indirecta, la relación familia/deuda es positiva, consistente con el argumento bajo el cual la supervisión externa viene acompañada de mayores niveles de endeuda-miento para reducir el riesgo de perder el control. Cuando las familias están presentes en la junta directiva (pero no en la gerencia), los niveles de deuda tienen a ser menores, sugiriendo que los directores familiares son más adversos al riesgo. Los resultados resaltan una tensión entre dos motivaciones diferentes que determinan la estructura de capital de las empresas familiares: La aversión al riesgo lleva a menores niveles de deuda, pero la necesidad de financiar el crecimiento y el riesgo de perder el control hacen que las empresas familiares prefieran mayores niveles de deuda.Introduction. Family involvement and capital structure. Database and methodology. Results. Robustness. Conclusions. References. Appendix.22 páginasapplication/pdfspaUniversidad de los AndesFacultad de AdministraciónGaleras de Administración, No. 33instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional SénecaFamily firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing controlEmpresas familiares y deuda: tensión entre aversión al riesgo y el riesgo de perder el controlDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPFamily businessesFamily controlCapital structureColombiaEmpresas familiares - ColombiaEmpresas familiares - FinanzasAdministraciónFacultad de AdministraciónPublicationTHUMBNAILGaleras-de-administración-33.pdf.jpgGaleras-de-administración-33.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg23602https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/dfdd36d7-7344-4524-be1e-caad3f9dff92/download1ed410a7758b4e2791a4daed7ebf74e9MD55ORIGINALGaleras-de-administración-33.pdfGaleras-de-administración-33.pdfapplication/pdf1650102https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/85a2c813-65da-40ad-b708-beeafc06096b/downloadaeb5537599bea5ec5e1ec53bbcc17f82MD51TEXTGaleras-de-administración-33.pdf.txtGaleras-de-administración-33.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain60750https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/20dfa489-e620-4f4a-a3db-f9869834aca4/downloade208f6253da48a651a061a9e49e64830MD541992/46365oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/463652023-10-10 16:33:03.369http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |