Human cooperation in the lab and in the field - experimenting with economics

This dissertation is the result of an attempt to understand how institutions and social-preferences affect human cooperation under two distinct social dilemmas, a 2-person public goods and the extraction of a common pool resource by several players, through the use of experimental methods to analyze individuals? behavior. In this work we address two main questions: (i) how the perception of potential inequality erodes asymmetrically the intentions to cooperate, i.e., how the fear of being taken advantage of might have a worst effect than the greed induced by the temptation of taking advantage of the other; and (ii) how centralized communication networks influence cooperative responses to messages according to the number of receivers. Theoretical foundations in these questions are akin to the perspective of a behavioral scientist, by providing explanations to our experimental results based on the coexistence of selfish and other-regarding behaviors, and the internalization of social norms endogenously established

• Autores: Mantilla Ribero, César Andrés
• Tipo de recurso: Doctoral thesis
• Fecha de publicación: 2013
• Institución: Universidad de los Andes
• Repositorio: Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
• Idioma: eng
• OAI Identifier: oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/7788
• Acceso en línea: http://hdl.handle.net/1992/7788
• Palabra clave: Economía experimental; Desigualdad económica; Cooperación económica; Economía
• Rights: openAccess
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/