Uncertainty in conflicts

This paper theoretically assesses the role that uncertainty plays in the intensity of conflicts. The standard two-player rent-seeking contest model (Tullock, 1980) is extended to allow for privately known subjective values of the prize. The conflict is modeled as a Bayesian game on which each player...

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Autores:
Prada Sarmiento, Juan David
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2010
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8207
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8207
Palabra clave:
Conflict
Uncertainty
Monotone comparative statics
Bayesian games
Conflictos sociales - Modelos econométricos
Incertidumbre - Modelos econométricos
C70, C72, D74, D80
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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spelling Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Prada Sarmiento, Juan Davidf7aa1c9d-851d-468a-8fe5-ccb6c7e312605002018-09-27T16:51:16Z2018-09-27T16:51:16Z20101657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/82071657-719110.57784/1992/8207instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/This paper theoretically assesses the role that uncertainty plays in the intensity of conflicts. The standard two-player rent-seeking contest model (Tullock, 1980) is extended to allow for privately known subjective values of the prize. The conflict is modeled as a Bayesian game on which each player's valuation is drawn independently from arbitrary distributions. We find sufficient conditions for when first-order and second-order stochastic refinements in the distributions cause predictable movements in the conflict's dissipation. We focus on arbitrary contest success functions and arbitrary independent distributions for each player, allowing us to extend our analysis beyond the case of symmetric equilibria.Este artículo estudia el papel que la incertidumbre juega en la determinación de la intensidad de un conflicto. El modelo estándar de búsqueda de rentas (Tullock, 1980) es extendido para permitir valoraciones privadas del premio. El conflicto es modelado como un juego Bayesiano en el que la valoración de cada jugador es tomada de distribuciones arbitrarias e independientes. Encontramos condiciones suficientes para cuando refinamientos estocásticos de primer y segundo orden en las distribuciones causan movimientos predecibles en la disipación del conflicto. Nos enfocamos en funciones de éxito arbitrarias e independientes para cada jugador, permitiéndonos extender el análisis más allá del caso de equilibrios simétricos.33 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 29 Octubre de 2010https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/007713.htmlUncertainty in conflictsIncertidumbre en conflictosDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPConflictUncertaintyMonotone comparative staticsBayesian gamesConflictos sociales - Modelos econométricosIncertidumbre - Modelos econométricosC70, C72, D74, D80Facultad de EconomíaPublicationORIGINALdcede2010-29.pdfdcede2010-29.pdfapplication/pdf882029https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/8886f9e2-c571-480d-8852-5f6536951031/downloadb2ad1c837afd5a282245d8a0de0e7a1aMD51THUMBNAILdcede2010-29.pdf.jpgdcede2010-29.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg3361https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/cc160c4d-1bf3-498b-a9aa-d8b8b7de8e9e/download2717d4720412e857b89ec2dfe925faf2MD55TEXTdcede2010-29.pdf.txtdcede2010-29.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain59293https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/9459ac11-5948-4970-938d-940d17546173/download0b303083f2d5b3e6a2482d6408fb6b6dMD541992/8207oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/82072024-06-04 15:27:58.261http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Uncertainty in conflicts
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv Incertidumbre en conflictos
title Uncertainty in conflicts
spellingShingle Uncertainty in conflicts
Conflict
Uncertainty
Monotone comparative statics
Bayesian games
Conflictos sociales - Modelos econométricos
Incertidumbre - Modelos econométricos
C70, C72, D74, D80
title_short Uncertainty in conflicts
title_full Uncertainty in conflicts
title_fullStr Uncertainty in conflicts
title_full_unstemmed Uncertainty in conflicts
title_sort Uncertainty in conflicts
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Prada Sarmiento, Juan David
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Prada Sarmiento, Juan David
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv Conflict
Uncertainty
Monotone comparative statics
Bayesian games
topic Conflict
Uncertainty
Monotone comparative statics
Bayesian games
Conflictos sociales - Modelos econométricos
Incertidumbre - Modelos econométricos
C70, C72, D74, D80
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv Conflictos sociales - Modelos econométricos
Incertidumbre - Modelos econométricos
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv C70, C72, D74, D80
description This paper theoretically assesses the role that uncertainty plays in the intensity of conflicts. The standard two-player rent-seeking contest model (Tullock, 1980) is extended to allow for privately known subjective values of the prize. The conflict is modeled as a Bayesian game on which each player's valuation is drawn independently from arbitrary distributions. We find sufficient conditions for when first-order and second-order stochastic refinements in the distributions cause predictable movements in the conflict's dissipation. We focus on arbitrary contest success functions and arbitrary independent distributions for each player, allowing us to extend our analysis beyond the case of symmetric equilibria.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2010
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:51:16Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:51:16Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo
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dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.57784/1992/8207
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad de los Andes
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url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8207
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv Documentos CEDE No. 29 Octubre de 2010
dc.relation.repec.spa.fl_str_mv https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/007713.html
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dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv 33 páginas
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
institution Universidad de los Andes
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