Uncertainty in conflicts
This paper theoretically assesses the role that uncertainty plays in the intensity of conflicts. The standard two-player rent-seeking contest model (Tullock, 1980) is extended to allow for privately known subjective values of the prize. The conflict is modeled as a Bayesian game on which each player...
- Autores:
-
Prada Sarmiento, Juan David
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2010
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8207
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8207
- Palabra clave:
- Conflict
Uncertainty
Monotone comparative statics
Bayesian games
Conflictos sociales - Modelos econométricos
Incertidumbre - Modelos econométricos
C70, C72, D74, D80
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Prada Sarmiento, Juan Davidf7aa1c9d-851d-468a-8fe5-ccb6c7e312605002018-09-27T16:51:16Z2018-09-27T16:51:16Z20101657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/82071657-719110.57784/1992/8207instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/This paper theoretically assesses the role that uncertainty plays in the intensity of conflicts. The standard two-player rent-seeking contest model (Tullock, 1980) is extended to allow for privately known subjective values of the prize. The conflict is modeled as a Bayesian game on which each player's valuation is drawn independently from arbitrary distributions. We find sufficient conditions for when first-order and second-order stochastic refinements in the distributions cause predictable movements in the conflict's dissipation. We focus on arbitrary contest success functions and arbitrary independent distributions for each player, allowing us to extend our analysis beyond the case of symmetric equilibria.Este artículo estudia el papel que la incertidumbre juega en la determinación de la intensidad de un conflicto. El modelo estándar de búsqueda de rentas (Tullock, 1980) es extendido para permitir valoraciones privadas del premio. El conflicto es modelado como un juego Bayesiano en el que la valoración de cada jugador es tomada de distribuciones arbitrarias e independientes. Encontramos condiciones suficientes para cuando refinamientos estocásticos de primer y segundo orden en las distribuciones causan movimientos predecibles en la disipación del conflicto. Nos enfocamos en funciones de éxito arbitrarias e independientes para cada jugador, permitiéndonos extender el análisis más allá del caso de equilibrios simétricos.33 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 29 Octubre de 2010https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/007713.htmlUncertainty in conflictsIncertidumbre en conflictosDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPConflictUncertaintyMonotone comparative staticsBayesian gamesConflictos sociales - Modelos econométricosIncertidumbre - Modelos econométricosC70, C72, D74, D80Facultad de EconomíaPublicationORIGINALdcede2010-29.pdfdcede2010-29.pdfapplication/pdf882029https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/8886f9e2-c571-480d-8852-5f6536951031/downloadb2ad1c837afd5a282245d8a0de0e7a1aMD51THUMBNAILdcede2010-29.pdf.jpgdcede2010-29.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg3361https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/cc160c4d-1bf3-498b-a9aa-d8b8b7de8e9e/download2717d4720412e857b89ec2dfe925faf2MD55TEXTdcede2010-29.pdf.txtdcede2010-29.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain59293https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/9459ac11-5948-4970-938d-940d17546173/download0b303083f2d5b3e6a2482d6408fb6b6dMD541992/8207oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/82072024-06-04 15:27:58.261http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Uncertainty in conflicts |
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv |
Incertidumbre en conflictos |
title |
Uncertainty in conflicts |
spellingShingle |
Uncertainty in conflicts Conflict Uncertainty Monotone comparative statics Bayesian games Conflictos sociales - Modelos econométricos Incertidumbre - Modelos econométricos C70, C72, D74, D80 |
title_short |
Uncertainty in conflicts |
title_full |
Uncertainty in conflicts |
title_fullStr |
Uncertainty in conflicts |
title_full_unstemmed |
Uncertainty in conflicts |
title_sort |
Uncertainty in conflicts |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Prada Sarmiento, Juan David |
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Prada Sarmiento, Juan David |
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Conflict Uncertainty Monotone comparative statics Bayesian games |
topic |
Conflict Uncertainty Monotone comparative statics Bayesian games Conflictos sociales - Modelos econométricos Incertidumbre - Modelos econométricos C70, C72, D74, D80 |
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv |
Conflictos sociales - Modelos econométricos Incertidumbre - Modelos econométricos |
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv |
C70, C72, D74, D80 |
description |
This paper theoretically assesses the role that uncertainty plays in the intensity of conflicts. The standard two-player rent-seeking contest model (Tullock, 1980) is extended to allow for privately known subjective values of the prize. The conflict is modeled as a Bayesian game on which each player's valuation is drawn independently from arbitrary distributions. We find sufficient conditions for when first-order and second-order stochastic refinements in the distributions cause predictable movements in the conflict's dissipation. We focus on arbitrary contest success functions and arbitrary independent distributions for each player, allowing us to extend our analysis beyond the case of symmetric equilibria. |
publishDate |
2010 |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2010 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:51:16Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:51:16Z |
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv |
Documento de trabajo |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.type.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.type.content.spa.fl_str_mv |
Text |
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https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
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1657-5334 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8207 |
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1657-7191 |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
10.57784/1992/8207 |
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instname:Universidad de los Andes |
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
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identifier_str_mv |
1657-5334 1657-7191 10.57784/1992/8207 instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8207 |
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv |
Documentos CEDE No. 29 Octubre de 2010 |
dc.relation.repec.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/007713.html |
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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openAccess |
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv |
33 páginas |
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes |
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