Effects of Ending Payments for Ecosystem Services: removal does not crowd prior conservation out

We implemented a decision experiment in the field with rural peasants in Colombia to test the effects of introducing then partially or totally removing Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES). We consider individual and collective payments and different rules for removal. We find that there is clearly...

Full description

Autores:
Moros, Lina
Vélez, María Alejandra
Pfaff, Alexander
Quintero, Daniela
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2020
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/48002
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/48002
Palabra clave:
Lab in the field experiment
Pro-environmental behavior
Payment for ecosystem Services
Incentives
Colombia
Q01, Q52, Q57, Q58
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description
Summary:We implemented a decision experiment in the field with rural peasants in Colombia to test the effects of introducing then partially or totally removing Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES). We consider individual and collective payments and different rules for removal. We find that there is clearly no behavioral 'crowding-out' when a PES is created then ended. Even a simple pre-versus-post-PES comparison finds 'crowding in', if anything, with contributions higher after PES was removed than before PES was introduced. Comparing to a control, without PES, strengthens that conclusion. We discuss four possible mechanisms explaining these findings: recognition or gratitude; lack of negative emotions; pre-existing and persistent intrinsic motivations, and evocation of pro-environmental behavior.