Homo aequalis : a cross-society experimental analysis of three bargaining games
Data from three bargaining games-the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game-played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across societies...
- Autores:
-
Wallace, Chris
Ensminger, Jean
Henrich, Joseph
Barrett, Clark
Bolyanatz, Alexander
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
Gurven, Michael
Gwako, Edwins
Lesorogol, Carolyn
Marlowe, Frank
McElreath, Richard
Tracer, David
Ziker, John
Barr, Abigail
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2009
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8104
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8104
- Palabra clave:
- Bargaining games
Cross-cultural experiments
Inequality aversion
Redes sociales - Aspectos económicos
Grupos sociales - Aspectos económicos
Teoría de los juegos
C72, C9, Z13
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Homo aequalis : a cross-society experimental analysis of three bargaining games |
| dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv |
Homo aequalis : un análisis experimental en diferentes sociedades de tres juegos de negociación |
| title |
Homo aequalis : a cross-society experimental analysis of three bargaining games |
| spellingShingle |
Homo aequalis : a cross-society experimental analysis of three bargaining games Bargaining games Cross-cultural experiments Inequality aversion Redes sociales - Aspectos económicos Grupos sociales - Aspectos económicos Teoría de los juegos C72, C9, Z13 |
| title_short |
Homo aequalis : a cross-society experimental analysis of three bargaining games |
| title_full |
Homo aequalis : a cross-society experimental analysis of three bargaining games |
| title_fullStr |
Homo aequalis : a cross-society experimental analysis of three bargaining games |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Homo aequalis : a cross-society experimental analysis of three bargaining games |
| title_sort |
Homo aequalis : a cross-society experimental analysis of three bargaining games |
| dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Wallace, Chris Ensminger, Jean Henrich, Joseph Barrett, Clark Bolyanatz, Alexander Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo Gurven, Michael Gwako, Edwins Lesorogol, Carolyn Marlowe, Frank McElreath, Richard Tracer, David Ziker, John Barr, Abigail |
| dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Wallace, Chris Ensminger, Jean Henrich, Joseph Barrett, Clark Bolyanatz, Alexander Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo Gurven, Michael Gwako, Edwins Lesorogol, Carolyn Marlowe, Frank McElreath, Richard Tracer, David Ziker, John Barr, Abigail |
| dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Bargaining games Cross-cultural experiments Inequality aversion |
| topic |
Bargaining games Cross-cultural experiments Inequality aversion Redes sociales - Aspectos económicos Grupos sociales - Aspectos económicos Teoría de los juegos C72, C9, Z13 |
| dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv |
Redes sociales - Aspectos económicos Grupos sociales - Aspectos económicos Teoría de los juegos |
| dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv |
C72, C9, Z13 |
| description |
Data from three bargaining games-the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game-played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across societies. The paper investigates whether this behavioural diversity can be explained solely by variations in inequality aversion. Combining a single parameter utility function with the notion of subgame perfection generates a number of testable predictions. While most of these are supported, there are some telling divergences between theory and data: uncertainty and preferences relating to acts of vengeance may have influenced play in the Ultimatum and ThirdParty Punishment Games; and a few subjects used the games as an opportunity to engage in costly signalling. |
| publishDate |
2009 |
| dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2009 |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:50:34Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:50:34Z |
| dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv |
Documento de trabajo |
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http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
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Text |
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https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
| dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
1657-5334 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8104 |
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1657-7191 |
| dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
10.57784/1992/8104 |
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instname:Universidad de los Andes |
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reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
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repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
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1657-5334 1657-7191 10.57784/1992/8104 instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
| url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8104 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
| language |
eng |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv |
Documentos CEDE No. 09 Marzo de 2009 |
| dc.relation.repec.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/005427.html |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
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openAccess |
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31 páginas |
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application/pdf |
| dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes |
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1812133952332234752 |
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Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Wallace, Chrisc81e0830-3fdb-4d42-89f1-bd4453194bd7500Ensminger, Jean84e94603-790a-4e29-a55e-04dea3eaec34500Henrich, Joseph93ff25bc-2490-45ca-96f1-fdf08e428a61500Barrett, Clark97a4f3fc-d814-40d6-a670-f2f034c431b9500Bolyanatz, Alexander4df277e8-1b2a-49e7-bee6-5a94b65e3942500Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo7633600Gurven, Michael2e24c240-fdd4-4a55-8533-05e487a782ff500Gwako, Edwinsf4595d20-2de8-4119-9e5f-db159b144530500Lesorogol, Carolynf72d1051-5302-487c-a43a-66c73c4c02f3500Marlowe, Frank49c507f0-90ce-49d0-a2fa-3a6566948ef0500McElreath, Richard9d898118-4f9b-47c9-8584-55061f1495da500Tracer, Davide2428c89-2411-4b73-9732-47a0bc629879500Ziker, John037b098f-aa7a-488c-847f-30260a0fbea7500Barr, Abigaild03678be-61d8-4583-a04e-d845b0ca9b875002018-09-27T16:50:34Z2018-09-27T16:50:34Z20091657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/81041657-719110.57784/1992/8104instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/Data from three bargaining games-the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game-played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across societies. The paper investigates whether this behavioural diversity can be explained solely by variations in inequality aversion. Combining a single parameter utility function with the notion of subgame perfection generates a number of testable predictions. While most of these are supported, there are some telling divergences between theory and data: uncertainty and preferences relating to acts of vengeance may have influenced play in the Ultimatum and ThirdParty Punishment Games; and a few subjects used the games as an opportunity to engage in costly signalling.Presentamos datos experimentales en tres juegos de negociación -Juego del Dictador, Ultimatum y el de Sanción de Terceros- aplicados en 15 sociedades que van de estudiantes de pregrado en Estados Unidos hasta cazadores-recolectores en la Amazonía, el Artico y Africa. El comportamiento en los juegos a lo largo de estas sociedades varía marcadamente. Este artículo investiga si esta diversidad de comportamiento puede ser explicada únicamente como variación de la aversión a la desigualdad. Combinando una función de utilidad de un solo parámetro con la noción de sub-juegos perfectos se genera una serie de predicciones que pueden ser probadas empíricamente. La mayoría de estas predicciones son soportadas por los datos, aunque se encuentran algunas divergencias entre la teoría y los datos: incertidumbre y preferencias relacionadas a actos de venganza pueden haber influido las decisiones en los juegos de Ultimatum y de la Sanción de Terceros; y algunos participantes usaron los juegos como oportunidades para llevar a cabo señalización costosa.31 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 09 Marzo de 2009https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/005427.htmlHomo aequalis : a cross-society experimental analysis of three bargaining gamesHomo aequalis : un análisis experimental en diferentes sociedades de tres juegos de negociaciónDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPBargaining gamesCross-cultural experimentsInequality aversionRedes sociales - Aspectos económicosGrupos sociales - Aspectos económicosTeoría de los juegosC72, C9, Z13Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTHUMBNAILdcede2009-09.pdf.jpgdcede2009-09.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg14049https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/8d4a280e-ab05-44ee-9b40-727b1113cffd/download22e6c1a00e78d7a9e14f850355e57f5eMD55ORIGINALdcede2009-09.pdfdcede2009-09.pdfapplication/pdf585519https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/0b0256ba-d001-45ad-a38e-34f4978f7601/download5ff19906347d651e2a974a839d583922MD51TEXTdcede2009-09.pdf.txtdcede2009-09.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain87293https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/442fc0f3-433f-4c1a-ac84-edeea34953c5/download12b6f678416d13d53dc56b1449238d3eMD541992/8104oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/81042024-06-04 15:37:01.411http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |