The Weak State Trap

Development outcomes come in `clusters' that seem difficult to exit. Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism. State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to ourish. C...

Full description

Autores:
Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo
Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés
Robinson, James A.
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2020
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/41137
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/41137
Palabra clave:
State capacity
Tax evasion
Clientelism
Vote buying
Social desirability bias
list experiments
D72, D73, H26, C83, C93
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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spelling Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo8207600Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés72ed3eb8-20f4-4273-a1fa-8a99ee062be3600Robinson, James A.47cc2411-1807-4e9b-a3d3-9d719cefc2716002020-07-28T17:16:36Z2020-07-28T17:16:36Z20201657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/411371657-719110.57784/1992/41137instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/Development outcomes come in `clusters' that seem difficult to exit. Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism. State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to ourish. Clientelism sets in place a structure of incentives for politicians and citizens that is detrimental to building state capacity. We show that vote buying, as a measure of clientelism, and tax evasion, as a measure of state weakness, are highly correlated at the individual level. We also report evidence that both practices are widely accepted in society, a result consistent with a deeply entrenched relationship of mutually reinforcing in uences. Finally, we propose a set of mechanisms that underlie the hypothesis that a weak state and widespread clientelism are part of a political equilibrium with multiple feedback loops. Our results suggest that state weakness is a trap that is likely hard to exit.53 páginasspaUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 25 Julio de 2020https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/018248.htmlThe Weak State TrapDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPState capacityTax evasionClientelismVote buyingSocial desirability biaslist experimentsD72, D73, H26, C83, C93Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTHUMBNAILdcede2020-25.pdf.jpgdcede2020-25.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg9523https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/23da46af-18fa-45e4-8e16-4682ed8aa152/download608b6a0f8ea47401baf1cb16908976f8MD55ORIGINALdcede2020-25.pdfdcede2020-25.pdfapplication/pdf786585https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/e5af0d99-7d49-4aa9-bb8c-95431ce7b132/download8c32f883f593a94434dcb54b18902866MD51TEXTdcede2020-25.pdf.txtdcede2020-25.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain123433https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/0ef87b4c-c3bf-4627-83e8-4c50e23c03c0/download3fb93fc3497d4551498755276eb26865MD541992/41137oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/411372024-06-04 15:44:44.455http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Weak State Trap
title The Weak State Trap
spellingShingle The Weak State Trap
State capacity
Tax evasion
Clientelism
Vote buying
Social desirability bias
list experiments
D72, D73, H26, C83, C93
title_short The Weak State Trap
title_full The Weak State Trap
title_fullStr The Weak State Trap
title_full_unstemmed The Weak State Trap
title_sort The Weak State Trap
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo
Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés
Robinson, James A.
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo
Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés
Robinson, James A.
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv State capacity
Tax evasion
Clientelism
Vote buying
Social desirability bias
list experiments
topic State capacity
Tax evasion
Clientelism
Vote buying
Social desirability bias
list experiments
D72, D73, H26, C83, C93
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv D72, D73, H26, C83, C93
description Development outcomes come in `clusters' that seem difficult to exit. Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism. State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to ourish. Clientelism sets in place a structure of incentives for politicians and citizens that is detrimental to building state capacity. We show that vote buying, as a measure of clientelism, and tax evasion, as a measure of state weakness, are highly correlated at the individual level. We also report evidence that both practices are widely accepted in society, a result consistent with a deeply entrenched relationship of mutually reinforcing in uences. Finally, we propose a set of mechanisms that underlie the hypothesis that a weak state and widespread clientelism are part of a political equilibrium with multiple feedback loops. Our results suggest that state weakness is a trap that is likely hard to exit.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-07-28T17:16:36Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-07-28T17:16:36Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2020
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo
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url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/41137
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dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv Documentos CEDE No. 25 Julio de 2020
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dc.rights.accessrights.spa.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv 53 páginas
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
institution Universidad de los Andes
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