The Weak State Trap
Development outcomes come in `clusters' that seem difficult to exit. Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism. State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to ourish. C...
- Autores:
-
Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo
Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés
Robinson, James A.
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2020
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/41137
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/41137
- Palabra clave:
- State capacity
Tax evasion
Clientelism
Vote buying
Social desirability bias
list experiments
D72, D73, H26, C83, C93
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo8207600Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés72ed3eb8-20f4-4273-a1fa-8a99ee062be3600Robinson, James A.47cc2411-1807-4e9b-a3d3-9d719cefc2716002020-07-28T17:16:36Z2020-07-28T17:16:36Z20201657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/411371657-719110.57784/1992/41137instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/Development outcomes come in `clusters' that seem difficult to exit. Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism. State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to ourish. Clientelism sets in place a structure of incentives for politicians and citizens that is detrimental to building state capacity. We show that vote buying, as a measure of clientelism, and tax evasion, as a measure of state weakness, are highly correlated at the individual level. We also report evidence that both practices are widely accepted in society, a result consistent with a deeply entrenched relationship of mutually reinforcing in uences. Finally, we propose a set of mechanisms that underlie the hypothesis that a weak state and widespread clientelism are part of a political equilibrium with multiple feedback loops. Our results suggest that state weakness is a trap that is likely hard to exit.53 páginasspaUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 25 Julio de 2020https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/018248.htmlThe Weak State TrapDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPState capacityTax evasionClientelismVote buyingSocial desirability biaslist experimentsD72, D73, H26, C83, C93Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTHUMBNAILdcede2020-25.pdf.jpgdcede2020-25.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg9523https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/23da46af-18fa-45e4-8e16-4682ed8aa152/download608b6a0f8ea47401baf1cb16908976f8MD55ORIGINALdcede2020-25.pdfdcede2020-25.pdfapplication/pdf786585https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/e5af0d99-7d49-4aa9-bb8c-95431ce7b132/download8c32f883f593a94434dcb54b18902866MD51TEXTdcede2020-25.pdf.txtdcede2020-25.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain123433https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/0ef87b4c-c3bf-4627-83e8-4c50e23c03c0/download3fb93fc3497d4551498755276eb26865MD541992/41137oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/411372024-06-04 15:44:44.455http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The Weak State Trap |
title |
The Weak State Trap |
spellingShingle |
The Weak State Trap State capacity Tax evasion Clientelism Vote buying Social desirability bias list experiments D72, D73, H26, C83, C93 |
title_short |
The Weak State Trap |
title_full |
The Weak State Trap |
title_fullStr |
The Weak State Trap |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Weak State Trap |
title_sort |
The Weak State Trap |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés Robinson, James A. |
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés Robinson, James A. |
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
State capacity Tax evasion Clientelism Vote buying Social desirability bias list experiments |
topic |
State capacity Tax evasion Clientelism Vote buying Social desirability bias list experiments D72, D73, H26, C83, C93 |
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv |
D72, D73, H26, C83, C93 |
description |
Development outcomes come in `clusters' that seem difficult to exit. Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism. State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to ourish. Clientelism sets in place a structure of incentives for politicians and citizens that is detrimental to building state capacity. We show that vote buying, as a measure of clientelism, and tax evasion, as a measure of state weakness, are highly correlated at the individual level. We also report evidence that both practices are widely accepted in society, a result consistent with a deeply entrenched relationship of mutually reinforcing in uences. Finally, we propose a set of mechanisms that underlie the hypothesis that a weak state and widespread clientelism are part of a political equilibrium with multiple feedback loops. Our results suggest that state weakness is a trap that is likely hard to exit. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-07-28T17:16:36Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-07-28T17:16:36Z |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2020 |
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv |
Documento de trabajo |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
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Text |
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https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP |
format |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
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1657-5334 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1992/41137 |
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv |
1657-7191 |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
10.57784/1992/41137 |
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad de los Andes |
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1992/41137 |
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv |
Documentos CEDE No. 25 Julio de 2020 |
dc.relation.repec.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/018248.html |
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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openAccess |
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv |
53 páginas |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes |
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