Cooperation under fear, greed and prison: the role of redistributive inequality in the evolution of cooperation

This work offers an analysis of cooperation dilemmas making emphasis in the role of the unequal outcomes. Increases in the benefit from leaving mutual cooperation are associated to the greed dimension, while increases in the cost from leaving mutual defection are associated to fear dimension. The ma...

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Autores:
Mantilla Ribero, César Andrés
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2012
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8299
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8299
Palabra clave:
Prisoner's dilemma
Payoff inequality
Evolutionary game theory
Salarios
Desigualdad económica
Política salarial
C72, C73, C91, D03, D30, D71, D74
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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spelling Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Mantilla Ribero, César Andrés14d7ae14-9c67-4afe-91c0-221f2d6417cf6002018-09-27T16:51:58Z2018-09-27T16:51:58Z20121657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/82991657-719110.57784/1992/8299instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/This work offers an analysis of cooperation dilemmas making emphasis in the role of the unequal outcomes. Increases in the benefit from leaving mutual cooperation are associated to the greed dimension, while increases in the cost from leaving mutual defection are associated to fear dimension. The manipulation of these dimensions allows defining two cooperation dilemmas derived from the standard Prisoner's Dilemma. Using two different frameworks, classical game theory and evolutionary game theory, is shown that the magnitude and the direction of these inequalities have an effect over the decision of cooperation.Este trabajo ofrece un análisis de los dilemas de cooperación haciendo énfasis en el papel de los outcomes desiguales. Aumentos en los beneficios de abandonar la cooperación mutua están asociados a la dimensión de ambición, mientras incrementos en el costo de abandonar la no cooperación mutua están asociados a la dimensión de miedo. La manipulación de este par de dimensiones permite definir dos dilemas de cooperación derivados del Dilema del Prisionero estándar. Utilizando dos marcos teóricos diferentes, teoría de juegos clásica y teoría de juegos evolutiva, se muestra que la magnitud y la dirección de la desigualdad tienen efecto sobre la decisión de cooperación.37 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 04 Marzo de 2012https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/009386.htmlCooperation under fear, greed and prison: the role of redistributive inequality in the evolution of cooperationCooperación bajo miedo y ambición: el papel de la desigualdad redistributiva en la evolución de la cooperaciónDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPPrisoner's dilemmaPayoff inequalityEvolutionary game theorySalariosDesigualdad económicaPolítica salarialC72, C73, C91, D03, D30, D71, D74Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTEXTdcede2012-04.pdf.txtdcede2012-04.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain316848https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/f0ecaf2e-8340-4fec-a7eb-10e3abb7e4fd/download2cd4dd1f58b841e215c5d932f2fbd11bMD54ORIGINALdcede2012-04.pdfdcede2012-04.pdfapplication/pdf1340260https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/e1e6ef57-d23d-47c4-8c6d-74c5ed4cb716/download4594fcda84eb0b6fc5d74353d15f44deMD51THUMBNAILdcede2012-04.pdf.jpgdcede2012-04.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg8765https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/7abd58c5-060a-40d1-b4a8-c606e532526b/downloadda181d749108e4893afef57692511a96MD551992/8299oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/82992024-06-04 15:39:45.776http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Cooperation under fear, greed and prison: the role of redistributive inequality in the evolution of cooperation
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv Cooperación bajo miedo y ambición: el papel de la desigualdad redistributiva en la evolución de la cooperación
title Cooperation under fear, greed and prison: the role of redistributive inequality in the evolution of cooperation
spellingShingle Cooperation under fear, greed and prison: the role of redistributive inequality in the evolution of cooperation
Prisoner's dilemma
Payoff inequality
Evolutionary game theory
Salarios
Desigualdad económica
Política salarial
C72, C73, C91, D03, D30, D71, D74
title_short Cooperation under fear, greed and prison: the role of redistributive inequality in the evolution of cooperation
title_full Cooperation under fear, greed and prison: the role of redistributive inequality in the evolution of cooperation
title_fullStr Cooperation under fear, greed and prison: the role of redistributive inequality in the evolution of cooperation
title_full_unstemmed Cooperation under fear, greed and prison: the role of redistributive inequality in the evolution of cooperation
title_sort Cooperation under fear, greed and prison: the role of redistributive inequality in the evolution of cooperation
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Mantilla Ribero, César Andrés
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Mantilla Ribero, César Andrés
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv Prisoner's dilemma
Payoff inequality
Evolutionary game theory
topic Prisoner's dilemma
Payoff inequality
Evolutionary game theory
Salarios
Desigualdad económica
Política salarial
C72, C73, C91, D03, D30, D71, D74
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv Salarios
Desigualdad económica
Política salarial
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv C72, C73, C91, D03, D30, D71, D74
description This work offers an analysis of cooperation dilemmas making emphasis in the role of the unequal outcomes. Increases in the benefit from leaving mutual cooperation are associated to the greed dimension, while increases in the cost from leaving mutual defection are associated to fear dimension. The manipulation of these dimensions allows defining two cooperation dilemmas derived from the standard Prisoner's Dilemma. Using two different frameworks, classical game theory and evolutionary game theory, is shown that the magnitude and the direction of these inequalities have an effect over the decision of cooperation.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2012
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:51:58Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:51:58Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo
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dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
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dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv 1657-7191
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.57784/1992/8299
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad de los Andes
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identifier_str_mv 1657-5334
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url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8299
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv Documentos CEDE No. 04 Marzo de 2012
dc.relation.repec.SPA.fl_str_mv https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/009386.html
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv 37 páginas
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
institution Universidad de los Andes
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