On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies...

• Autores: Jaramillo Vidales, Paula; Kayi, Cagatay; Klijn, Flip
• Tipo de recurso: Work document
• Fecha de publicación: 2012
• Institución: Universidad de los Andes
• Repositorio: Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
• Idioma: eng
• OAI Identifier: oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8333
• Acceso en línea: http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8333
• Palabra clave: Dropping strategies; Manipulability; Many-to-many; Matching; Stability; Truncation strategies; Mercado laboral; Trabajadores; D61, D63
• Rights: openAccess
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/