Research and development in culture : a case for cross subsidies in the arts
Several types of arguments advocate state involvement in the promotion of culture. Many of them imply some sort of subsidy, usually to non-for-profit firms; none favors taxing cultural events. The tax literature, on the other side, discusses excise taxation on culture only as a way to redistribute i...
- Autores:
-
Jaramillo Herrera, Christian Rafael
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2009
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8093
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8093
- Palabra clave:
- Excise taxes
Cross subsidies
Art
Culture
Public policy
Artist development
Impuestos - Política gubernamental
Arte - Impuestos
Impuestos sobre el patrimonio - Investigaciones
H23, H50, Z11
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Summary: | Several types of arguments advocate state involvement in the promotion of culture. Many of them imply some sort of subsidy, usually to non-for-profit firms; none favors taxing cultural events. The tax literature, on the other side, discusses excise taxation on culture only as a way to redistribute income. However, to the extent that culture is a public good, taxing it is undesirable. Why are then excise taxes on public events extant in many countries? This paper argues that the development of profitable artists is analogous to R&D in the industrial organization literature, and that the excise taxation of public cultural events may be part of an efficient policy to fund it. Using a Stackelberg game to model the investment to develop an artist, I find that the optimal tax is a multiple of the expected surplus created by the artist that cannot be appropriated by the investor who funds her, and that progressivity plays a limited role at most. |
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