Rewarding good taxpayers, an effective mechanism?
In this paper, I examine the conditions under which rewarding honest taxpayers is an optimal mechanism to reduce tax evasion and improve collection. My theoretical model suggests that when it is expensive to audit contributors, and moral (or pecuniary) evasion cost is high enough, rewarding tax comp...
- Autores:
-
Cabra-Acela, Pedro A.
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2021
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/50296
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/50296
- Palabra clave:
- Tax evasion
Good taxpayer
Rewards
Fiscal policy
Argentina
H21, H26, H30
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Cabra-Acela, Pedro A.4bfe03a2-a911-4d44-939c-1f3a75e72bcf5002021-07-16T13:44:49Z2021-07-16T13:44:49Z2021http://hdl.handle.net/1992/502961657-719110.57784/1992/50296instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/In this paper, I examine the conditions under which rewarding honest taxpayers is an optimal mechanism to reduce tax evasion and improve collection. My theoretical model suggests that when it is expensive to audit contributors, and moral (or pecuniary) evasion cost is high enough, rewarding tax compliance is an effective strategy to increase collection. I provide empirical evidence from Argentina's province variation of rewards policies and tax collection. Where the data suggests that theoretical conditions hold, I find a positive effect in real estate per capita tax collection between 0.4 and more than 2 standard deviations.50 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 30 Julio de 2021https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/019419.htmlRewarding good taxpayers, an effective mechanism?Documento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPTax evasionGood taxpayerRewardsFiscal policyArgentinaH21, H26, H30Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTEXTdcede2021-30.pdf.txtdcede2021-30.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain84064https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/e6c3b081-5656-46a0-aabd-23c592e64e55/download1ecf69d829df93c529a7cdf2e241e7d3MD54ORIGINALdcede2021-30.pdfdcede2021-30.pdfapplication/pdf9162291https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/3fb407bd-2ca3-4ffd-9bb6-4dec5f078ef2/downloada3e57013057a1bd434d6b6a32570e88cMD51THUMBNAILdcede2021-30.pdf.jpgdcede2021-30.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg15982https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/40d9b002-7fdd-4c4e-b29c-a8f015e24924/download654f2e2bd67d9e09f4f23b2748f8c15fMD551992/50296oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/502962024-06-04 15:13:27.034http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Rewarding good taxpayers, an effective mechanism? |
| title |
Rewarding good taxpayers, an effective mechanism? |
| spellingShingle |
Rewarding good taxpayers, an effective mechanism? Tax evasion Good taxpayer Rewards Fiscal policy Argentina H21, H26, H30 |
| title_short |
Rewarding good taxpayers, an effective mechanism? |
| title_full |
Rewarding good taxpayers, an effective mechanism? |
| title_fullStr |
Rewarding good taxpayers, an effective mechanism? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Rewarding good taxpayers, an effective mechanism? |
| title_sort |
Rewarding good taxpayers, an effective mechanism? |
| dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Cabra-Acela, Pedro A. |
| dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Cabra-Acela, Pedro A. |
| dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Tax evasion Good taxpayer Rewards Fiscal policy Argentina |
| topic |
Tax evasion Good taxpayer Rewards Fiscal policy Argentina H21, H26, H30 |
| dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv |
H21, H26, H30 |
| description |
In this paper, I examine the conditions under which rewarding honest taxpayers is an optimal mechanism to reduce tax evasion and improve collection. My theoretical model suggests that when it is expensive to audit contributors, and moral (or pecuniary) evasion cost is high enough, rewarding tax compliance is an effective strategy to increase collection. I provide empirical evidence from Argentina's province variation of rewards policies and tax collection. Where the data suggests that theoretical conditions hold, I find a positive effect in real estate per capita tax collection between 0.4 and more than 2 standard deviations. |
| publishDate |
2021 |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-07-16T13:44:49Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-07-16T13:44:49Z |
| dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2021 |
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Documento de trabajo |
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http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
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Text |
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https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1992/50296 |
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1657-7191 |
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10.57784/1992/50296 |
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reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
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repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1992/50296 |
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1657-7191 10.57784/1992/50296 instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
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eng |
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eng |
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Documentos CEDE No. 30 Julio de 2021 |
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https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/019419.html |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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openAccess |
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50 páginas |
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application/pdf |
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes |
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