Applying the stick to excessive water use : Does the group-size matters?
Increasing water efficiency is one of the main goals of governments in Latin America. In presence of droughts, water regulators used to apply monetary incentives to promote collective action in supply systems users. A vast part of the literature has agreed that the larger the size of a group the low...
- Autores:
-
López Rivas, José David
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2016
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/34383
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/34383
- Palabra clave:
- Utilización del agua - Investigaciones
Incentivos financieros - Investigaciones
Grupos sociales - Aspectos económicos - Investigaciones
Economía
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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Applying the stick to excessive water use : Does the group-size matters? |
| title |
Applying the stick to excessive water use : Does the group-size matters? |
| spellingShingle |
Applying the stick to excessive water use : Does the group-size matters? Utilización del agua - Investigaciones Incentivos financieros - Investigaciones Grupos sociales - Aspectos económicos - Investigaciones Economía |
| title_short |
Applying the stick to excessive water use : Does the group-size matters? |
| title_full |
Applying the stick to excessive water use : Does the group-size matters? |
| title_fullStr |
Applying the stick to excessive water use : Does the group-size matters? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Applying the stick to excessive water use : Does the group-size matters? |
| title_sort |
Applying the stick to excessive water use : Does the group-size matters? |
| dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
López Rivas, José David |
| dc.contributor.advisor.none.fl_str_mv |
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo |
| dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
López Rivas, José David |
| dc.contributor.jury.none.fl_str_mv |
Maldonado, Jorge Higinio Carriazo Osorio, Fernando Eslava Mejía, Marcela |
| dc.subject.keyword.es_CO.fl_str_mv |
Utilización del agua - Investigaciones Incentivos financieros - Investigaciones Grupos sociales - Aspectos económicos - Investigaciones |
| topic |
Utilización del agua - Investigaciones Incentivos financieros - Investigaciones Grupos sociales - Aspectos económicos - Investigaciones Economía |
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Economía |
| description |
Increasing water efficiency is one of the main goals of governments in Latin America. In presence of droughts, water regulators used to apply monetary incentives to promote collective action in supply systems users. A vast part of the literature has agreed that the larger the size of a group the lower the cooperation. Situation that calls for design of deterrent incentives that promote it. However, little is known about the effect of the application of monetary disincentives and the results on cooperation when the group size is variable. In this paper, I analyze the effect the application of a monetary disincentive, the group-size and the crossed-effect between on cooperation. Cooperation in this context is related to reduction of water consumption when the supply system is affected by exogenous reductions. To estimate these effects, I use data from a residential water-use fines program implemented in 2014 in Colombia, whose aim was to punish the overuse... |
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2016 |
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2016 |
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2020-06-10T09:03:32Z |
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2020-06-10T09:03:32Z |
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Trabajo de grado - Maestría |
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http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1992/34383 |
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u807531.pdf |
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26 hojas |
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Uniandes |
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Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilovirtual::7454-1López Rivas, José David11297500Maldonado, Jorge HiginioCarriazo Osorio, FernandoEslava Mejía, Marcela2020-06-10T09:03:32Z2020-06-10T09:03:32Z2016http://hdl.handle.net/1992/34383u807531.pdfinstname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/Increasing water efficiency is one of the main goals of governments in Latin America. In presence of droughts, water regulators used to apply monetary incentives to promote collective action in supply systems users. A vast part of the literature has agreed that the larger the size of a group the lower the cooperation. Situation that calls for design of deterrent incentives that promote it. However, little is known about the effect of the application of monetary disincentives and the results on cooperation when the group size is variable. In this paper, I analyze the effect the application of a monetary disincentive, the group-size and the crossed-effect between on cooperation. Cooperation in this context is related to reduction of water consumption when the supply system is affected by exogenous reductions. To estimate these effects, I use data from a residential water-use fines program implemented in 2014 in Colombia, whose aim was to punish the overuse..."El aumento de la eficiencia del agua es uno de los objetivos principales de los gobiernos en América Latina. En presencia de sequías, los reguladores del agua solían aplicar incentivos monetarios para promover la acción colectiva en los usuarios de sistemas de suministro. Una gran parte de la literatura ha acordado que cuanto mayor es el tamaño de un grupo, menor es la cooperación. Situación que requiere el diseño de incentivos disuasivos que la promuevan. Sin embargo, se sabe poco sobre el efecto de la aplicación de desincentivos monetarios y los resultados en la cooperación cuando el tamaño del grupo es variable. En este trabajo, analizo el efecto de la aplicación de un desincentivo monetario, el tamaño del grupo y el efecto cruzado entre la cooperación. La cooperación en este contexto está relacionada con la reducción del consumo de agua cuando el sistema de suministro se ve afectado por reducciones exógenas. Para estimar estos efectos..."--Tomado del Formato de Documento de Grado.Magíster en EconomíaMaestría26 hojasapplication/pdfengUniandesMaestría en EconomíaFacultad de Economíainstname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional SénecaApplying the stick to excessive water use : Does the group-size matters?Trabajo de grado - Maestríainfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesishttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TMUtilización del agua - InvestigacionesIncentivos financieros - InvestigacionesGrupos sociales - Aspectos económicos - InvestigacionesEconomíaPublicationhttps://scholar.google.es/citations?user=yfeFFpIAAAAJvirtual::7454-10000-0003-0005-7595virtual::7454-1https://scienti.minciencias.gov.co/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0000053686virtual::7454-1b563b7bf-5ec9-4e6d-a30c-3d1e8c37d90cvirtual::7454-1b563b7bf-5ec9-4e6d-a30c-3d1e8c37d90cvirtual::7454-1TEXTu807531.pdf.txtu807531.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain57263https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/437fed9b-e5e3-499b-9a07-77990e67643b/download3d220654e5e849e696f7803a7689a7adMD54ORIGINALu807531.pdfapplication/pdf1623407https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/35b80ac7-46e2-4e16-87d2-5853c5f7f4b9/download58bb633168b0171128fa7b5a8ffb930fMD51THUMBNAILu807531.pdf.jpgu807531.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg17029https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/2cd6ff52-55b4-4b04-8213-c07fb6e87e2a/download4fe927d2179356a45a1d12f631f61226MD551992/34383oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/343832024-03-13 13:26:15.45http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |