Applying the stick to excessive water use : Does the group-size matters?
Increasing water efficiency is one of the main goals of governments in Latin America. In presence of droughts, water regulators used to apply monetary incentives to promote collective action in supply systems users. A vast part of the literature has agreed that the larger the size of a group the low...
- Autores:
-
López Rivas, José David
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2016
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/34383
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/34383
- Palabra clave:
- Utilización del agua - Investigaciones
Incentivos financieros - Investigaciones
Grupos sociales - Aspectos económicos - Investigaciones
Economía
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
| Summary: | Increasing water efficiency is one of the main goals of governments in Latin America. In presence of droughts, water regulators used to apply monetary incentives to promote collective action in supply systems users. A vast part of the literature has agreed that the larger the size of a group the lower the cooperation. Situation that calls for design of deterrent incentives that promote it. However, little is known about the effect of the application of monetary disincentives and the results on cooperation when the group size is variable. In this paper, I analyze the effect the application of a monetary disincentive, the group-size and the crossed-effect between on cooperation. Cooperation in this context is related to reduction of water consumption when the supply system is affected by exogenous reductions. To estimate these effects, I use data from a residential water-use fines program implemented in 2014 in Colombia, whose aim was to punish the overuse... |
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