Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There i...
- Autores:
-
Jaramillo Vidales, Paula
Kayi, Cagatay
Klijn, Flip
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2012
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8300
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8300
- Palabra clave:
- Justicia
Manipulación estratégica
Bien indivisible
Restitución de tierras
Distribución de tierras - Aspectos económicos
Tenencia de la tierra - Aspectos económicos
Economía política
D61, D63
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
| Summary: | We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint. |
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