Competition between managed care organizations and indemnity plans in health insurance markets

This paper examines a model of competition between two types of health insurers: Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) and "Conventional Insurers". MCOs vertically integrate health care providers and pay them at a competitive price, while conventional insurers work as indemnity plans and pay t...

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Autores:
Baranes, Edmond
Bardey, David
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2012
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8318
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8318
Palabra clave:
Competition policy
Managed care organization
Vertical integration
Compañías de seguros - Investigaciones
Seguros de salud - Investigaciones
L42, I11, G22
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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network_acronym_str UNIANDES2
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dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Competition between managed care organizations and indemnity plans in health insurance markets
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv Competencia entre aseguradores integrados y tradicionales en los mercados de seguros de salud
title Competition between managed care organizations and indemnity plans in health insurance markets
spellingShingle Competition between managed care organizations and indemnity plans in health insurance markets
Competition policy
Managed care organization
Vertical integration
Compañías de seguros - Investigaciones
Seguros de salud - Investigaciones
L42, I11, G22
title_short Competition between managed care organizations and indemnity plans in health insurance markets
title_full Competition between managed care organizations and indemnity plans in health insurance markets
title_fullStr Competition between managed care organizations and indemnity plans in health insurance markets
title_full_unstemmed Competition between managed care organizations and indemnity plans in health insurance markets
title_sort Competition between managed care organizations and indemnity plans in health insurance markets
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Baranes, Edmond
Bardey, David
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Baranes, Edmond
Bardey, David
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv Competition policy
Managed care organization
Vertical integration
topic Competition policy
Managed care organization
Vertical integration
Compañías de seguros - Investigaciones
Seguros de salud - Investigaciones
L42, I11, G22
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv Compañías de seguros - Investigaciones
Seguros de salud - Investigaciones
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv L42, I11, G22
description This paper examines a model of competition between two types of health insurers: Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) and "Conventional Insurers". MCOs vertically integrate health care providers and pay them at a competitive price, while conventional insurers work as indemnity plans and pay the health care providers that are freely chosen by their policyholders at a wholesale price. This first difference is called input price effect. Moreover, we assume that policyholders put a positive value on providers. diversity supplied by their health insurance plan and that this value increases with their probability of disease. Due to the restricted choice of health care providers in MCOs, a risk segmentation occurs: policyholders who choose conventional insurers are characterized by a higher risk. Surprisingly, our results point out that the effects of this input price and risk segmentation can be countervailing and do not necessarily work in the same direction. More precisely, we show that vertical integration in health insurance markets can create an anti-raise rivals' cost effect. Consequently, our results reveal that the penetration of vertical integration may decrease conventional insurers' premiums, which is a sufficient condition to be Pareto-improving. After more than three decades of vertical integration waves, our model may also explain why we observe an interior equilibrium in which conventional insurers have survived.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2012
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:52:07Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:52:07Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo
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dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8318
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dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.57784/1992/8318
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad de los Andes
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url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8318
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv Documentos CEDE No. 16 Julio de 2012
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dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv 20 páginas
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
institution Universidad de los Andes
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spelling Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Baranes, Edmond4508f364-617e-4a54-a1d4-617410e9580f600Bardey, Davideb5d55eb-0c4d-4330-b74c-b4e0ef0037ac6002018-09-27T16:52:07Z2018-09-27T16:52:07Z20121657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/83181657-719110.57784/1992/8318instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/This paper examines a model of competition between two types of health insurers: Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) and "Conventional Insurers". MCOs vertically integrate health care providers and pay them at a competitive price, while conventional insurers work as indemnity plans and pay the health care providers that are freely chosen by their policyholders at a wholesale price. This first difference is called input price effect. Moreover, we assume that policyholders put a positive value on providers. diversity supplied by their health insurance plan and that this value increases with their probability of disease. Due to the restricted choice of health care providers in MCOs, a risk segmentation occurs: policyholders who choose conventional insurers are characterized by a higher risk. Surprisingly, our results point out that the effects of this input price and risk segmentation can be countervailing and do not necessarily work in the same direction. More precisely, we show that vertical integration in health insurance markets can create an anti-raise rivals' cost effect. Consequently, our results reveal that the penetration of vertical integration may decrease conventional insurers' premiums, which is a sufficient condition to be Pareto-improving. After more than three decades of vertical integration waves, our model may also explain why we observe an interior equilibrium in which conventional insurers have survived.Este artículo propone un análisis en el cual se modela la competencia entre dos tipos de aseguradores: integrados (MCOs) y tradicionales. Los MCOs integran verticalmente a los proveedores de salud y les pagan sus servicios a un precio competitivo (costo marginal), mientras que, los aseguradores tradicionales simplemente reembolsan a los proveedores de salud, libremente escogidos por sus afiliados, a un precio de mercado. Esta primera diferencia es llamada efecto precio. Además, se asume que los asegurados valoran positivamente la diversidad de proveedores a los cuales tienen acceso gracias a su plan de salud y que esta valoración aumenta con su probabilidad de estar enfermo. Debido a las elecciones restringidas de los proveedores de salud con los MCOs, una segmentación de los riesgos ocurre: los asegurados que escogen aseguradores tradicionales se caracterizan por un riesgo mayor. De manera sorprendente, nuestros resultados revelan que estos efectos precios y de segmentación de los riesgos pueden actuar en direcciones opuestas. Más precisamente, se muestra que la integración vertical en los mercados de seguros de salud puede generar un efecto opuesto al efecto tradicional de incrementar el costo de los competidores. En consecuencia, nuestros resultados revelan que la penetración de la integración vertical disminuye las primas de los aseguradores tradicionales, lo cual constituye una condición suficiente para ser Pareto-improving. Después de tres décadas de ola de integración vertical, nuestro modelo permite explicar porque todavía existe un equilibrio interior en el cual los aseguradores tradicionales han sobrevivido.20 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 16 Julio de 2012https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/009802.htmlCompetition between managed care organizations and indemnity plans in health insurance marketsCompetencia entre aseguradores integrados y tradicionales en los mercados de seguros de saludDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPCompetition policyManaged care organizationVertical integrationCompañías de seguros - InvestigacionesSeguros de salud - InvestigacionesL42, I11, G22Facultad de EconomíaPublicationORIGINALdcede2012-16.pdfdcede2012-16.pdfapplication/pdf686289https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/53f5bf85-1806-41b5-9628-f7a483f6af82/download1d84560609e6c3bdffa1842eb7967d63MD51TEXTdcede2012-16.pdf.txtdcede2012-16.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain357813https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/338bc0f0-c278-4689-91c3-38f30786e7ea/download0ef0d5de7b47b7b478079a4572991cd2MD54THUMBNAILdcede2012-16.pdf.jpgdcede2012-16.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg9008https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/1b5c8a0f-8d2e-4b3a-a39a-11365a040f86/downloada5a41fde4db85b3bc3985f39fc089b78MD551992/8318oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/83182024-06-04 15:32:26.598http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co