Compulsory social service matching market for physicians in Colombia
In Colombia, physicians must work during a year to fulfill a compulsory social service known as año rural. This service constitutes an entry-level labor market which can be modeled as a many-to-one matching market. To match physicians with hospitals, a centralized and equiprobable random drawing is...
- Autores:
-
Montaño Correa, Sebastian
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2015
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8571
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8571
- Palabra clave:
- Two-sided matching
Random mechanisms
Ex-post stability
Ex-post efficiency
Strategy-proofness
Axiomas - Investigaciones
Práctica médica - Colombia - Modelos econométricos
Servicio social - Colombia
Procesos estocásticos - Colombia
C71, C78, D47
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
| Summary: | In Colombia, physicians must work during a year to fulfill a compulsory social service known as año rural. This service constitutes an entry-level labor market which can be modeled as a many-to-one matching market. To match physicians with hospitals, a centralized and equiprobable random drawing is employed in the market. This random mechanism is evaluated here by using axioms of ex-post stability, ex-post efficiency and strategy-proofness. It is underlined in this paper that agents in the market have identified these axioms as a matter of interest. A formal proof shows that the random mechanism violates these axioms. |
|---|