Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach
We present a new design of a simple public goods experiment with a large number of players, where up to 80 people in a computer lab have the possibility to connect with others in the room to induce more cooperators to contribute to the public good and overcome the social dilemma. This experimental d...
- Autores:
-
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
Jaramillo Herrera, Christian Rafael
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2007
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8041
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8041
- Palabra clave:
- Social capital
Social networks
Collective action
Cooperation
VCM
Experiments
Public goods provision
Information flows
Capital social (Sociología)
Pobreza - Aspectos sociales
Redes sociales
Cooperación internacional
C92, D7, D85, H41
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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|
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach |
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv |
Cooperación en redes extensas: un enfoque experimental |
title |
Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach |
spellingShingle |
Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach Social capital Social networks Collective action Cooperation VCM Experiments Public goods provision Information flows Capital social (Sociología) Pobreza - Aspectos sociales Redes sociales Cooperación internacional C92, D7, D85, H41 |
title_short |
Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach |
title_full |
Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach |
title_fullStr |
Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach |
title_full_unstemmed |
Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach |
title_sort |
Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo Jaramillo Herrera, Christian Rafael |
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo Jaramillo Herrera, Christian Rafael |
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Social capital Social networks Collective action Cooperation VCM Experiments Public goods provision Information flows |
topic |
Social capital Social networks Collective action Cooperation VCM Experiments Public goods provision Information flows Capital social (Sociología) Pobreza - Aspectos sociales Redes sociales Cooperación internacional C92, D7, D85, H41 |
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv |
Capital social (Sociología) Pobreza - Aspectos sociales Redes sociales Cooperación internacional |
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv |
C92, D7, D85, H41 |
description |
We present a new design of a simple public goods experiment with a large number of players, where up to 80 people in a computer lab have the possibility to connect with others in the room to induce more cooperators to contribute to the public good and overcome the social dilemma. This experimental design explores the possibility of social networks to be used and institutional devices to create the same behavioral responses we observe with small groups (e.g. commitments, social norms, reciprocity, trust, shame, guilt) that seem to induce cooperative behavior in the private provision of public goods. The results of our experiment suggest that the structure of the network affects the players' ability to communicate -and through it, their cooperation levels-, and also their willingness to engage in a more costly type of collective action, namely the endogenous creation of new links to individuals previously out of reach. Finally, the information flows in the network seem to reduce uncertainty in the players: players with more links tend to have more stable play strategies. |
publishDate |
2007 |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2007 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:50:12Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:50:12Z |
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv |
Documento de trabajo |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.type.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.type.content.spa.fl_str_mv |
Text |
dc.type.redcol.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP |
format |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
1657-5334 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8041 |
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv |
1657-7191 |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
10.57784/1992/8041 |
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad de los Andes |
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
dc.identifier.repourl.spa.fl_str_mv |
repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
identifier_str_mv |
1657-5334 1657-7191 10.57784/1992/8041 instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8041 |
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv |
Documentos CEDE No. 06 Abril de 2007 |
dc.relation.repec.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/002202.html |
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
dc.rights.accessrights.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv |
38 páginas |
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
institution |
Universidad de los Andes |
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spelling |
Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo7633600Jaramillo Herrera, Christian Rafael0e5bbbd4-0361-44cc-97f3-d7c21330666d6002018-09-27T16:50:12Z2018-09-27T16:50:12Z20071657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/80411657-719110.57784/1992/8041instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/We present a new design of a simple public goods experiment with a large number of players, where up to 80 people in a computer lab have the possibility to connect with others in the room to induce more cooperators to contribute to the public good and overcome the social dilemma. This experimental design explores the possibility of social networks to be used and institutional devices to create the same behavioral responses we observe with small groups (e.g. commitments, social norms, reciprocity, trust, shame, guilt) that seem to induce cooperative behavior in the private provision of public goods. The results of our experiment suggest that the structure of the network affects the players' ability to communicate -and through it, their cooperation levels-, and also their willingness to engage in a more costly type of collective action, namely the endogenous creation of new links to individuals previously out of reach. Finally, the information flows in the network seem to reduce uncertainty in the players: players with more links tend to have more stable play strategies.Presentamos un nuevo diseño de un experimento de bienes públicos simplificados para un número grande de jugadores, donde hasta 80 personas en el laboratorio tienen la posibilidad de comunicarse con otros jugadores para inducir más contribuyentes al bien público y así solucionar el dilema social. Este diseño experimental explora la posibilidad de que las redes sociales y mecanismos institucionales creen las mismas respuestas de comportamiento que se observan con pequeños grupos (e.g. compromisos, normas sociales, reciprocidad, confianza, pena y culpa), que al parecer inducen el comportamiento cooperativo en la provisión de bienes públicos. Los resultados de nuestro experimento sugieren que la estructura de la red afecta de un lado la posibilidad del jugador de comunicarse, y de otro su disposición a involucrarse en acciones colectivas más costosas -la creación endógena de nuevas conexiones con individuos que inicialmente fuera de su alcance en la red. Finalmente, el flujo de información en la red parece disminuir la incertidumbre que enfrentan los jugadores: jugadores mejor conectados tienden a tener estrategias de juego más estables.38 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 06 Abril de 2007https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/002202.htmlCooperation in large networks: an experimental approachCooperación en redes extensas: un enfoque experimentalDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPSocial capitalSocial networksCollective actionCooperationVCMExperimentsPublic goods provisionInformation flowsCapital social (Sociología)Pobreza - Aspectos socialesRedes socialesCooperación internacionalC92, D7, D85, H41Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTEXTdcede2007-06.pdf.txtdcede2007-06.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain68297https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/617d1a73-c61f-4d3f-b19e-d53927973d12/download69547d81bbb815fc49d3f670f4eded53MD54ORIGINALdcede2007-06.pdfdcede2007-06.pdfapplication/pdf283283https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/390ae18f-9386-4b1d-8991-aa77c2cc9f2f/download0341d9e97d0d49f3fea74e6ca92bf366MD51THUMBNAILdcede2007-06.pdf.jpgdcede2007-06.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg19398https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/eaebb3f5-e584-4039-85a7-91834535303c/download58b66214a2fc59e9ef9a9617db86d457MD551992/8041oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/80412024-06-04 15:25:39.46http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |