Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach

We present a new design of a simple public goods experiment with a large number of players, where up to 80 people in a computer lab have the possibility to connect with others in the room to induce more cooperators to contribute to the public good and overcome the social dilemma. This experimental d...

Full description

Autores:
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
Jaramillo Herrera, Christian Rafael
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2007
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8041
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8041
Palabra clave:
Social capital
Social networks
Collective action
Cooperation
VCM
Experiments
Public goods provision
Information flows
Capital social (Sociología)
Pobreza - Aspectos sociales
Redes sociales
Cooperación internacional
C92, D7, D85, H41
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8041
network_acronym_str UNIANDES2
network_name_str Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
repository_id_str
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv Cooperación en redes extensas: un enfoque experimental
title Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach
spellingShingle Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach
Social capital
Social networks
Collective action
Cooperation
VCM
Experiments
Public goods provision
Information flows
Capital social (Sociología)
Pobreza - Aspectos sociales
Redes sociales
Cooperación internacional
C92, D7, D85, H41
title_short Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach
title_full Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach
title_fullStr Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach
title_full_unstemmed Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach
title_sort Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
Jaramillo Herrera, Christian Rafael
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
Jaramillo Herrera, Christian Rafael
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv Social capital
Social networks
Collective action
Cooperation
VCM
Experiments
Public goods provision
Information flows
topic Social capital
Social networks
Collective action
Cooperation
VCM
Experiments
Public goods provision
Information flows
Capital social (Sociología)
Pobreza - Aspectos sociales
Redes sociales
Cooperación internacional
C92, D7, D85, H41
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv Capital social (Sociología)
Pobreza - Aspectos sociales
Redes sociales
Cooperación internacional
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv C92, D7, D85, H41
description We present a new design of a simple public goods experiment with a large number of players, where up to 80 people in a computer lab have the possibility to connect with others in the room to induce more cooperators to contribute to the public good and overcome the social dilemma. This experimental design explores the possibility of social networks to be used and institutional devices to create the same behavioral responses we observe with small groups (e.g. commitments, social norms, reciprocity, trust, shame, guilt) that seem to induce cooperative behavior in the private provision of public goods. The results of our experiment suggest that the structure of the network affects the players' ability to communicate -and through it, their cooperation levels-, and also their willingness to engage in a more costly type of collective action, namely the endogenous creation of new links to individuals previously out of reach. Finally, the information flows in the network seem to reduce uncertainty in the players: players with more links tend to have more stable play strategies.
publishDate 2007
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2007
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:50:12Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:50:12Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo
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dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 1657-5334
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8041
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv 1657-7191
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.57784/1992/8041
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad de los Andes
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url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8041
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv Documentos CEDE No. 06 Abril de 2007
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dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv 38 páginas
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
institution Universidad de los Andes
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spelling Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo7633600Jaramillo Herrera, Christian Rafael0e5bbbd4-0361-44cc-97f3-d7c21330666d6002018-09-27T16:50:12Z2018-09-27T16:50:12Z20071657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/80411657-719110.57784/1992/8041instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/We present a new design of a simple public goods experiment with a large number of players, where up to 80 people in a computer lab have the possibility to connect with others in the room to induce more cooperators to contribute to the public good and overcome the social dilemma. This experimental design explores the possibility of social networks to be used and institutional devices to create the same behavioral responses we observe with small groups (e.g. commitments, social norms, reciprocity, trust, shame, guilt) that seem to induce cooperative behavior in the private provision of public goods. The results of our experiment suggest that the structure of the network affects the players' ability to communicate -and through it, their cooperation levels-, and also their willingness to engage in a more costly type of collective action, namely the endogenous creation of new links to individuals previously out of reach. Finally, the information flows in the network seem to reduce uncertainty in the players: players with more links tend to have more stable play strategies.Presentamos un nuevo diseño de un experimento de bienes públicos simplificados para un número grande de jugadores, donde hasta 80 personas en el laboratorio tienen la posibilidad de comunicarse con otros jugadores para inducir más contribuyentes al bien público y así solucionar el dilema social. Este diseño experimental explora la posibilidad de que las redes sociales y mecanismos institucionales creen las mismas respuestas de comportamiento que se observan con pequeños grupos (e.g. compromisos, normas sociales, reciprocidad, confianza, pena y culpa), que al parecer inducen el comportamiento cooperativo en la provisión de bienes públicos. Los resultados de nuestro experimento sugieren que la estructura de la red afecta de un lado la posibilidad del jugador de comunicarse, y de otro su disposición a involucrarse en acciones colectivas más costosas -la creación endógena de nuevas conexiones con individuos que inicialmente fuera de su alcance en la red. Finalmente, el flujo de información en la red parece disminuir la incertidumbre que enfrentan los jugadores: jugadores mejor conectados tienden a tener estrategias de juego más estables.38 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 06 Abril de 2007https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/002202.htmlCooperation in large networks: an experimental approachCooperación en redes extensas: un enfoque experimentalDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPSocial capitalSocial networksCollective actionCooperationVCMExperimentsPublic goods provisionInformation flowsCapital social (Sociología)Pobreza - Aspectos socialesRedes socialesCooperación internacionalC92, D7, D85, H41Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTEXTdcede2007-06.pdf.txtdcede2007-06.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain68297https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/617d1a73-c61f-4d3f-b19e-d53927973d12/download69547d81bbb815fc49d3f670f4eded53MD54ORIGINALdcede2007-06.pdfdcede2007-06.pdfapplication/pdf283283https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/390ae18f-9386-4b1d-8991-aa77c2cc9f2f/download0341d9e97d0d49f3fea74e6ca92bf366MD51THUMBNAILdcede2007-06.pdf.jpgdcede2007-06.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg19398https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/eaebb3f5-e584-4039-85a7-91834535303c/download58b66214a2fc59e9ef9a9617db86d457MD551992/8041oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/80412024-06-04 15:25:39.46http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co