Family Involvement and Dividend Policy in Listed and Non-Listed Firms

We evaluate the relationship between family involvement, the likelihood of dividend payment, and the amounts of the dividends paid. Using a detailed data-base of 523 mostly non-listed Colombian companies (1996 to 2006), we found that majority family owner-ship has significant negative effects on the likelihood of dividend payment. Furthermore, family control through pyramidal structures significantly reduces the level of payouts. In addition, family involvement on the board positively and significantly increases the likelihood of dividend payment, even when the CEO is a member of the founding family. The presence of the founder has a negative, though weakly significant impact on the dividend payments made by firms.

• Autores: González, Maximiliano; Guzmán, Alexander; Pombo, Carlos; Trujillo, María Andrea
• Tipo de recurso: Work document
• Fecha de publicación: 2012
• Institución: Universidad de los Andes
• Repositorio: Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
• Idioma: spa
• OAI Identifier: oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/46364
• Acceso en línea: http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46364
• Palabra clave: Family businesses; dividend policy; agency problems; Empresas familiares - Colombia; Empresas familiares - Finanzas; Administración
• Rights: openAccess
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/