A game-theoretical method for dynamic agent-zone allocation problems

We consider an agent-zone allocation problem, where agents are expected to optimally allocate themselves into a set of zones. For such, we use a game-theoretical formulation of the problem, where the agents make individual decisions to optimize their own utility function, while they also optimize the global utility. We use a negotiation mechanism named generalized regret monitoring with fading memory and inertia, which helps to obtain an optimal solution. Moreover, we propose a utility function based on carrying capacities, so that the agents consider the occupation of each zone while making their decisions. We present a sensitivity analysis of the parameters used in the negotiation mechanism and the utility function. Finally, we show some simulation results of three scenarios and their corresponding statistical analysis.

• Autores: Sandoval Carranza, María Alejandra
• Tipo de recurso: Trabajo de grado de pregrado
• Fecha de publicación: 2020
• Institución: Universidad de los Andes
• Repositorio: Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
• Idioma: eng
• OAI Identifier: oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/51559
• Acceso en línea: http://hdl.handle.net/1992/51559
• Palabra clave: Sistemas multiagente; Agentes inteligentes (Programas para computador); Problemas de asignación (Programación); Teoría de los juegos; Aprendizaje automático (Inteligencia artificial); Ingeniería
• Rights: openAccess
• License: https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/static/pdf/aceptacion_uso_es.pdf