Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector
We study the effect of UI benefits in a typical developing country where the informal sector is sizeable and persistent. In a partial equilibrium environment we characterize the stationary equilibrium of an economy where policyholders may be employed in the formal sector, short-run unemployed receiv...
- Autores:
-
Bardey, David
Jaramillo, Fernando
Peña Parga, Ximena
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2013
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8373
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8373
- Palabra clave:
- Developing countries
Income effect
Informal sector
Unemployment insurance
Economía informal - Países en desarrollo
Seguros de desempleo - Países en desarrollo
H55, I38, J65
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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|
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector |
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv |
Seguro de desempleo en una economía con sector informal |
title |
Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector |
spellingShingle |
Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector Developing countries Income effect Informal sector Unemployment insurance Economía informal - Países en desarrollo Seguros de desempleo - Países en desarrollo H55, I38, J65 |
title_short |
Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector |
title_full |
Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector |
title_fullStr |
Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector |
title_full_unstemmed |
Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector |
title_sort |
Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Bardey, David Jaramillo, Fernando Peña Parga, Ximena |
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Bardey, David Jaramillo, Fernando Peña Parga, Ximena |
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Developing countries Income effect Informal sector Unemployment insurance |
topic |
Developing countries Income effect Informal sector Unemployment insurance Economía informal - Países en desarrollo Seguros de desempleo - Países en desarrollo H55, I38, J65 |
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv |
Economía informal - Países en desarrollo Seguros de desempleo - Países en desarrollo |
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv |
H55, I38, J65 |
description |
We study the effect of UI benefits in a typical developing country where the informal sector is sizeable and persistent. In a partial equilibrium environment we characterize the stationary equilibrium of an economy where policyholders may be employed in the formal sector, short-run unemployed receiving UI benefits and long-run unemployed without UI benefits. We perform comparative static exercises to understand how UI benefits affect unemployed workers' effort to secure a formal job, their labor supply in the informal sector and leisure time. Our model reveals that an increase in UI benefits generates two opposing effects for the short-run unemployed. First, since search efforts cannot be monitored it generates moral hazard behaviours that lower effort. Second, it generates an income effect as it reduces the marginal cost of searching for a formal job and increases effort. The overall effect is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these two effects. Additionally, we show that an increase in UI benefits increases the efforts of long-run unemployed workers. Using data from Brazil to calibrate the parameters of the model we provide a simple simulation exercise which suggests that the income effect pointed out is not necessarily of second-order importance in comparison with moral hazard strength: An increase in UI benefits may increase unemployed workers efforts to secure a job in the formal sector, instead of increasing informal-sector work. This result softens the widespread opinion that the presence of dual labor markets is an obstacle to providing UI in developing countries. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2013 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:52:36Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:52:36Z |
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv |
Documento de trabajo |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.type.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.type.content.spa.fl_str_mv |
Text |
dc.type.redcol.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP |
format |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
1657-5334 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8373 |
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv |
1657-7191 |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
10.57784/1992/8373 |
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad de los Andes |
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
dc.identifier.repourl.spa.fl_str_mv |
repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
identifier_str_mv |
1657-5334 1657-7191 10.57784/1992/8373 instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8373 |
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv |
Documentos CEDE No. 03 Enero de 2013 |
dc.relation.repec.SPA.fl_str_mv |
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/010496.html |
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
dc.rights.accessrights.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv |
26 páginas |
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes |
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spelling |
Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Bardey, Davideb5d55eb-0c4d-4330-b74c-b4e0ef0037ac500Jaramillo, Fernandodc569eca-f9b8-4a7e-8276-0050b7f9f63c500Peña Parga, Ximena9d2bd73d-4974-4e39-94c8-59fbe2a0eaef5002018-09-27T16:52:36Z2018-09-27T16:52:36Z20131657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/83731657-719110.57784/1992/8373instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/We study the effect of UI benefits in a typical developing country where the informal sector is sizeable and persistent. In a partial equilibrium environment we characterize the stationary equilibrium of an economy where policyholders may be employed in the formal sector, short-run unemployed receiving UI benefits and long-run unemployed without UI benefits. We perform comparative static exercises to understand how UI benefits affect unemployed workers' effort to secure a formal job, their labor supply in the informal sector and leisure time. Our model reveals that an increase in UI benefits generates two opposing effects for the short-run unemployed. First, since search efforts cannot be monitored it generates moral hazard behaviours that lower effort. Second, it generates an income effect as it reduces the marginal cost of searching for a formal job and increases effort. The overall effect is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these two effects. Additionally, we show that an increase in UI benefits increases the efforts of long-run unemployed workers. Using data from Brazil to calibrate the parameters of the model we provide a simple simulation exercise which suggests that the income effect pointed out is not necessarily of second-order importance in comparison with moral hazard strength: An increase in UI benefits may increase unemployed workers efforts to secure a job in the formal sector, instead of increasing informal-sector work. This result softens the widespread opinion that the presence of dual labor markets is an obstacle to providing UI in developing countries.Estudiamos los efectos del seguro de desempleo en un típico país en desarrollo, donde el sector informal es sustancial y persistente. Caracterizamos el equilibrio estacionario de un modelo de equilibrio parcial donde los agentes pueden estar empleados en el sector formal, desempleados de corto plazo recibiendo seguro de desempleo o desempleados de largo plazo sin seguro de desempleo. Realizamos ejercicios de estática comparativa para determinar el efecto de aumentar el seguro de desempleo sobre el esfuerzo de los agentes para conseguir un empleo formal, la oferta de trabajo en el sector informal y el tiempo de ocio. Nuestro modelo sugiere que un aumento en los beneficios del seguro de desempleo genera dos efectos encontrados sobre los desempleados de corto plazo. Primero, dado que los esfuerzos por buscar un empleo formal no se pueden monitorear se generan comportamientos de riesgo moral que disminuyen el esfuerzo. Segundo, hay un efecto ingreso que reduce el costo marginal de buscar un empleo formal que aumenta el esfuerzo. El efecto total es ambiguo y depende...26 páginasapplication/pdfspaUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 03 Enero de 2013https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/010496.htmlUnemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sectorSeguro de desempleo en una economía con sector informalDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPDeveloping countriesIncome effectInformal sectorUnemployment insuranceEconomía informal - Países en desarrolloSeguros de desempleo - Países en desarrolloH55, I38, J65Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTEXTdcede2013-03.pdf.txtdcede2013-03.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain780434https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/def55e5c-f5d6-4f4e-8a07-06dc8e6b5c13/download3718485a1839f6f41565723554b43c0fMD54THUMBNAILdcede2013-03.pdf.jpgdcede2013-03.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg30732https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/9f03a802-1c74-42d8-b155-972cb160fec4/download97c43ef271b61b973164ab91a9bb25bcMD55ORIGINALdcede2013-03.pdfdcede2013-03.pdfapplication/pdf1813772https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/04a7472f-f97b-403e-a651-6f9998de8966/downloaddea8500888ce87667e99d677e183316aMD511992/8373oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/83732024-06-04 15:25:50.82http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |