Conceptual content and unattended visual features
McDowell (1994) proposed a philosophical theory about perceptual content −call it “conceptualism”− that states that in every case the content of a visual experience necessarily involves concepts that fully specify every single feature consciously and simultaneously available during the experience. I...
- Autores:
-
Pereira, Francisco
- Tipo de recurso:
- Article of journal
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2009
- Institución:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Repositorio:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/71530
- Acceso en línea:
- https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/71530
http://bdigital.unal.edu.co/36001/
http://bdigital.unal.edu.co/36001/2/
- Palabra clave:
- McDowell
perceptual content
conceptualism
experiential richness
sensory memory
attention
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
| Summary: | McDowell (1994) proposed a philosophical theory about perceptual content −call it “conceptualism”− that states that in every case the content of a visual experience necessarily involves concepts that fully specify every single feature consciously and simultaneously available during the experience. In this paper I will question conceptualism, arguing that some visual experiences carry information about so many objects, properties and relations at the same time that it is unlikely for subjects to possess and implement concepts for every feature represented simultaneously by the experience at that time. If this is the case, then McDowell’s conceptualism is insufficiently grounded. |
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