Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels
The coca far ming dynamics seems to partially follow the patterns of a long war against organized crime in Colombian. Since the early 80s, the cocaine market in the US and the rest of the world has been mainly supplied by Colombian cartels. Consequently, these illegal organizations have been tar get...
- Autores:
-
Jaén, Sebastián
Dyner, Isaac
- Tipo de recurso:
- Article of journal
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2010
- Institución:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Repositorio:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/38707
- Acceso en línea:
- https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/38707
http://bdigital.unal.edu.co/28804/
- Palabra clave:
- Illegal Monopolies
Cocaine Market
Law Enforcement
Simulation.
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
| Summary: | The coca far ming dynamics seems to partially follow the patterns of a long war against organized crime in Colombian. Since the early 80s, the cocaine market in the US and the rest of the world has been mainly supplied by Colombian cartels. Consequently, these illegal organizations have been tar geted by Colombian and American law en forcement agencies. Our work argues that such policy has had a counter-intuitive effect which contributes to increases coca farming and reductions in cocaine prices. This paper hypothesizes that such situation was the consequence of the way that drug cartels were dismantled – thus the Colombian paradox. The consequences of the war against cartels may be assessed with the support of a dynamic theor etical framework and SD. Effective policy may consider alternative actions before dismantling drug cartels. |
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