Kant on Free Will and Theoretical Rationality
The focus of this essay is Kant’s argument in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS) III that regarding oneself as rational implies regarding oneself as free. After setting out an interpretation of how the argument is meant to go (§§1-2), I argue that Kant fails to show that regarding o...
- Autores:
-
Wolt, Daniel
- Tipo de recurso:
- Article of journal
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2018
- Institución:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Repositorio:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/67725
- Acceso en línea:
- https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/67725
http://bdigital.unal.edu.co/68754/
- Palabra clave:
- 1 Filosofía y psicología / Philosophy and psychology
Kant
free will
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals
theoretical rationality
Kant
libre albedrío
Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres
racionalidad teórica
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
| Summary: | The focus of this essay is Kant’s argument in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS) III that regarding oneself as rational implies regarding oneself as free. After setting out an interpretation of how the argument is meant to go (§§1-2), I argue that Kant fails to show that regarding oneself as free is incompatible with accepting universal causal determinism (§3). However, I argue that the argument succeeds in showing that regarding oneself as rational is inconsistent with accepting universal causal determinism if one accepts a certain, plausible view of the explanation of events (§4). |
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