Disyuntivismo representacionalista y el rol explicativo de la experiencia
En este trabajo se busca defender una aproximación de corte intencionalista en el debate en torno al carácter presentacional de la experiencia y su rol explicativo que se presenta entre las diversas variantes disyuntivistas con respecto a la experiencia perceptual. Así, se pretende mostrar la posibi...
- Autores:
-
Murillo Villa, Alberto Sebastián
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2023
- Institución:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Repositorio:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/85534
- Palabra clave:
- 120 - Epistemología, causalidad, humanidad::121 - Epistemología (Teoría del conocimiento)
REPRESENTACION (FILOSOFIA)
INTENCIONALIDAD (FILOSOFIA)
Representacion (Philosophy)
Intentionality (Philosophy)
Representacionalismo
Disyuntivismo
Rol explicativo
Conceptualismo
Represetationalism
Disjunctivism
Explanatory role
Conceptualism
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional
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Disyuntivismo representacionalista y el rol explicativo de la experiencia |
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Representationalist disjunctivism and the explanatory role of experience |
| title |
Disyuntivismo representacionalista y el rol explicativo de la experiencia |
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Disyuntivismo representacionalista y el rol explicativo de la experiencia 120 - Epistemología, causalidad, humanidad::121 - Epistemología (Teoría del conocimiento) REPRESENTACION (FILOSOFIA) INTENCIONALIDAD (FILOSOFIA) Representacion (Philosophy) Intentionality (Philosophy) Representacionalismo Disyuntivismo Rol explicativo Conceptualismo Represetationalism Disjunctivism Explanatory role Conceptualism |
| title_short |
Disyuntivismo representacionalista y el rol explicativo de la experiencia |
| title_full |
Disyuntivismo representacionalista y el rol explicativo de la experiencia |
| title_fullStr |
Disyuntivismo representacionalista y el rol explicativo de la experiencia |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Disyuntivismo representacionalista y el rol explicativo de la experiencia |
| title_sort |
Disyuntivismo representacionalista y el rol explicativo de la experiencia |
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Murillo Villa, Alberto Sebastián |
| dc.contributor.advisor.none.fl_str_mv |
Ávila Cañamares, Ignacio |
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Murillo Villa, Alberto Sebastián |
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120 - Epistemología, causalidad, humanidad::121 - Epistemología (Teoría del conocimiento) |
| topic |
120 - Epistemología, causalidad, humanidad::121 - Epistemología (Teoría del conocimiento) REPRESENTACION (FILOSOFIA) INTENCIONALIDAD (FILOSOFIA) Representacion (Philosophy) Intentionality (Philosophy) Representacionalismo Disyuntivismo Rol explicativo Conceptualismo Represetationalism Disjunctivism Explanatory role Conceptualism |
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REPRESENTACION (FILOSOFIA) INTENCIONALIDAD (FILOSOFIA) |
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Representacion (Philosophy) Intentionality (Philosophy) |
| dc.subject.proposal.spa.fl_str_mv |
Representacionalismo Disyuntivismo Rol explicativo Conceptualismo Represetationalism Disjunctivism Explanatory role Conceptualism |
| description |
En este trabajo se busca defender una aproximación de corte intencionalista en el debate en torno al carácter presentacional de la experiencia y su rol explicativo que se presenta entre las diversas variantes disyuntivistas con respecto a la experiencia perceptual. Así, se pretende mostrar la posibilidad de articular una respuesta a la pregunta por el rol de la experiencia con respecto a nuestro pensamiento acerca de objetos que no sólo sea disyuntivista, sino que suscriba el principio representacional y que, a su vez, sea compatible con una versión conceptualista del intencionalismo. La idea general tiene que ver con mostrar que la aproximación disyuntivista de McDowell posee herramientas que le permiten contestar a las críticas que desde el relacionalismo se le plantean a su exposición a propósito del rol explicativo de la experiencia. (Texto tomado de la fuente) |
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2023 |
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2024-01-30T19:16:39Z |
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2024-01-30T19:16:39Z |
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Ávila, I. Filosofía Contemporánea de la percepción: Algunas tendencias Bermúdez, J (2012). Nonconceptual Mental Content. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Byrne, A (2004). Perception and Conceptual Content. In E. Sosa and M. Steup (eds.), contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Chalmers, D (2006). Perception and the Fall from Eden. In Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press Crane, T (1992). The Nonconceptual Content of Experience. In Tim Crane (ed.) The Contents of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crane, T (2003). The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines, and Mental Representation (Second edition). London: Routledge. Crane, T (2006). Is there a perceptual relation? In Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crane, T (2009). Is Perception A Propositional Attitude? The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 59 Crane, T (2011). The problem of perception. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Campbell, J. (2002). Berkeley´s Puzzle. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. MIT Press Campbell, J. 2002. Consciousness and Reference . Oxford: Clarendon Press Davidson, D 1973 A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. En: Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Davidson, D 1974 On the very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47: 5–20; reprinted in Davidson 2001b Evans, Gareth (1982). The Varieties of Reference. John McDowell (Ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fish, W. 2010 Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction. NY and London: Routledge Fodor, J 1986 Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind Frege, G (1952). On Sense and Reference. In P.T. Geach and Max Black (eds.), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Blackwell. (Original work published 1892) Heck, R (2000). Nonconceptual content and the Space of Reasons. The Philosophical Review 109 Kelly, S. (2001a). The Non-Conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Martin, M. (2002) The Content of Perception Oxford: Oxford University Press. Martin, M. (1992). Perception, Concepts and Memory. Philosophical Review Vol. 101 McAllister. (2019) Conceptualism and Concept Acquisition McDowell, J. (1986) Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space Cambridge: En Meaning, Knowledge and Reality, ed. John McDowell. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998 McDowell, J. (1987) In defense of Modesty, Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press McDowell, J (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. McDowell, John; (1997) Another Plea for Modesty, Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press McDowell, J. (2000). Experiencing the World. En: Reason and Nature, ed. Marcus Willascheck. Münster: LIT VERLAG, 2000 McDowell, John (2005) Evans‘s Frege, En: Bermudez, José Luis (ed.), Thought, reference and Experience: themes from the philosophy of Garret Evans, Clarendon Press Oxford. McDowell, John (2008). Avoiding the Myth of the Given. In Jakob Lindgaard (ed.), John McDowell: Experience, Norm, and Nature. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing McDowell, J. (2009) The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as material for a Transcendental Argument En The Engaged Intellect Harvard University Press Niikawa, T. (2006) Naïve Realism and the Explanatory Role of Visual Phenomenology Peacocke, C (1992). A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Peacocke, C (1998). Nonconceptual content defended. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58 Peacocke, C (2001a). Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content? The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 98, No. 5: 239-264. Peacocke, C (2001b). Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 62, No. 3 Sellars, W. 1956 Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Schellenberg, S. (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience Philosophical Studies 149 Schellenberg, S. (2011). Perceptual Content Defended. Noûs Schellenberg, S (2015) A Defense of Content View Schellenberg, S (2018) The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence Oxford University Press Siegel, S (2010). The Contents of Perception. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Soteriou, M. (2016) Disjunctivism: New Problems of Philosophy Routledge Speaks, J. (2005). Is There A Problem About Non-Conceptual Content. Philosophical Review 114 Speaks, J (2009). Transparency, Intentionalism and the Nature of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXIX No. 3 Speaks, J (2019). Content and The Explanatory Role of Experience Singular Thought and Mental Files Rachel Goodman (ed.) et al. Thompson, B (2006). Colour constancy and Russellian representationalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 84, No. 1: 75-94 Thornton, T. (2019) John McDowell, second edition Routledge Travis, C (2004). The Silence of the Senses. Mind, Vol. 113, No. 449. Travis, C (2007). Reason‘s Reach. The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 15, No. 2 |
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Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacionalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Ávila Cañamares, Ignacioc575e219698844afc26605a8dd1a280eMurillo Villa, Alberto Sebastián1dc50500d8bb79061b0321cb7ac217282024-01-30T19:16:39Z2024-01-30T19:16:39Z2023https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/85534Universidad Nacional de ColombiaRepositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombiahttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/En este trabajo se busca defender una aproximación de corte intencionalista en el debate en torno al carácter presentacional de la experiencia y su rol explicativo que se presenta entre las diversas variantes disyuntivistas con respecto a la experiencia perceptual. Así, se pretende mostrar la posibilidad de articular una respuesta a la pregunta por el rol de la experiencia con respecto a nuestro pensamiento acerca de objetos que no sólo sea disyuntivista, sino que suscriba el principio representacional y que, a su vez, sea compatible con una versión conceptualista del intencionalismo. La idea general tiene que ver con mostrar que la aproximación disyuntivista de McDowell posee herramientas que le permiten contestar a las críticas que desde el relacionalismo se le plantean a su exposición a propósito del rol explicativo de la experiencia. (Texto tomado de la fuente)This paper seeks to defend an intentionalist approach in the debate about the presentational character of experience and its explanatory role that arises among the various disjunctivist variants with respect to perceptual experience. Thus, it is intended to show the possibility of articulating an answer to the question of the role of experience with respect to our thinking about objects that is not only disjunctivist, but that subscribes to the representational principle and is compatible with a conceptualist version of intentionalism. The general idea has to do with showing that McDowell's disjunctivist approach possesses tools that allow him to answer the criticisms that relationalism has raised against his exposition regarding the explanatory role of experience.MaestríaMagíster en FilosofíaMente, lenguaje y Ciencia cognitiva79 páginasapplication/pdfspaUniversidad Nacional de ColombiaBogotá - Ciencias Humanas - Maestría en FilosofíaFacultad de Ciencias HumanasBogotá, ColombiaUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotá120 - Epistemología, causalidad, humanidad::121 - Epistemología (Teoría del conocimiento)REPRESENTACION (FILOSOFIA)INTENCIONALIDAD (FILOSOFIA)Representacion (Philosophy)Intentionality (Philosophy)RepresentacionalismoDisyuntivismoRol explicativoConceptualismoRepresetationalismDisjunctivismExplanatory roleConceptualismDisyuntivismo representacionalista y el rol explicativo de la experienciaRepresentationalist disjunctivism and the explanatory role of experienceTrabajo de grado - Maestríainfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionTexthttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TMÁvila, I. Filosofía Contemporánea de la percepción: Algunas tendenciasBermúdez, J (2012). Nonconceptual Mental Content. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)Byrne, A (2004). Perception and Conceptual Content. In E. Sosa and M. Steup (eds.), contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell PublishingChalmers, D (2006). Perception and the Fall from Eden. In Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University PressCrane, T (1992). The Nonconceptual Content of Experience. In Tim Crane (ed.) The Contents of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Crane, T (2003). The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines, and Mental Representation (Second edition). London: Routledge.Crane, T (2006). Is there a perceptual relation? In Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Crane, T (2009). Is Perception A Propositional Attitude? The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 59Crane, T (2011). The problem of perception. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Campbell, J. (2002). Berkeley´s Puzzle. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. MIT PressCampbell, J. 2002. Consciousness and Reference . Oxford: Clarendon PressDavidson, D 1973 A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. En: Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.Davidson, D 1974 On the very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47: 5–20; reprinted in Davidson 2001bEvans, Gareth (1982). The Varieties of Reference. John McDowell (Ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.Fish, W. 2010 Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction. NY and London: RoutledgeFodor, J 1986 Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of MindFrege, G (1952). On Sense and Reference. In P.T. Geach and Max Black (eds.), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Blackwell. (Original work published 1892)Heck, R (2000). Nonconceptual content and the Space of Reasons. The Philosophical Review 109Kelly, S. (2001a). The Non-Conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain. Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchMartin, M. (2002) The Content of Perception Oxford: Oxford University Press.Martin, M. (1992). Perception, Concepts and Memory. Philosophical Review Vol. 101McAllister. (2019) Conceptualism and Concept AcquisitionMcDowell, J. (1986) Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space Cambridge: En Meaning, Knowledge and Reality, ed. John McDowell. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998McDowell, J. (1987) In defense of Modesty, Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University PressMcDowell, J (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.McDowell, John; (1997) Another Plea for Modesty, Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University PressMcDowell, J. (2000). Experiencing the World. En: Reason and Nature, ed. Marcus Willascheck. Münster: LIT VERLAG, 2000McDowell, John (2005) Evans‘s Frege, En: Bermudez, José Luis (ed.), Thought, reference and Experience: themes from the philosophy of Garret Evans, Clarendon Press Oxford.McDowell, John (2008). Avoiding the Myth of the Given. In Jakob Lindgaard (ed.), John McDowell: Experience, Norm, and Nature. Oxford: Blackwell PublishingMcDowell, J. (2009) The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as material for a Transcendental Argument En The Engaged Intellect Harvard University PressNiikawa, T. (2006) Naïve Realism and the Explanatory Role of Visual PhenomenologyPeacocke, C (1992). A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT PressPeacocke, C (1998). Nonconceptual content defended. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58Peacocke, C (2001a). Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content? The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 98, No. 5: 239-264.Peacocke, C (2001b). Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 62, No. 3Sellars, W. 1956 Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Schellenberg, S. (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience Philosophical Studies 149Schellenberg, S. (2011). Perceptual Content Defended. NoûsSchellenberg, S (2015) A Defense of Content ViewSchellenberg, S (2018) The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence Oxford University PressSiegel, S (2010). The Contents of Perception. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)Soteriou, M. (2016) Disjunctivism: New Problems of Philosophy RoutledgeSpeaks, J. (2005). Is There A Problem About Non-Conceptual Content. Philosophical Review 114Speaks, J (2009). Transparency, Intentionalism and the Nature of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXIX No. 3Speaks, J (2019). Content and The Explanatory Role of Experience Singular Thought and Mental Files Rachel Goodman (ed.) et al.Thompson, B (2006). Colour constancy and Russellian representationalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 84, No. 1: 75-94Thornton, T. (2019) John McDowell, second edition RoutledgeTravis, C (2004). The Silence of the Senses. Mind, Vol. 113, No. 449.Travis, C (2007). Reason‘s Reach. The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 15, No. 2LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-85879https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/bitstream/unal/85534/1/license.txteb34b1cf90b7e1103fc9dfd26be24b4aMD51ORIGINAL1072663611.2023.pdf1072663611.2023.pdfapplication/pdf1004273https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/bitstream/unal/85534/2/1072663611.2023.pdf770e68450fbd712001b4030daf4e0379MD52THUMBNAIL1072663611.2023.pdf.jpg1072663611.2023.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg3934https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/bitstream/unal/85534/3/1072663611.2023.pdf.jpgbf87710c1f1ad5d577e63a49878a13dfMD53unal/85534oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/855342024-08-22 23:10:08.249Repositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de 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