A weak version of Barberà-Kelly's Theorem
Lifting preferences over candidates to preferences over sets of candidates allows us to give a very natural notion of manipulability for social choice functions. In particular, we give simple conditions over the liftings entailing the manipulability of reasonable social choice functions. Our result...
- Autores:
-
Leal, Jahn Franklin
Pino Pérez, Ramón
- Tipo de recurso:
- Article of journal
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2017
- Institución:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Repositorio:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/66430
- Acceso en línea:
- https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/66430
http://bdigital.unal.edu.co/67458/
- Palabra clave:
- 51 Matemáticas / Mathematics
Preferences
Manipulation
Social Choice
Merging
Preferencias
Manipulación
Elección Social
Fusión
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
| Summary: | Lifting preferences over candidates to preferences over sets of candidates allows us to give a very natural notion of manipulability for social choice functions. In particular, we give simple conditions over the liftings entailing the manipulability of reasonable social choice functions. Our result is a weak version of Barberà and Kelly's Theorem, indeed it can be obtained from this last Theorem. However, we give a direct and very natural proof of our manipulability Theorem which is informative about the nature of the liftings allowing manipulability. |
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